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Abstract
The international issue of climate change is appearing on domestic agendas with 
increasing regularity. More than one hundred nations have now ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (the 
Kyoto Protocol), which entered into force on the 16th of February 2005. The 
importance of the domestic climate change policy process of developed countries is 
therefore increasing.
Reduction of emissions must take place at the national or sub-national level. 
International negotiations cannot make reductions; they can only direct that 
reductions take place. Therefore any international agreement must be enacted into 
national law for its objectives to be met. An understanding of the factors that 
influence policy selection will help us to identify what makes an international treaty 
successful on the national front. Governments, including the United States, are 
agreed that climate change is an important issue. While each has the same range of 
policy instruments at their disposal, each chooses to address the problem in different 
ways.
This thesis focuses on the influence that differing political and legal cultures exert on 
the development and selection of climate change policies in the United Kingdom and 
California. It draws on qualitative data collected through interviews with key players 
in the policy process in the subject jurisdictions in conjunction with analysis of 
relevant documents, official and otherwise.
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The study suggests that the political and legal culture of a jurisdiction plays a major 
role in the determination of policy, providing new and valuable insights into the 
policy-making process in the. subject jurisdictions. Its findings constitute an argument 
for giving greater consideration to political and legal cultural issues during 
international negotiations with the aim of framing international agreements with a 
greater potential for adoption into domestic law.
This thesis covers the period up to December 2004. Any significant developments 
between December 2004 and August 2007 affecting the research or the conclusions 
reached herein have been noted in footnotes.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
/ .  Introduction
This thesis is a socio-legal study of the role of culture in the formation of climate 
change policy in the European Union and the United States of America covering the 
period up to December 2004. The topic demands a socio-legal analysis because legal 
aspects of climate change cannot be fully understood unless we see them in their 
social, economic and cultural contexts. As these contexts vary and change over time 
because of the change in political configurations and the state of scientific 
knowledge, law will be called upon to undertake new and potentially unforeseen 
challenges. However, climate change is an emerging field of study in which law has 
yet fully to develop its role. If therefore this thesis relied only on legal analysis the 
picture derived would be partial and incomplete. Indeed, it would hardly inform 
debate and policy formation and, in fact, could possibly hinder it. It is only through 
examining this nascent area of law and policy in these various contexts that we are 
able to understand how the field is evolving.
Socio-legal study or the analysis of law and society can be traced back to Max 
Weber’s work on law and society in the early 20th century (Weber 1978), but has 
really come to fruition in the last 20 years. It grew out of the study of legal history led 
primarily by Professor J Willard Hurst of the University of Wisconsin. Hurst was a 
legal historian, but “his influential works on that subject pointed the way to the social
study of law in American Society”1 (Macaulay, Friedman et al 1995:12). Socio-legal 
study exists because the operation or function of law, while it produces a rich array 
of fruits for doctrinal analysis, really only yields empirically useful results when 
studied within the context of its operation. The field of administrative decision 
making and law has been a particularly fertile one for socio-legal research. Examples 
of recent work include studies of decision making by immigration officers (Gilboy 
1991) and the regulation of the telecommunications industry (Hall, Scott et al 1999). 
The product of this research has informed the development of policy formation as 
well as evaluating the utility of it.
2. Topic and Field o f Study
By its very nature climate change is transnational. It does not lend itself to domestic 
analysis. There are other areas where transnational government cooperation is 
required — such as tax and law enforcement. But the way to distinguish climate 
change from the others is that tax and law enforcement are social constructs. They 
don’t exist unless someone defines them; the effects of climate change are in stark 
terms “brute facts”. They happen whether we acknowledge them or not. The issue is 
that we are only beginning to understand the scientific aspects of climate change. We 
have a two-fold problem; on the one hand we are trying to capture what is happening 
in physical and scientific terms in respect to climate change and on the other hand, as 
we learn more about these aspects, we are impelled to create policy. Policy and law in 
relation to climate change therefore always lag behind our interpretation of the 
scientific data. This lag means that the climate change field is open textured and is
1 See Hurst, J W (1950). The Growth o f American Law: The Law Makers. Boston, Little, Brown & 
Co.; Hurst, J W (1960). Law and Social Process in United States History. Ann Arbor, University o f  
Michigan.
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necessarily a site of struggle between the competing elements that constitute the 
members of the climate change field.
According to Pierre Bourdieu a field cannot be defined outside of the context in 
which it is set. It “consists of a set of objective, historical relations between positions 
anchored in certain forms of power (capital)” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). In the 
area of climate change policy the field consists of governments, scientists, 
accountants, lawyers, businesses, NGOs, the press - really anyone who has any 
interest in how this policy develops or is affected by its development. All of these 
groups are struggling over power and who is going to have it. Having this power 
gives them control over the direction policy development takes.
“Climate Change represents an oddity in government policy. It is a policy that must 
be sustained over a long period of time and governments are not good at long-term 
strategy” (Macrory 2001 Ini). Despite this they are compelled to develop policies. 
Governments around the world have accepted they need to take action. They are 
using a wide range of the various policy options at their disposal from “Command 
and Control”2 legislation, such as the UK’s Climate Change Levy, to “market based 
instruments”3, such as the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, to “voluntary
2 A “‘Command-and-Control’ regime is in essence a regulatory approach whereby the government 
‘commands’ pollution reductions (e.g. by setting emissions standards) and ‘controls’ how these 
reductions are achieved (e.g. through the installation o f specific pollution-control technologies)” Cole, 
D  H and P Z Grossman (1999). "When is Command-and-Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology 
and the Comparative Efficiency o f Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection." 
Wisconsin Law Review: 887.
3 Market-based instruments are regulations that are designed to influence behavior through price 
signals rather than through explicit instructions on pollution control levels or methods. These policy 
instruments, such as tradable permits or pollution charges, are often described as “harnessing market 
forces” because if they are properly implemented, they encourage firms or individuals, through 
economic incentives, to undertake pollution control efforts that are both in the financial self-interest 
o f the firm or individual and that collectively will meet the policy goals o f the government Stavins, R 
N  and B W Whitehead (1997). Market-Based Environmental Policies. Thinking Ecologically The next
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agreements”4 such as the California Climate Action Registry. This thesis attempts to 
understand why the subject jurisdictions have chosen their specific combination of 
policy instruments. The difficulty of developing and maintaining a long-term strategy 
is made worse by a number of short-term hurdles that governments face in order to 
see their climate change policies enacted. Climate change is new, controversial and 
cross-departmental; governments face these hurdles no matter what their stated 
position on climate change.
Governments only started to address climate change seriously in the 1980s and the 
most significant policy developments have occurred in the last ten or fifteen years. 
The United Kingdom and California were two of the first jurisdictions in the World 
to respond to the challenges presented by climate change in 1989 and 1988 
respectively. It is only recently that there has been enough confidence in the scientific 
predictions for governments to proceed with policies that require companies to take 
action.
Controversy around the development of climate change policy has raged since 
governments first started debating the issue. There have been arguments about 
whether climate change is actually happening, whether we can or should do anything 
about it, and if we are going to do something about it whether we are doing the right 
thing. The European Union and the United States of America argued at the Kyoto 
negotiations about the best way to combat the increasing emissions of greenhouse
generation o f  environmental policy. M R Chertow and D  C Esty. New Haven, Yale University Press,: 
271.
4 A voluntary agreement is an agreement between government and industry to facilitate voluntary 
action with a desirable social outcome, which is encouraged by the government, to be undertaken by 
the participant based on the participant’s self interest. OECD (1997). Voluntary Agreements With 
Industry. Annex I Expert Group on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
Working Paper. Paris, OECD. ELNI, Ed. (1998). Environmental Agreements The Role and Effect o f  
Environmental Agreements in Environmental Policy. London, Cameron May Ltd.
11
gases; the US wanted to be able to use economic instruments and the EU opposed 
the use of these so-called flexible mechanisms. Now the US has withdrawn from the 
Kyoto Protocol and the only way the EU is going to make its commitments is 
through these flexible mechanisms. There has been subsequent vociferous 
opposition from business in Europe at the level of the targets that have been set 
under the EU emissions trading scheme.
In order for governments to make their proposed policies work, people in different 
government departments with different responsibilities have to communicate and 
work together. If government departments don’t work together you end up with 
something like the United Kingdom’s Climate Change Levy; a tax which it is 
generally agreed delayed the introduction of the UK’s climate change programme and 
resulted in an emissions trading scheme that was overly complicated and not very 
effective.
Given these difficulties it is surprising that governments have managed to develop 
any policies at all. An understanding of how governments have dealt with these 
difficulties and the cultural factors that have been central in responding to these 
challenges is important so that we can understand how future policies might develop. 
Policies are not formed in a vacuum, so it is essential not to study them in a vacuum. 
It is necessary that we examine factors that surround and influence the sector that we 
are studying. Philip Stott, a leading contrarian geologist in the field of climatology, 
has recognised that it is cultural differences between the US and the EU that have led 
to different policy responses (Stott 2004).
According to Pierre Bourdieu, the juridical field, like all other fields, is “organised 
around a body of internal protocols and assumptions, characteristic of behaviours 
and self-sustaining values — what we might informally term a ‘legal culture’” 
(Bourdieu 1987: 806).
This dissertation looks at the policy options chosen by the United Kingdom and 
California to try and understand the legal culture of the subject jurisdictions and 
therefore the reasons why specific policies were chosen. These jurisdictions are 
placed in context with a historical review of the science and international politics 
behind the development of international climate change policies and an examination 
of the policy framework in the European Union and the United States of America. 
By placing the policies of California and the United Kingdom in the context in which 
they were set, talking to the people involved in the policy making process and 
examining the socio-legal reasons behind policy selection, we are better able to 
understand why the policies were selected and then to develop new policies that will 
work in each specific jurisdiction.
Very little academic attention has been paid to the practicalities of the democratic 
decision-making process. Researchers have seemed generally uninterested in making 
generalised predictions about actual political decision making. Buchanan and Tullock 
posit that this may be because, at least in part, there is an implicit assumption that 
participants seek to further the “public interest” without ever actually defining 
“public interest” (Macaulay, Friedman et al 1995:129). In a policy area like climate 
change, where policy makers are faced with the difficulties identified above, there is 
no agreed definition of public interest. All sides of the debate claim they are the best 
placed to look after the public interest.
Certainly, President George W Bush believed he was representing the best interest of 
Americans when he announced that he would not seek Senate ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol and that voluntary commitments by industry would be sufficient to 
combat climate change. But politicians in California believe they have the best 
interests of the citizens of the state in mind when they enact policies that limit 
tailpipe emissions and mandate minimum renewable energy requirements. Both of 
these jurisdictions agree that climate change is a problem and it needs to be 
addressed. They both represent the same population, albeit at different levels of 
government, yet they have very different views on how best to serve the public 
interest.
In the European Union there is not the clear dichotomy. Both the United Kingdom 
and the European Union have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. But they have responded 
to the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in different ways; both created 
emissions trading schemes but they were different, encompassing different gases and 
different industries.
3. Methodology
3a . M u l t i -p e r s p e c t iv e
It is important to understand differences and similarities in the legal culture of the 
subject jurisdictions. This thesis looks to explain why the subject jurisdictions have 
selected the specific policy instruments they have in order to meet their climate 
change objectives.5 It does this through an analysis of the political and legal culture of
5 This research does not attempt to determine whether these policies have been effective or whether 
they were the right polices for the subject jurisdictions.
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each jurisdiction. Since this thesis is an interdisciplinary study, it draws on aspects of 
comparative law, sociology, history, political science and anthropology. It attempts to 
elaborate on the issues behind the selection of policy instruments. It will examine the 
extra-legal aspects of the legislative process, especially the cultural inputs. Every 
country’s legal system is different and they vary according to cultural tradition, 
economics and politics (Macaulay, Friedman et al 1995:9)
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3 b . D o c u m e n t a r y  So u r c e s 6
To do this, this study was a product of multi-research techniques and a variety of 
data collection methods were used. Climate change was placed in its scientific and 
historical context analysing the contents of various international and multilateral 
foundational documents including:
• The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (the 
Climate Change Convention);
• The Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Change Convention (the Kyoto 
Protocol);
• Documents prepared by the subject governments that have been filed 
with:
■ The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC);
■ The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC); and
■ The European Union (EU); and
• Law review, newspaper and magazine articles
The domestic climate change programmes of the subject jurisdictions were analysed 
to provide the current state of climate change regulation.7 To do this the following 
types of domestic foundational documents were analysed:
• Preparatory documents - Papers prepared for submission to the
Conferences of the Parties (COPs);
• Legislation prepared by the subject jurisdictions to meet their climate 
change obligations;
• Documents' prepared by government departments of the subject
jurisdictions which discuss their climate change policies;
• Constitutions of the subject jurisdictions, both written and unwritten; 
and
• Comments made by organisations interested in the subject jurisdictions’ 
climate change programmes.
To obtain empirical data, interviews were conducted with individuals in the subject 
jurisdictions.
6 The importance o f the documents identified in this section will be explained through-out the thesis.
7 Only those policies that specifically have as their purpose climate change mitigation were examined 
in this research. The author recognises that many different policy areas will have an effect on a 
jurisdiction’s greenhouse gas emissions but an examination o f  the political and legal cultural factors 
behind the development o f  climate change policy requires that only those policies specifically 
developed to address climate change be studied
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To understand the unwritten and subde manoeuvres that lie behind the selection of 
policy instruments I interviewed a range of people involved in the selection, rejection, or 
advocacy of various policy instruments. Qualitative methods of research were chosen 
because the current literature is inadequate to tell the complete story. The full political 
and cultural ramifications of the story can only be learned through conducting a 
contemporary oral history of the climate change project. An oral history provides the 
narrative thread that enables us to interpret the varieties of official documentation. It is 
through this qualitative analysis that an ethnographic description is built that will then 
allow me to “decode the “unwritten musical score according to which the actions of 
agents, each of whom believes she is improvising her own melody are organised”” 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:8).
To do this, I have interviewed people in the following groups:
• Government agencies;
• NGOs;
• The press;
• Multinational corporations;
• Trade associations;
• Market makers; and
• Independent Advisors such as lawyers, accountants, consultants and 
economists.
These groups were chosen through an initial review of newspaper, magazine and 
journal articles that discussed developments in the subject jurisdictions’ climate 
change policy. Specifically, I was looking for groups interested enough in climate 
change policy to comment to the press or write on any of these developments. After 
the relevant groups were identified, a combination of sources was used to develop a 
set of initial people to be interviewed. These sources included:
• Government officials involved in the development of climate change 
policy;
• Attendees at international climate change negotiations;
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• Speakers’ lists from relevant conferences;
• Participants in government committees;
• Senior officers of climate change, environmental and government policy 
NGOs;
• Heads of relevant departments in multinational corporations; and
• Individuals referenced in newspaper, magazine or journal articles.
The initial set of potential interviewees was then reviewed and confirmed with James 
Cameron, a world recognised expert in climate change policy (Thomas 2002 Ini). The 
contact details for most of the potential interviewees were relatively easy to find 
through searches on the World Wide Web. There were problems finding a few 
people who had just changed government departments or joined new companies. 
Only one person in all those I contacted refused to speak with me or provide another 
person within his organisation.
Names of additional potential interviewees were collected through snowball 
sampling. At the completion of each interview, the interviewees were asked to 
identify other potential interviewees. These people were then contacted to arrange a 
possible interview. Interviews were conducted until such time as no new people or 
no additional relevant information was forthcoming.
The interviews were focused semi-structured interviews that allowed the respondents 
to frame their responses within their own terms of reference and so not preclude 
anything of interest and use. It was not intended that the interviews be a random 
sample. Not only was the research of a preliminary nature, but I aimed to capture 
individuals from the leading groups involved in the policy selection process, thus 
trying to ensure that no salient individual or organisation was omitted and the field 
destroyed. Pierre Bourdieu has emphasized “the importance of capturing the salient 
members of a field, otherwise a researcher risks ‘mutilating the object [he/she has]
set out to construct”’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:243; Flood and Boon 1999:603). 
Interviews were tape-recorded when the interviewee allowed this and generally lasted 
between one and two hours.
We discussed only those jurisdictions that were relevant to the particular interviewee. 
Some of the interviewees were only involved in the policy process in one jurisdiction, 
but they may have had thoughts on or experiences with other jurisdictions. Each of 
the interviewees’ answers led to more relevant questions. As there was a large 
amount of information available on the policy instruments used by each subject 
jurisdiction and statements made by the interviewees’ organisation it was possible to 
triangulate sources and to test the reliability of the data obtained from the 
interviewees.
4 . The Thesis and Its Structure
Because the field of climate change policy is necessarily emerging and transnational, 
the approach I’ve taken to try and capture these elements is to compare the key 
members of the field namely the EU and the US. Because these are overarching 
political structures of a federal kind, in order to comprehend the dynamics of policy 
formation in climate change I selected two salient units of these structures, namely 
the United Kingdom and California.
I t  is the core of this thesis that the main responses to climate change have been a mix 
of public and private policies. Policy formation in this area embraces both the public 
and private sectors. It is vital to understand the interaction of the two. The reason it 
is necessary to take a cultural approach is because the commitment of states and
entities to different approaches varies according to social, political and economic 
aspects. As a contrast with other areas of administrative decision making and 
regulatory activity, such as immigration, which tend to be finally located in one field, 
namely the state sector, climate change by its very nature must be located in both the 
state and private sectors. This can be understood when we come to look at how 
climate change occurs and who affects climate change policy.
The research is arranged in three parts. The first part provides background on the 
development of climate change as an issue. Included in this part are the science of 
climate change and the history of climate change as an international issue, bringing 
the reader up to February 2004. Information on the development of the science and 
the history surrounding the development of international climate change policy was 
gathered through archival analysis of government documents and documents 
produced by groups attempting to influence the legislative process surrounding the 
development of international climate change policy.8
The second section contains the case studies of the United Kingdom and California 
and the contextual chapters on the European Union and the United States of 
America. The case studies examine in detail why each of these jurisdictions have 
chosen their specific collection of policy instruments. The contextual chapters 
provide the setting for the case studies. These chapters review the history of climate 
change policy in the EU and the US and lay out these jurisdictions’ current climate 
change policy. The commentary on these policies was obtained from various news 
sources around the world. Interviews were not conducted for these jurisdictions
8 This is a PhD is in law and policy and therefore the underlying scientific literature has not been 
reviewed as it is beyond the expertise o f the author. In addition, the many interviewees have stated 
that they rely on summaries and commentaries on the current state o f the scientific research.
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directly. However, they often were addressed in interviews for the case study 
jurisdictions. If any relevant information was obtained during the interviews it was 
included where appropriate in these chapters.
The final part provides the concluding analysis. This part reminds the reader of the 
context in which the research was set and reviews the results of the analysis of the 
subject jurisdictions. The dominant members of the field are identified, as are the 
members whose power is waning. It is this former group that will set the agenda for 
the development of policy in the subject jurisdictions. Understanding of their roles as 
perceived by other members of the field as well as themselves is essential to 
understanding how policies have developed in the past and how they may develop in 
the future. This may sound obvious but it is only by studying the things we take for 
granted that we can really understand them (Bourdieu 1987: 810-811).
A set of appendices provides short chapters on the political and legal structure of the 
subject jurisdictions as they relate to the development of the jurisdictions’ climate 
change policies. The chapters on the EU and the US also examine the relationship 
each entity has with the case study jurisdiction. There are also appendices that 
identify the individuals interviewed for this dissertation and provide a list of 
abbreviations.
The range of states considered in this research is restricted to those states in Annex I 
to the Climate Change Convention9 and their political subdivisions. This has been
9 Annex I states are Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, 
European Economic Community, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
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done because Annex I states are currently the primary emitters of the greenhouse 
gases regulated under the Kyoto Protocol.10 Without the participation of these 
countries there could be no solution to the climate change problem.
Several criteria were used in the choice of the European Union, the United Kingdom, 
the United States of America and California as the primary empirical focus. In 
particular these jurisdictions exhibit different characteristics essential to the 
comparative assessment of why different legal instruments are chosen to respond to 
the demands of climate change as an international and domestic political issue. 
Specifically these jurisdictions:
• Are all Annex 1 states;
• Have distinctive political systems and patterns of relations between 
state and civil society;
• Experience distinctive sets of global and regional influences on policy 
formulation and implementation;
• Demonstrate common as well as divergent responses to global 
warming; and
• Have declared climate change policy orientations that range along a 
continuum from pro-active to wait-and-see.
The European Union negotiated the Kyoto protocol as a block; when examining the 
EU’s climate change policy it is important to understand why it did this. There are a 
number of issues to consider including:
• Climate change is an area of mixed competence in the European 
Union;
• Negotiating for an EU-wide target allowed some members states to 
increase their greenhouse gas emissions while others decreased theirs;
• The disadvantage of negotiating as a single entity is that everything 
must be agreed by the collective and then presented to the 
international community;
Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom o f  Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States o f America.
10 OECD countries are currently responsible for two-thirds o f emissions o f  greenhouse gases. 
Developing countries are growing quickly and it is forecast that by 2025 their emissions will account 
for two-thirds o f the global emissions o f greenhouse gases Sharing the Greenhouse (1997). The 
"Economist.
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• The Member States have very different requirements when it comes 
to climate change policies;
• The Commission has limited authority in key areas for solving climate 
change, namely tax and energy policy;
• The Commission and the Member States are constantly battling for 
power; and
• Each Member State is distinctive in its location within the power 
hierarchy in the EU.
I have chosen to examine the United Kingdom’s climate change policies because it 
was an early mover in developing national policies and advocating international 
action. The UK first studied the potential ramifications of climate change on its 
economy before many other European countries and before the EU. It developed 
and launched an emissions trading scheme before any other European country, 
giving industry based in the UK the opportunity to learn about carbon trading before 
the EU scheme came into effect. On the international stage from Margaret Thatcher 
to Tony Blair UK Prime Ministers have advocated action. It has acted as a bridge 
between the US and the rest of the European Union attempting to broker an 
international agreement in the face of often diametrically opposing views.
When assessing the United States’ response to climate change it is important to 
consider the activities of the states as well as the federal government because:
• The US federal government is a government of limited powers and 
therefore will not be able to mandate all of the cuts necessary to meet its 
Kyoto obligations;
• The role of the federal government and the relationship with the states is 
constantly changing (e.g. federalism);
• All states will have obligations for cutting their greenhouse gas emissions 
set by the federal government;
• Each state is distinctive in its location within the power hierarchy in the 
US; and
• The different migration patterns in the states have had an effect on the 
development of the political and legal culture.
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I have chosen to look specifically at the state of California because California 
established its equivalent of the Environmental Protection Agency before the federal 
Clean Air Act was passed. Because of this it can take action beyond that taken by the 
federal government under the Clean Air Act. Also, if California chooses to take 
action, other states may opt into California’s programme. Although California has 
not necessarily been the most active state in combating greenhouse gases recendy, it 
has a long history of working to reduce carbon dioxide emission because of its batde 
with air pollution. California is also the fifth largest economy in world. Its individual 
emissions exceed many signatories to the Kyoto Protocol. Any action that California 
decides to take will have an effect on global emissions.
It is this profile of similarities and differences that makes the choice of the United 
Kingdom and California a useful study of the differential impacts of culture on the 
selection of policy instruments used to meet the demands climate change place on 
the international and domestic political agenda.
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Chapter 2 - The Science o f Climate Change
“Climate change is a historical fact, as illustrated by the ice ages. Part of the 
controversy today is the extent to which human activities are responsible for changes 
in the climate system” (Shogren and Toman 2000:5). While there are many 
uncertainties, scientists generally agree “ [e]missions of greenhouse gases and aerosols 
due to human activities continue to alter the atmosphere in ways that are expected to 
affect the climate” (IPCC 2001 a: 5).
Scientists have been studying the warming of the earth’s surface for almost 175 years. 
“As early as 1827 the French scientist Fourier suggested that the Earth’s atmosphere 
warms the surface by letting through high-energy solar radiation but trapping part of 
the longer-wave heat radiation coming back from the surface” (Grubb, Vrolijk et al 
1999:3). “The greenhouse effect is caused by the Sun’s radiation that is reflected off 
the Earth’s surface and trapped by carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) in the atmosphere. This natural greenhouse effect increases the global mean 
temperature by about 15°C; warm enough to sustain life on Earth. By burning fossil 
fuels and releasing more C 0 2 into the atmosphere, humans have altered this basic 
mechanism leading to an additional human induced greenhouse effect also known as 
‘global warming’” (Oberthiir and Ott 1999:3).
The current state of scientific research on climate change is addressed by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Its reports are the authoritative 
assessment of the state of climate change research around the world. The IPCC 
issued its Third Assessment Report (TAR) in October 2001. It “addresse[d] policy 
relevant to scientific, technical, and socio-economic dimensions of climate change. It
concentrate[d] on findings since 1995 and pa[id] attention to both regional and global 
scales, including non-English literature to the extent possible” (USD 2001:2). It 
found “about three-quarters of the anthropogenic emissions of C 0 2 to the 
atmosphere during the past 20 years is due to fossil fuel burning”(IPCC 2001a:7). 
And that “globally, it is very likely that the 1990s was the warmest decade and 1998 
the warmest year in the instrumental record, since 1861” (IPCC 2001a:2).
The Beginning of Climate Change Research
Svante August Arrhenius, a Swedish chemist and Noble Laureate, published the first 
major scientific article recognising global warming in 1896. He found “that the 
carbon divide allows solar radiation to pass unimpeded through the atmosphere, but 
sequesters a portion of the energy (heat) as it is reradiated by the Earth” (Bernarde 
1992:2). Arrhenius also calculated that the doubling of C 0 2 would produce a 6°F 
(3.3°C) increase in mean global surface temperature (Bernarde 1992:2).
Arrhenius’ findings did not lead to more research. In fact, climate change as an area 
of research attracted very little interest until the late 1950s. In 1956 Gilbert Plass of 
Johns Hopkins University challenged the then common belief that “water vapor 
absorbed as much of the sun’s long-wave radiation as carbon dioxide” (Bernarde 
1992:2). This re-examination established C 0 2 as the major “greenhouse gas”. He 
found that a “relatively small change in the average temperature can have a large 
effect on the climate” (Bernarde 1992:2). Finally, in this same paper, Plass noted that 
“the burning of fossil fuel . . . had greatly disturbed the C 0 2 balance. If all this 
additional C 0 2 remains in the atmosphere, there will be 30% more C 0 2 in the 
atmosphere at the end of the twentieth century that at the beginning. Man’s activities 
are increasing the average temperature by 1.1 °C per century” (Bernarde 1992:3).
The building of a Scientific Consensus
The International Geophysical Year, 1957, “provided the foundation for a global 
scientific community dedicated to understanding planetary processes and human 
influence on them, and established a network of monitoring stations” (Grubb, 
Vrolijk et al 1999:4). It also provided the necessary funding to get many projects 
started (Keeling 1998). Roger Revelle and Hans Suess of the Scripps Institute of 
Oceanography questioned the then common assumption that the oceans absorbed 
the vast majority of the anthropogenic C 0 2 (Mintzer and Leonard 1994:46). They 
warned, in language that would later be echoed by Margaret Thatcher, that “[h]uman 
beings are now carrying out a large-scale geophysical experiment of a kind that could 
not have happened in the past nor be repeated in the future” (Bernarde 1992:3). They 
went on to say “within a few centuries we are returning to the atmosphere and 
oceans the concentrated organic carbon stored in the sedimentary rocks over 
hundreds of millions of years” (Bernarde 1992:3). This article appeared in the 
obscure Swedish journal Tellus read only by research meteorologists and geo­
climatologists. It would be more than 30 years before its significance was recognised 
(Bernarde 1992:3).
Charles Keeling and Robert Bacastow, also of the Scripps Institute of Oceanography, 
started the first significant scientific experiment to measure the change in C 0 2 in the 
atmosphere. Their research, also funded through the International Geophysical Year, 
placed gas analysers near the summit of Mauna Loa in Hawaii, the South Pole station 
of the US Antarctic Program and on ships and planes. The research lasted until 1978 
and conclusively proved for the first time that concentrations of C 0 2were increasing
in the atmosphere. Their research also disproved the commonly held assumption that 
large amounts of C 0 2 that were being emitted were being harmlessly absorbed into 
the oceans (Kopp and Thatcher 2000:5).
“If the severe economic and political repercussions that are likely on a world scale are 
to be avoided, a technological commitment must be made in the next few years and a 
world strategy arrived at with enlightenment and wisdom. Though humanity may not 
be able to foresee the consequences of the ‘great experiment’ clearly enough to 
control them, we cannot afford not to try!” (Bernarde 1992:2).
This is a warning issued by scientists from the US Department of Energy’s Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory in 1977. They predicted that by the year 2075 if C 0 2 
levels doubled then mean global temperatures would rise by 1° to 5°C. With limited 
urgency the scientists warned that society’s use of fossil fuels would “make it difficult 
. . . to adjust . . .  to non-fossil fuel use quickly enough to avoid eventual severe 
consequences” (Bernarde 1992:3).
The article however fell on “deaf ears” (Bernarde 1992:4). The scientists knew there 
was a potential problem, but no one was listening. Professor Daniel Bodansky in his 
seminal (Esty 2000:318) article, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change: A  Commentary said awareness was finally raised as the result of several 
scientific developments. First, Keeling and Bacastow’s data provided conclusive 
proof that C 0 2 levels were rising and the oceans were not absorbing it. Second, in 
the 1980s research to examine the role of other trace gases in global warming showed 
that gases such as methane, nitrous oxide, and chlorofluorocarbons had an effect 
roughly equal to that of C 0 2 “indicating that the problem was twice as serious as
previously thought” (Bodansky 1993:459). Third, increased computer power allowed 
the creation of more complex climatic models. The advent of satellite sensing data 
combined with the increase in computing power permitted scientists to represent the 
atmosphere in three dimensions and take into account some of the principle climatic 
feedback mechanisms. These new models gave scientists increased confidence in the 
accuracy of their predictions. Based on the new data in 1979 a US National Academy 
of Sciences panel concluded “that, if the concentration of carbon dioxide (sic) in the 
atmosphere continues to increase, ‘there is no reason to believe that these changes 
will be negligible’” (Bodansky 1994:47).
Bodansky posited that scientific evidence alone was probably not sufficient to spur 
the international community into action. He believed three things worked to catalyse 
government and public interest. First, a number of scientists publicised the threat of 
global warming. Second, the discovery of the ozone hole in 1987 demonstrated that 
anthropogenic activity could affect the global atmosphere. Third, the testimony of 
James Hanson, a NASA scientist, before a US Senate subcommittee in 1988 put 
climate change on the front page of most American newspapers (Bodansky 
1993:459).
Establishm ent of the IP C C
In 1985 the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) held a conference in 
Villach, Austria that recommended “the establishment of an Advisory Group on 
Greenhouse Gases ‘to make continuous scientific assessment and review of 
greenhouse gases and the progress being made to a more complete understanding of 
their nature and extent’. Against this background, the World Meteorological 
Organisation (WMO) Executive Council (in June 1988) paid particular attention to
establishing an intergovernmental mechanism to carry out internationally co­
ordinated scientific assessments of the magnitude, timing and potential impact of 
climate change and welcomed the initiatives of the Secretary-General in establishing 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and noted with appreciation 
the co-operation and positive response of the Executive Director of UNEP in this 
matter” (Director's Office World Climate Research Programme 2001).
Since its establishment in 1988, the IPCC has prepared a series of comprehensive 
assessments, special reports and technical papers, providing scientific information on 
climate change to the international community, including policy-makers and the 
general public. This information has played an important role in the negotiations 
under the UNFCCC.
“The purpose of the IPCC is to assess the scientific, technical and socio-economic 
information relevant to understanding the risks associated with human-induced 
climate change. The IPCC does not undertake new research, nor does it monitor 
climate-related data, but bases its assessments on published and peer-reviewed 
scientific and technical literature. Its Secretariat is located in Geneva and is staffed by 
both WMO and UNEP employees” (IISD 2001:1-2). The IPCC’s mission is to pool 
scientific and policy experts from as many countries as possible to create a consensus 
report on the current state of climate change research. Its members are both 
proponents and opponents of the science of climate change. Its reports are published 
every five years; all members of the panel agree the contents of these reports.
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The IPCC is a consensus-based organisation composed mostly of scientists. For this 
reason it is perceived to be a very conservative organisation (Cameron 2001 Int). It 
does not rush to judgement and is not known to overstate its concerns.
“The current structure of the IPCC includes three working groups and a Task Force 
on National Greenhouse Gas Inventories:
Working Group I addresses the scientific aspects of the climate system and climate 
change;
Working Group II addresses the scientific, technical, environmental, economic and 
social aspects of the vulnerability (sensitivity and adaptability) to climate change; and 
the negative and positive consequences (impacts) for ecological systems, socio­
economic sectors and human health, with an emphasis on regional sectoral and 
cross-sectoral issues; and
Working Group III assesses the scientific, technical, environmental, economic and 
social aspects of the mitigation of climate change, as well as the methodological 
aspects of crosscutting issues” (IISD 2001:2).
“The current Bureau of the IPCC was established in 1997. It has 30 members 
representing all six WMO regions (Africa, Asia, South America, North and Central 
America, South-West Pacific, Europe)” (USD 2001:2). One of the key documents 
produced by each of the Working Groups is the Summary for Policy Makers (SPM). 
These documents are meant to summarize their findings in a way in which policy 
makers and the general public can understand and use them. As the international 
politics of climate change is understood to have a greater impact on domestic policies
the preparation of the SPMs has become increasingly political with many delegations 
now staffed by professional diplomats rather than scientists.
The Current State of Scientific Research
The scientific community today has unprecedented consensus on the science of 
climate change. To encourage “individuals, businesses and governments . . .  to take 
prompt action to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases” sixteen academies of 
science11 issued a joint statement on the science of climate change in July 2001 (Royal 
Society 2001). This statement reaffirmed the position of the IPCC as “the world’s 
most reliable source of information on climate change and its causes” and struck out 
at the climate sceptics calling their doubts unjustifiable (Royal Society 2001). But 
Bjorn Lomborg whom I will discuss later has questioned this.
The most recent report from the IPCC, the Third Assessment Report (TAR), was 
finalised in October 2001.12 It, like the previous reports, is composed of three 
individual reports prepared by the Working Groups, a Summary for Policy Makers13 
(SPM) and technical summary of each working group report, and a Synthesis Report.
11 Australian Academy o f Sciences, Royal Flemish Academy o f Belgium for Sciences and the Arts, 
Brazilian Academy o f Sciences, Royal Society o f  Canada, Caribbean Academy o f Sciences, Chinese 
Academy o f Sciences, French Academy o f  Sciences, German Academy o f Natural Scientists 
Leopoldina, Indian National Science Academy, Indonesian Academy o f Sciences, Royal Irish 
Academy, Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei (Italy), Academy o f Sciences Malaysia, Academy Council o f  
the Royal Society o f New Zealand, Royal Swedish Academy o f Sciences, and Royal Society (UK).
12 There have been various special reports issued by the IPCC since the publication o f the TAR. These 
reports look at very specific issues such as technology transfer, Land Use, Land Use Change and 
Forestry, Clean Coal; they are not an assessment o f the status o f global scientific research on climate 
change as are the FAR, SAR, and TAR.
13 As this PhD is in law and policy, this review o f  the current state o f  scientific research is based on 
the Summaries for Policy Makers and not the underlying scientific research. The Summaries for 
Policies Makers are what the policy makers and policy influencers in the subject jurisdictions are 
relying on when discussing policy options so I am also relying on it.
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The Third Assessment Report of Working Group I (WGI) “builds upon past 
assessments and incorporates new results from the past five years of research on 
climate change.”14 The preparation and review of the WGI’s TAR involved the 
participation of 122 co-ordinating lead authors and lead authors, 515 contributing 
authors, 21 review editors and 337 expert reviewers. The Second Assessment Report 
(SAR) released in 1995 “concluded: ‘The balance of evidence suggests a discernible 
human influence on global climate’. That report also noted that the anthropogenic 
signal was still emerging from the background of natural climate variability. Since the 
SAR, progress has been made in reducing uncertainty, particularly with respect to 
distinguishing and quantifying the magnitude of responses to different external 
influences. Although many of the sources of uncertainty identified in the SAR still 
remain to some degree, new evidence and improved understanding support an 
updated conclusion” (IPCC 200la: 10).
Using this as its base the TAR of WGI described “the current state of understanding 
of the climate system and provide[d] estimates of its projected future evolution and 
their uncertainties” (IPCC 2001 a:2). It found “concentrations of atmospheric 
greenhouse gases and their radiative forcing have continued to increase as a result of 
human activities” (IPCC 2001a:7). The evidence to support this included among 
other things:
• “The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2) has increased by 
31% since 1750. The present C 0 2 concentration has not been exceeded 
during the past 420,000 years and likely not during the past 20 million years.
14 Climate change in IPCC usage refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural 
variability or as a result o f human activity. This usage differs from that in the Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, where climate change refers to a change o f climate that is attributed directly or 
indirectly to human activity that alters the composition o f  the global atmosphere and that is in 
addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.
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The current rate of increase is unprecedented during at least the past 20,000 
years;
• About three-quarters of the anthropogenic emissions of C 0 2 to the 
atmosphere during the past 20 years is due to fossil fuel burning. The rest is 
predominantly due to land-use change, especially deforestation;
• The atmospheric concentration of nitrous oxide (N20 ) has increased by 46 
ppb (17%) since 1750 and continues to increase. The present N 20  
concentration has not been exceeded during at least the past thousand years. 
About a third of current N 20  emissions are anthropogenic (e.g., agricultural 
soils, cattle feed lots and chemical industry);
• Since 1995, the atmospheric concentrations of many of those halocarbon 
gases that are both ozone-depleting and greenhouse gases (e.g., CFQj and 
O y y ,  are either increasing more slowly or decreasing, both in response to 
reduced emissions under the regulations of the Montreal Protocol and its 
Amendments. Their substitute compounds (e.g., CHF2Cj and CF3CH2F) and 
some other synthetic compounds (e.g., perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur 
hexafluoride (SF6)) are also greenhouse gases, and their concentrations are 
currently increasing; and
• The atmospheric concentration of methane (CH4) has increased by 1060 ppb 
(151%) since 1750 and continues to increase. The present CH4 concentration 
has not been exceeded during the past 420,000 years. The annual growth in 
CH4 concentration slowed and became more variable in the 1990s, compared 
with the 1980s. Slightly more than half of current CH4 emissions are 
anthropogenic (e.g., use of fossil fuels, cattle, rice agriculture and landfills). In 
addition, carbon monoxide (CO) emissions have recently been identified as a 
cause of increasing CH4 concentration” (IPCC 200la:7).
They have also concluded
• “there is new and stronger evidence that most of the warming observed over 
the last 50 years is attributable to human activities” (IPCC 2001a:10);
• Emissions of C 0 2 due to fossil fuel burning are virtually certain15 to be the 
dominant influence on the trends in atmospheric C 0 2 concentration during 
the 21st century (IPCC 200la: 12); and
• After greenhouse gas concentrations have stabilised, global average surface 
temperatures would rise at a rate of only a few tenths of a degree per century 
rather than several degrees per century as projected for the 21st century 
without stabilisation (IPCC 200la: 17).
15 This term is defined in the SPM to indicate judgemental estimates o f confidence greater that 99% 
that a result is true IPCC (2001a). Summary for Policy Makers: A Report o f Working Group I o f  the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Shanghai, IPCC: 20.
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The findings of WGI set the context for Working Group II (WGII) whose 
assessment was finalised in February 2001 and assessed “the sensitivity, adaptive 
capacity, and vulnerability of natural and human systems to climate change, and the 
potential consequences of climate change” (IPCC 2001b:3). The report was written 
by 183 coordinating lead authors and lead authors, and 243 contributing authors. The 
review process was overseen by 440 government and expert reviewers and 33 review 
editors (IPCC 2001b:3).
WGI concludes that inter alia the globally averaged surface temperature has increased 
by 0.6°C ± 0.2°C over the 20th century and that, for the range of scenarios developed 
in the IPCC Special R£port on Emissions Scenarios (SRES), the globally averaged surface 
air temperature is projected by models to warm 1.4°C to 5.8°C by 2100 relative to 
1990, and the globally averaged sea level is projected by models to rise 0.09m to 
0.88m by 2100. These projections indicate that the warming would vary by regions 
and be accompanied by increases and decreases in precipitation. In addition, there 
would be changes in the frequency and intensity of some extreme climate 
phenomena (IPCC 2001b:3).
WGII expressed four basic reasons for concern: Risks to Unique and Threatened 
Systems, Distribution of Impacts, Aggregate Impacts, and Risks from Future Large- 
Scale Discontinuities. “The report considered] the effects of climate change on water 
resources, terrestrial ecosystems and human health. It also addressefd] regional 
concerns, vulnerabilities and adaptive capacities” (IISD 2001:1-2). It found “the 
potential for large-scale and possibly irreversible impact poses risks that have yet to 
be reliably quantified” (IPCC 2001b:6).
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WGII had the following specific comments on adaptive capacity, vulnerability, and 
key concerns for the subject jurisdictions in this PhD.
Europe Adaptive capacity is generally higher in Europe for human systems; 
southern Europe and the European Arctic are more vulnerable than 
other parts of Europe
Summer runoff, water availability, and soil moisture are likely to 
decrease in southern Europe, and would widen the difference 
between the north and drought-prone south; increases are likely in 
winter in the north and south {high confidence
Half of alpine glaciers and large permafrost areas could disappear by 
end of the 21st century {medium confidence).
River flood hazard will increase across much of Europe {medium to 
high confidence)’, in coastal areas, the risk of flooding, erosion, and 
wedand loss will increase substantially with implications for human 
settlements, industry, tourism, agriculture, and coastal natural 
habitats
There will be some broadly positive effects on agriculture in 
northern Europe {medium confidence); productivity will decrease in 
southern and eastern Europe {medium confidence)
Upward and northward shift in biotic zones will take place. Loss of 
important habitats (wetlands, tundra, isolated habitats) would 
threaten some species {high confidence)
16 In this Summary for Policymakers, the following words have been used to indicate judgmental 
estimates o f confidence (based upon the collective judgment o f the authors using observational 
evidence, modelling results, and theory that they have examined): very high (95% or greater), high (67- 
95%), medium (33-67%), low (5-33%), and very low (5% or less).
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Higher temperatures and heat waves may change traditional summer 
tourist destinations, and less reliable snow conditions may impact 
adversely on winter tourism
North America Adaptive capacity of human systems is generally high and 
vulnerability low in North America, but some communities (e.g., 
indigenous peoples and those dependent on climate-sensitive 
resources) are more vulnerable; social, economic, and demographic 
trends are changing vulnerabilities in subregions.
Some crops would benefit from modest warming accompanied by 
increasing C 0 2, but effects would vary among crops and regions {high 
confidence), including declines due to drought in some areas of Canada 
north of current production areas, and increased warm-temperate 
mixed forest production {medium confidence). However, benefits for 
crops would decline at an increasing rate and possibly become a net 
loss with further warming {medium confidence).
Snowmelt-dominated watersheds in western North America will 
experience earlier spring peak flows {high confidence), reductions in 
summer flows {medium confidence) and reduced lake levels and outflows 
for the Great Lakes-St Lawrence under most scenarios {medium 
confidence)', adaptive responses would offset some, but not all, of the 
impacts on water users and on aquatic ecosystems {medium confidence).
Unique natural ecosystems such as prairie wetlands, alpine tundra, 
and cold-water ecosystems will be at risk and effective adaptation is 
unlikely {medium confidence).
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Sea-level rise would result in enhanced coastal erosion, coastal 
flooding, loss of coastal wetlands, and increased risk from storm 
surges, particularly in Florida and much of the U.S. Atlantic coast 
{high confidence).
Weather-related insured losses and public sector disaster relief 
payments in North America have been increasing; insurance sector 
planning has not yet systematically included climate change 
information, so there is potential for surprise (high confidence).
Working Group III (WGIII) “assesse[d] the scientific, technical, environmental, 
economic and social aspects of the mitigation of climate change” (IPCC 2001 c:3). 
WGIII noted “climate change is a problem with unique characteristics. It is global, 
long term (up to several centuries), and involves complex interactions between 
climatic, environmental, economic, political, institutional, social, and technological 
processes” (IPCC 2001 c:3). It considered “options for cutting greenhouse gas 
emissions by reviewing: technologies available for controlling emissions; steps that 
can be taken in the industry and energy sectors to promote a transition to a cleaner 
energy future; contributions through carbon sequestration by forestry and agriculture; 
policies for achieving cost-effective and "no-regrets” emissions reductions; and ways 
to overcome political, cultural and institutional barriers to mitigation.” (IISD 2001:1- 
2). Among its conclusions was “there is no single path to a low emissions future and 
countries and regions will have to choose their own path” (IPCC 2001 c:8) and 
“National responses to climate change can be more effective if deployed as a 
portfolio of policy instruments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions . . . Each 
government may apply different evaluation criteria, which may lead to different 
portfolios of instruments” (IPCC 2001c:12).
The Climate Sceptics
The climate sceptics first began challenging the growing scientific consensus just as 
climate change reached the front pages of the world’s newspapers. They made three 
basic arguments:
• That not enough is known about climate change to justify action;
• That global warming might be a good thing; and
• The scientific research demonstrates that climate change is not a problem
Their basic message was “the scientific base for a greenhouse warming is too 
uncertain to justify drastic action at this time” (Singer 1992:394). Generally, the 
climate sceptics agreed that the increase in atmospheric greenhouse gases over the 
past one hundred years was due to human activity (Singer 1999:184-185). However, 
they did not subscribe to the “warming scenarios being popularly described” 
(Lindzen 1992:1). They argued that global warming may be a good thing. In the 
1970s the US National Academy of Sciences and the National Research Council were 
predicting that the climate was cooling with potential disastrous consequences for the 
economy (Singer 1992:400). The sceptics argued that “If cooling was bad, then 
warming should be good” (Singer 1992:400). The warmer night temperatures would 
translate into longer growing seasons and fewer frosts. Singer concluded in a 1992 
article “that if significant warming were to occur in the next century, the net impact 
may well be beneficial” (Singer 1992:401).
Hugh Ellsaesser, a scientist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, stated “I 
strongly believe that greenhouse warming has been gready exaggerated and its effects 
distorted, largely for the same purpose that motivated the tailors of ‘The Emperor’s 
New Clothes’” (Ellsaesser 1992:404). He believed that climatic models were 
overstating the amount of warming “by at least two to three fold” and that increased
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C 0 2 would exert a primarily beneficial effect on the environment (Ellsaesser 
1992:404). It is his assertion that climate modellers began publishing climate change 
data because scientific journals would no longer accept papers on the general 
circulation models. So they ran their models with increases in C 0 2 to see what would 
happen. The resulting change in the climate could be measured by subtracting the 
current climate models from the models with the increased C 0 2. This assumes the 
current climate models are accurate. Ellsaesser argues that they are not accurate and 
so the resultant climate change models could not be accurate (Ellsaesser 1992:412).
The climate sceptics’ basic criticisms of the climate science were that the models for 
predicting climate change were inconsistent with observed fact (Lindzen 1992:2) and 
that the scientists doing the predicting were changing their model to get the results 
they sought (Lindzen 1992:2; Leggett 2000).
Richard Lindzen argued that there was no point in trying to reduce the emissions of 
greenhouse gases, especially carbon dioxide, because the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change’s (IPCC) first report suggested a 60% reduction of carbon dioxide 
emissions would be needed to curb global warming and this was not feasible. 
(Lindzen 1992:6).
Sebastian Oberthiir and Hermann Ott in their book on the Kyoto Protocol noted 
that the climate sceptics criticised the IPCC’s measurement methods and claimed that 
the data did not show a significant warming trend (Oberthiir and O tt 1999:10). 
However, as Obethiir and Ott pointed out, the IPCC did not conduct its own 
research, but rather was there “to assess the state of scientific knowledge taking into 
account only peer-reviewed work” (Oberthiir and Ott 1999:10). It was because of
this approach that the IPCC’s findings represented a broad international consensus. 
JD Mahlam in his article for Science magazine on the uncertainties of climatic models 
argued that if scientists were going to claim that climate change was not happening 
then they should start their criticism with the broad international consensus achieved 
by the IPCC (Mahlman 1997:1416).
The former IPCC chairman, Bert Bolin, said that despite the fact that most of the 
climate sceptics’ work was not peer reviewed it was considered and rejected by the 
IPCC “because of inadequate scientific bases” (Oberthiir and Ott 1999:10).
The New Scientist suggested in 1997 that the climate sceptics might have begun to 
challenge the basic tenets of the climate models because of “indignation, coupled 
with a maverick instinct to buck the trend” (Leggett 2000). It also noted that these 
climate sceptics had managed to secure lucrative consultancy fees and lecture 
contracts with entities whose objective was to “undermine international efforts to 
control emissions of greenhouse gases such as C 0 2” (Oberthiir and O tt 1999:10; 
Leggett 2000).
Whatever the motivations of the climate sceptics, their work and comments have 
now been mostly discredited, and their arguments about the defects of the climate 
models and the seriousness of the climate change have been rejected. The only 
debate that remains is what we should do about the fact that the climate is changing.
Bjorn Lomborg’s book The Sceptical Environmentalist (Lomborg 2001) offers one 
possible response that the sceptics have taken to heart, namely, that there are better 
things to spend money on than climate change. In his book Lomborg addresses most
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major environmental issues, waste, pollution, energy, water, forests, population 
growth and climate change. The breadth of the book required most reviewers to 
concentrate on those areas where they had the most experience (Grubb 2001:1286; 
Pimm and Harvey 2001:149; Simberloff 2001).
The longest chapter in the book is devoted to climate change. Lomborg 
acknowledges that “Global warming . . .  is almost certainly taking place” (Lomborg 
2001:4). But he does not agree with how the world is responding. Lomborg reviewed 
a number of findings by the IPCC and pointed out where he saw flaws in the 
reasoning or assumptions. O f the comments on climate change Michael Grubb says 
“I can only describe his analysis of it as at best inconsequential. On the scientific 
issues, he does nothing more than place himself firmly at the optimistic end of a wide 
spectrum of opinion amid legitimate uncertainties, and he picks somewhat selectively 
from the work of the IPCC to justify his position” (Grubb 2001:1286).
Lomborg is also very critical of the Kyoto Protocol “because independent scientific 
models suggest that it will have little impact on the scale of global warming and 
offers very poor value for money” (The Times of London 2001a). While Lomborg 
believes something should be done about climate change The Times of London says in 
its comments “Instead of wasting money on implementing Kyoto, he [Lomborg] 
says, the world would do better to invest much more than at present in research into 
renewable forms of energy, such as solar power and nuclear fusion. Should solar 
power become an economic way of generating energy by the middle of the century, 
carbon dioxide emissions would decline very steeply” (The Times of London 2001a).
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Effect of Scientific Research
Whether Lomborg’s findings will have any long-term effect on policymaking remains 
to be seen. The same cannot be said about the conclusions reached by the IPCC 
Working Groups. Policy makers around the world rely on the findings of the IPCC 
for the scientific basis for responding to the challenges of climate change. While 
governments may choose different paths they can do so in the knowledge that the 
scientific community has reached a consensus: the climate is changing as a result of 
anthropogenic activity. It is now up to the politicians to decide what to do about it.
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Chapter 3 - The Search for International Political 
Agreement
International political agreement on climate change was never going to be easy. It is a 
very complicated issue that cuts across all sectors of an economy. In Europe the issue 
grew in importance out of environmental concerns and has been handled out of 
environment departments; in the US climate change has always been an economic 
issue handled cross-departmentally and co-ordinated through the White House. Two 
of the strongest jurisdictions on the international stage approached the issue from 
different political and legal cultural perspectives. Despite this and very publicly stated 
disagreements over the seriousness of climate change as an issue, climate change 
moved rapidly from a purely scientific issue onto the international political stage.
In the Beginning
In 1979 at the first World Climate Conference scientists “cautiously concluded:
It can be said with some confidence that the burning of fossil fuels, 
deforestation and changes of land use have increased the amount of 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere by about 15 per cent (sic) during 
the last century and that it is at present increasing by about 0.4 per 
cent (sic) per year . . .  it appears plausible that an increased amount of 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere can contribute to a gradual 
warming of the lower atmosphere, especially at high latitudes ” 
(Dasgupta 1994:129)
From this meeting it was not long until climate change emerged into the political 
arena. The calls of the scientists eventually lead to the creation of the IPCC.17
17 See Chapter on the Science o f  Climate Change for more discussion o f  the creation o f the IPCC.
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The concept was proposed in 1985 at the ICSU conference in Villach, Austria where 
the invited scientists concluded, “although quantitative uncertainty in model results 
persists, it is highly probable that increasing concentration of the greenhouse gases 
will produce significant climatic change” (Bodansky 1993:460). The final conference 
statement recommended that since “the understanding of the greenhouse question is 
sufficiently developed, scientists and policy-makers should begin an active 
collaboration to explore the effectiveness of alternative policies and adjustments” 
(Bodansky 1993:460). This conference recommended that the organisers take action 
to “initiate, if deemed necessary, consideration of a global convention” (Bodansky 
1994:48).
“Humanity is conducting an unintended, uncontrolled, globally pervasive experiment 
whose ultimate consequences could be second only to a global nuclear war . . .  It is 
imperative to act now”. So said the policy-makers who attended the follow-up to the 
Villach Conference hosted by Canada in 1988 (Bodansky 1994:49). The conference 
in Toronto entitled "The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security". It had as 
its purpose to bridge the gap between policy makers and scientists on the issue of 
climate change (Bodansky 1994:48).
It was the high water mark in global climate change policy (Bodansky 1993:462). “As 
initial actions, the conference recommended:
• A 20 percent reduction in global C 0 2 emissions from 1998 levels by the year 
2005;
• Development of a ‘comprehensive global convention as a framework for 
protocols on the protection of the atmosphere’; and
• Establishment of a ‘World Atmosphere Fund’ to be financed in part by a levy 
on fossil fuel consumption in industrialized countries”(Bodansky 1994:49).
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While the recommendations of this conference were not met they did have 
ramifications for the future of climate change policy around the world. For instance, 
the conclusions of this conference were directly responsible for the United 
Kingdom's goal of a 20% reduction in C 0 2 emissions by 2010 (Tindale 2001 Inf). 
When the Labour party was formulating ‘In Trust for Tomorrow” they drew on this 
declaration as to what was “possible and achievable. It was intended to drive policy 
instead of vice versa” (Tindale 2001 Inf).
The Toronto conference was held as James Hansen, a NASA scientist, was giving 
evidence stating: “the greenhouse effect has been detected and it is changing our 
climate now” before the US Senate Energy Committee (Bodansky 1994:48). This 
statement put global warming on the front page of many American newspapers and 
firmly moved it onto the political stage. It also ensured that the Toronto conference 
and its conclusions received significant global press coverage (O'Riordan and Jager 
1996:18).
The IPCC was established just after the Toronto conference. Bodansky asserts that 
the IPCC was formed in part to reassert political control over what was becoming an 
increasingly important international and domestic political issue (Bodansky 1993:464- 
465). It has succeed in this objective. The assessment reports and the summaries for 
policy makers, published every five years, have become an essential tool for 
understanding the science behind climate change and the development of policy to 
address it. Bill Fang of the Edison Electric Institute believes that the Summary for 
Policy Makers has become so politicised in fact that it can no longer be relied on to 
provide an accurate summary of the underlying assessments (Fang 2002 Inf). James 
Cameron has pointed out that many industrialists lobbied for the IPCC Reports to
become political; they attended the meetings of the IPCC and urged their 
governments to include language that they believed would benefit their industries 
(Cameron 2002 Inf).
Despite the Toronto conference statement and James Hansen’s testimony little 
progress was made towards international political agreement in the late 1980s. The 
next real breakthrough came in May and June 1990 when the IPCC met to finalise its 
First Assessment Report. This report became the leading scientific document on 
climate change and was clearly aimed at policy makers (Bodansky 1993:469). It 
predicted that if things continued in the same manner, the global mean temperature 
would rise during the next century by an average of 0.3°C per decade - “a rate of 
change unprecedented in human history” (Bodansky 1993:469). “This would be the 
fastest sustained, global rate seen for at least 10,000 years, and compares with a 
global average temperature difference of only 4°-7° C between now and the last ice 
age” (Grubb, Vrolijk et al 1999:6).
In November 1990, the Second World Climate Change Conference was held in 
Geneva. It was unique at the time because it had both a scientific and a ministerial 
component. James Cameron (2001 Inf) believes this conference was the most 
significant event in climate change politics because it managed to established a 
connection between scientific consensus, policy analysis and the negotiation of an 
international treaty. It was here that the terms of reference for a climate change 
convention were negotiated (Leggett 2000:20).
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The United N ations Framework Convention on Climate Change
As a result of the declarations at the Second World Climate Change Conference the 
UN General Assembly on December 21, 1990 adopted Resolution 45/212 
establishing the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (INC) (Resolution 45/212 1990). The INC was to 
complete its work in time for the Convention to be signed at the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992.
The INC was “charged with drafting ‘an effective framework convention on climate 
change, containing appropriate commitments.’ This mandate left open a fundamental 
question that ran throughout the negotiations: was the INC’s task to draft a 
framework convention — that is, a largely procedural convention, establishing a basis 
for future action — or a substantive convention committing states to specific 
measures and policies?” (Bodansky 1993:493). This question was not answered until 
the end of the INC negotiating process when it considered whether the title should 
be “UN Convention on Climate Change” or as was ultimately adopted “UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change” (Bodansky 1993:496). “In the end the 
Convention lies somewhere between a framework and a substantive convention” 
(Bodansky 1993:496). It set broad objectives but left specific details to be negotiated 
at a later date. Given the complexity of the issues involved most commentators 
agreed it was negotiated remarkably quickly (Bodansky 1993:460; O'Riordan and 
Jager 1996:19). 18 This was managed because many of the complex and contentious
18 For a detailed discussion o f the negotiations that led to the UNFCCC see Bodansky, D  (1993). "The 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary." Yale J o f Int'l Law 18: 
451.
, Leggett, J (2000). The Carbon War. London, Penguin Books.)
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issue were left to be resolved at a later date. More than 150 countries and the 
European Community signed the Climate Change Convention.
O b j e c t iv e s  a n d  P r in c ip l e s  o f  t h e  C l im a t e  C h a n g e  
C o n v e n t i o n
The Climate Change Convention defines climate change as “a change of climate 
which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition 
of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability 
observed over comparable time periods” (UNFCCC 1992:Art 1(2)). The definition is 
notable in its stringency of limiting climate change to that which is attributable to 
human activity (Bodansky 1993:497). The definition used by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change is more inclusive.
Article 2 of the Climate Change Convention defines the objective as:
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal 
instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to 
achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 
Convention, stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved 
within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally 
to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened 
and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable 
manner (UNFCCC 1992:Art 2).
“The non-specific nature of the objective allows for different interpretations while 
acknowledging the need for adaptation to and mitigation of climate change 
(Oberthiir and O tt 1999:34). Article 3 established the principle of equity and 
precaution noting “where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of 
full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures
taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be 
cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost” (UNFCCC 
1992:Art 3(3)). Again the parties allowed for flexibility and different interpretations 
of how to respond to the challenge presented by climate change. Article 3 recognises 
that each party faces different national circumstances and these must be taken into 
account when formulating responses (UNFCCC 1992: Art 4(4)).
While these principles were not translated into legally binding targets the Climate 
Change Convention did for the first time, in a formal international setting, recognise 
climate change as a serious threat (Bodansky 1993:454-455). It also set the aim of 
returning “to 1990 levels the anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol” (UNFCCC 1992: Art 
4(2)b). While very few countries will reach this aim, with the US withdrawal from the 
Kyoto Protocol but affirmation of its commitment to comply with the Climate 
Change Convention (Bush 2001a), the Climate Change Convention may take on 
renewed importance.
In addition to the optimistic aims, the Climate Change Convention included 
substantial obligations. All parties must:
• “Develop national inventories of anthropogenic GHG emissions and 
removals by sinks;
• Elaborate and implement national and regional programmes containing 
measures to mitigate and facilitate adaptation to climate change;
• Promote sustainable management of sinks and reservoirs;
• Co-operate in preparing for adaptation;
• Promote and co-operate in the integration of climate policy consideration 
into other policy areas and international co-operation in related fields 
(science, technology, education etc.); and
• Report on inventories and relevant policies and measures” (Oberthiir and Ott 
1999:34-35).
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There are additional obligations for developed countries. They must bear the “agreed 
full costs” (UNFCCC 1992:Art 12) of developing countries’ reporting costs and the 
“agreed full incremental costs” of other implementing measures including emissions 
mitigation projects (UNFCCC 1992: Art 4(3), 4(4), 4(5); Oberthiir and Ott 1999:36). 
AO SIS ensured there was explicit financial support for developing country 
adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change. This financial assistance is 
funnelled through GEF (UNFCCC 1992:Art 21; Oberthiir and O tt 1999:36).
In s t i t u t i o n s  a n d  t h e  D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  C l im a t e  C h a n g e  
C o n v e n t i o n
The Climate Change Convention has been described as a “milestone because it 
established the institutional framework and some, although rudimentary, procedures 
that can be used by Parties to further elaborate the provisions of the Convention” 
(Oberthiir and Ott 1999:37). The “most important” (Oberthiir and O tt 1999:38) 
institution established by the Climate Change Convention is the Conference of the 
Parties (COP) (UNFCCC 1992:Art 7). Among the powers and responsibilities of the 
COP are:
• “Reviewing the implementation of the Convention and the adequacy of 
commitments;
• Promoting the development and refinement of methodologies for GHG 
inventories;
• Assessing the overall effectiveness of the Convention; and
• Fulfilling any other function required for the achievement of the objective of 
the Convention” (Oberthiir and Ott 1999:38).
Three years after the completion of the negotiations of the Climate Change
Convention the first COP was held in Berlin in 1995. The result of COP1 was the
Berlin Mandate -  a pledge by developed countries to begin work on a Protocol to the
Climate Change Convention to strengthen their commitment to cut greenhouse gas
emissions by setting specific and binding targets for emissions reductions. The goal 
was for this protocol to be signed in Kyoto at COP3. (Oberthiir and O tt 1999:47).
Negotiations got off to a slow start with many participants trying to agree a domestic 
strategy and some arguing that nothing should be agreed until the IPCC published its 
second report (Grubb, Vrolijk et al 1999:63; Oberthiir and Ott 1999:51). This report 
was published in December 1995 and found: “The balance of evidence suggests that 
there is a discernible human influence on global climate” (Oberthiir and Ott 
1999:51). It was accepted and publicly supported by the United States, a prelude to a 
significant shift in US climate change policy.
At COP2, July 1996, the US announced for the first time that it would accept legally 
binding targets on emissions (Grubb, Vrolijk et al 1999:56). It argued that “because of 
its culture and internal political structure, it would be held accountable to any specific 
commitments made” (Grubb, Vrolijk et al 1999:54). The United States believed the 
Europeans had a tendency to declare targets with no plan for achieving them; 
therefore if the US was going to agree to targets they should be binding on all 
signatories. There was however still no agreement on what these targets should be or 
on how they should be reached and there wouldn’t be until the waning moments of 
COP3.19
COP3 in Kyoto was where the details of targets and timetables were going to be 
worked out. There was little progress over the first week of the meeting with a
19 For a detailed discussion o f  the negotiations that led to the Kyoto Protocol see Grubb, M, C 
Vrolijk, et al (1999). The Kyoto Protocol: A Guide and Assessment. Earthscan and RIIA.; Oberthiir, S 
and H E Ott (1999). The Kyoto Protocol: International Climate Policy for the 21st Century. Berlin, 
Springer.; Leggett, J (2000). The Carbon War. London, Penguin Books.
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deadlock between the US and the European Community. The US was ready to return 
greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels but the European Community wanted 
deeper cuts. As the conference neared the end, the then US Vice-President Al Gore 
arrived with new instructions from Washington “to show increased negotiating 
flexibility if a comprehensive plan can be put into place” (Oberthiir and Ott 1999:86).
Oberthiir and Ott pointed out in their book on the Kyoto Protocol that the EU’s 
complex internal decision-making structure hampered it in the fast and intense 
negotiations (Oberthiir and O tt 1999:86-87). Working through the night negotiators 
were able to agree targets that reduced the US average greenhouse gas emissions by 
7% from 1990 levels and the EC average greenhouse gas emissions by 8%. The 
emissions from all industrial countries would come down by 5.2% overall.
The Kyoto Protocol is a consensus document: adopted unanimously so no formal 
vote was needed to approve it. This consensus, while hard fought, was only achieved 
by leaving many contentious issues out of the final agreement. There are no rules on 
how the various “flexible mechanisms” included to assist countries in achieving these 
targets were to operate, how to measure and verify a country’s emissions, and what 
would happen if a country failed to achieve its targets (Anderson 2000:5).
Policy-makers recognised the defects and set about correcting them. However, little 
progress was made at either COP4 or COP5. The parties did agree that the final rules 
for meeting the Kyoto targets would be completed by COP6 at The Hague in 
November 2000, thus paving the way for ratification and implementation of Kyoto 
by the ten-year anniversary of the signing of the Climate Change Convention in 2002.
The delegates failed to meet their goal. The negotiations at The Hague collapsed 
despite last-minute diplomacy by John Prescott, Deputy Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom, and Frank Loy, the delegation head from the US. Jan Pronck, chairman of 
COP6 did not close the meeting but suspended it until further negotiations could 
take place in the summer of 2001, in the hope that they would still be able to reach 
an agreement. At the request of the newly-elected US presidential administration, 
COP6bis was delayed from May 2001 until July 2001. This was to allow the new 
administration time to formulate a policy and gets its negotiators in place. However, 
after reviewing the available options, in March 2001, US President George W Bush 
announced that the US would not seek Senate approval of the Kyoto Protocol, 
removing the US from the Kyoto Protocol process.20 The President did promise that 
the US would come forward with an alternative proposal in time for COP6bis.
With much worry and many stories of the death of the Kyoto Protocol, the delegates 
reconvened in Bonn in July 2001. At COP6bis there was no certainty as to what 
would happen. Most commentators and participants did not expect anything 
significant and all hopes had been placed on COP7 in Marrakech. They believed 
there would be no agreement while everyone waited to see what the US would put 
forward. To most observers’ surprise the delegates, excluding the US which attended 
but did not block the consensus, agreed individual quotas for the use of sinks, the 
rules for the flexible mechanisms (emissions trading, Joint Implementation and the 
Clean Development Mechanism) and the compliance mechanism (Secretariat 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 2001a).
20 See US Chapter for further details.
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This has paved the way for ratification by the signatory countries, and its 
implementation into domestic law. Domestic climate change policies will now be put 
to the test to see if they will succeed in ensuring countries meet their obligations.
COP7 was held in Marrakech from 29 October to 9 November 2001. The US still 
had not put forward any alternative to the Kyoto Protocol; this was understandable 
given the tragic events in New York and Washington DC on 11 September 2001. At 
COP7 the international community finalised the work it had begun at COP6bis. The 
Kyoto rulebook was finalised, covering how to measure emissions and reductions, 
the use of sinks, how joint implementation and emissions trading will work and the 
rules for ensuring compliance commitments (Secretariat Framework Convention on 
Climate Change 2001b).
Where We A re  Today
Most commentators agree the US will not return to Kyoto and it is unlikely to put 
forward an alternative in the near future (Claussen 2002 Inf). The EU on the other 
hand has ratified and is moving onto implementation issues. Both these jurisdictions 
agree “Climate change, with its potential to impact every corner of the world, is an 
issue that must be addressed by the world” (Bush 2001a). What they don’t agree on is 
how to do this.
If they agree that climate change is a problem and that we should do something 
about it then why can’t they agree on what to do? Perhaps Michael Grubb’s 
comment that a key debate in the Berlin Mandate revolved around a fundamental 
clash of political and governmental cultures was not true just for the Berlin Mandate, 
but extends through the entire climate change negotiation process.
Chapter 4 - The EU and Climate Change Policy
The European Union (EU), as a relatively young international organisation, is still 
attempting to balance power between Member States and Community institutions. 
As the EU matures as an international institution, many of these challenges can be 
seen through an examination of its attempts to develop an effective climate change 
policy.
As was discussed in previous chapters, the cross-cutting nature of climate change 
makes developing policy difficult for many governments. The addition of the EU 
into the policy development process increases this complexity by many folds for the 
Member States. This is not only because of the difficulties surrounding the science of 
climate change or the inherent problems of trying to make policy predictions for 50, 
100 or even 200 years in the future; it is also because climate change is an area of 
mixed competence within the European Union and the EU has no authority over 
energy or tax policy, limiting the areas in which it can take action, yet it remains the 
entity responsible under the Kyoto Protocol for emissions reductions in Europe.
If the EU fails to meet its obligations the so-called “Bubble Group”21 will burst and 
then the Member States will be individually responsible for their emission levels; this
21 The “Bubble Group” is the colloquial term for the EU’s Burden Sharing Agreement which is 
authorised under Article 4 o f the Kyoto Protocol. This article allows parties included in Annex I to 
reach an agreement to fulfil their commitments joindy (Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (1998). ILM. 37: 22.) If the EU as a whole fails to meet its 
target, then each member state is responsible for meeting its own individual target as agreed with in 
the Burden Sharing Agreement (Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (1998). ILM. 37: 22.)
The EU agreed the contributions o f each member state to the overall 8% reduction commitment at 
the meeting o f Environment Ministers o f 15-16 June 1998. The Council Conclusions o f 16 June 1998 
set out each country’s commitment and is referred to as the “Burden Sharing Agreement”.
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is not something the EU wants to happen. It lobbied hard for the “Bubble Group” 
because it believed that it gave it an economic and emissions reduction advantage 
over the United States, allowed for fairness and equity within the EU, enabled the 
EU to make a greater commitment to reduce emissions, reduced the comparative 
disadvantage if the US did not ratify the Treaty (ie it provided more flexibility), and 
was consistent with the EU vision to build a single economic entity.
Unfortunately, as of December 2002 the EU has failed to achieve its objective of 
meeting its international obligation. The European Environment Agency issued a 
report that said that the EU was projected to reduce its emissions by only 4.7%, well 
below its international obligation of 8% (European Environment Agency 2002:10).22 
Under existing policies only Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom are 
projected to make sufficient reductions to meet their burden-sharing targets 
(European Environment Agency 2002:10).
To try to reduce emissions further the commission has proposed several new climate 
change policies and has been working to strengthen existing policies. But there is 
only so much it can do if Member States fail to institute their own emissions 
reduction programmes. Without these programmes the EU will find it difficult, if not 
impossible, to meet its international commitments. The case study of the United 
Kingdom that follows this chapter provides some insight into how and why one 
Member State has developed its climate change programme. It places a Member 
State’s actions in context within the European Union, attempting to understand how
22 The European Environment Agency noted in its most recent report that national projections for 
emissions o f greenhouse gases are not fully comparable because o f different underlying assumptions 
(European Environment Agency (2002). Greenhouse gas emission trends and projections in Europe: 
Are the EU and the candidate countries on track to achieve the Kyoto Protocol targets? Copenhagen, 
European Environment Agency: 76.)
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one country will meet its European commitments and work with the European 
Union towards a lower carbon future.
Everything within the EU involves complex political compromises and climate 
change is no different. This often leads to a policy being the fewest common 
denominator among the Member States or that the best policy proposals for the 
Community as a whole are never implemented because domestic political pressures 
within a Member State require that it be blocked. This does not mean the 
Community has no climate change policies. It has been working on climate change 
issues since the late 1980s with the introduction of an inter-service group of 
Directorates General that looked at the issue and made recommendations on what 
the Community could do to address the problem. Several important issues regarding 
the development of a Community climate change policy were identified. These 
include subsidiarity and the lack of competence in key climate change related areas.
Im portant Factors in the Development of Climate Change Policy in 
the European Union
Climate change moved onto the EU political agenda at the high point in 
environmental regulation in the EU. Many important environmental directives were 
agreed in the late 1980s and in 1987 the Single European Act (SEA) (SEA 1986) 
clearly gave the EU competence in the environmental area. The Treaty on European 
Union (Maastricht 1992) increased this authority by introducing qualified majority 
voting23 to some areas of environmental policy and set as an objective “to achieve 
balanced and sustainable development” (Maastricht 1992:Art 2). I mention this in the
23 For explanation o f  qualified majority voting and when it is used see Appendix 1 on the Structure o f  
European Union Government.
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context of EU environment policy because climate change has historically been an 
environmental issue in the EU. It has been handled by Member States’ environment 
departments with economic and foreign affairs departments taking a minor role at 
best.
Su b s id ia r it y 24
The principle of subsidiarity is particularly important in the area of climate change 
policy because subsidiarity “is valid when there is shared competence between the EU 
and the member states” (Dahl 2000:21 l).The concept of subsidiarity holds that 
“decisions should be taken at the most appropriate level of government and 
establishes a presumption that this level will be the lowest available” (Golub 
1996:687). Jonathan Golub has argued that this concept has always existed in EU 
environmental policy although until recently it was implicit.
The principle of subsidiarity was confirmed in the first action programme for the 
environment in 1973.
L ac k  o f  C o m p e t e n c e  i n  t h e  F ie l d  o f  E n e r g y  P o l ic y
The concept of subsidiarity is especially important in the field of energy policy where 
the commission’s powers are limited and they are unlikely to be extended in any way. 
This is despite the fact that the first of the European Communities had energy at its 
heart, the European Coal and Steel Community.
24 A more detailed discussion o f subsidiarity and its importance to the development o f EU  
environmental policy and more specifically climate change policy can be found in Appendix 1 on the 
Structure o f  European Union Government.
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The possibility of an energy policy has been debated numerous times at the 
European level, dating back to 1962 when a working party adopted a memorandum 
on energy policy which was designed to allow free movement of energy within the 
Community (Collier 1997).
Member States have fought hard to keep energy policy with their purviews. When the 
Single European Act (SEA) was signed there was an attached declaration that stated 
that new environmental policies would not affect a Member State’s ability to develop 
its own energy policy and Maastricht requires unanimous consent on all policies that 
might affect a Member State’s energy sector.
Despite this the commission has continued to strive towards an EU-wide energy 
policy. In 1988, the commission issued a special White Paper on Energy Policy 
(European Commission 1988b). This White Paper proposed policies related to 
deregulation of the energy sector and therefore harmonisation of the single market. It 
is through its exclusive competence in issues related to the function of the internal 
market that the commission has been able to play an increasingly visible role in the 
development of a community-wide energy policy.
Beyond the drive for harmonisation of the single market, international obligations 
have increased the role of the European Community in the energy field. Two major 
treaties have given the Community the history to believe it would be successful in 
introducing climate-change-related legislation. The first, negotiated in 1979, was the 
Geneva Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP 1979) 
which was a successful regional agreement. The second resulted from the 1987
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Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol 
1987). In 1988 the commission issued a directive on large combustion plants. This 
directive regulates SOx and N O x emissions from power stations and large industrial 
boilers. Both of these treaties have been successfully integrated into Community law 
and the obligations created have been met.
.E arlj Development o f E U  Climate Change 'Policy
Despite the observations of the previous section, the EU does have a climate change 
programme and it is constantly working to find ways to make it more successful. It is 
also important for agenda setting in and by the Member States. In the late 1980s and 
early 1990s EU climate change policy in itself may not have been very successful in 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, but it is important for setting the context of 
Member States’ climate change policy. However, policies that were not specifically 
identified as climate change may well have contributed to a reduction in, or at least 
slowed the growth of, EU emissions.25 For these reasons it is important to
25 The 1980 Council Directive 80/1268/E E C  o f 16 December 1980 on the approximation o f  the laws 
o f the Member States relating to the fuel consumption o f motor vehicles does not reference CO2 . This 
directive was amended by the 1993 Commission Directive 93/116/E C  o f  17 December 1993 adapting 
to technical progress Council Directive 80 /1268/EEC relating to the fuel consumption o f  motor 
vehicles which does note concerns about CO2 emissions.
This directive states in the 7th paragraph o f the preamble “Whereas, in view o f  the increasing concern 
about the environmental effects o f carbon dioxide emissions, the fifth programme o f action o f the 
European Communities on the protection o f the environment approved by the Council on 16 
December 1992 provides for a stabilization target o f these emissions whereas it is necessary to 
determine the carbon dioxide emissions o f  light motor vehicles in the framework o f the EC type- 
approval whereas it is appropriate to base the measurement o f  carbon dioxide on the test procedure 
established by Directive 70/220/E E C  for the measurement o f the air-polluting substances o f motor 
vehicles, and consequently to calculate fuel consumption on the basis o f the results o f  these 
measurements” (European Commission (1993). COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 93/116/E C  o f 17 
December 1993 adapting to technical progress Council Directive 8 0 /1268/EEC relating to the fuel 
consumption o f motor vehicles does note concerns about C 0 2  emissions: p. 39.)
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understand the development of EU climate change policy and the context for that 
development.
Initial steps to place climate policy on the EU agenda, excluding the funding of 
climatology research, began with a 1986 Resolution from the European Parliament 
(European Parliament 1986). The Fourth Action Plan on the Environment, adopted 
in 1987 and covering the period 1987 to 1992, made no mention of climate change 
except to call for further research (European Commission 1987). The first 
communication from the commission on climate change came in 1988 (European 
Commission 1988c). This communication summarised the current state of scientific 
research and the outcome of the Toronto Conference (European Commission 
1988a).26 To place it in context this communication was issued at the same time as 
the IPCC was established. Following this communication an ad hoc committee of the 
ten Directorates General (DGs) most likely to be involved in the development of EC 
climate change policy was convened27 (Council of Environment Ministers 1990). The 
relationship between DG XI (environment) and DG XVII (energy) was crucial for 
the development of EU climate change policy: “DG XI sought to promote 
environment interests, i.e. coping with the greenhouse problem, while DGXVII’s 
major concern was to promote energy efficiency which in turn would promote 
energy security” (Skjaerseth 1994:27).
26 For more information on the importance o f the Toronto Conference see chapter 3 on International 
Political Agreement.
27 This interservice group consisted o f  D G  I (external relations), D G  II (economic analysis), D G  III 
(internal market), D G  VI (agriculture), D G  VII (transport), D G  VIII (development aid), D G  XI 
(environment), D G  XII (research), D G  XVII (energy) and D G  XXI (taxation). The main contributors 
were D G  XI (environment), D G  XVII (energy) and D G  XXI (taxation).
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The European Council (composed of heads of state and government) confirmed the 
“seriousness of this subject” at the highest level when in June 1990 after meeting in 
Dublin it “called for early adoption of targets and strategies for limiting greenhouse 
gases” (Haigh 1996:161). At this meeting the Council issued a declaration on the 
‘environmental imperative’ that stated: “The Community and its Member States have 
a special responsibility to encourage and participate in international action to combat 
global environmental problems. Their capacity to provide leadership in this field is 
enormous” (Haigh 1996:163). The following October the Energy and Environment 
Council of Ministers met just before the 2nd World Climate Conference to agree a 
Community-wide C 0 2 reduction target. The agreed target was to return emissions to 
1990 levels by the year 2000. It should be noted that this was not the same as the 
burden-sharing agreement created after Kyoto, but was based on individual country 
commitments (Collier and Lofstedt 1997:10). Initially, there was talk of equitable 
target sharing, that is, allocating individual targets for C 0 2 emissions to Member 
States according to their development needs. This allowed some less developed 
member states to increase emissions while others decreased theirs. The agreement 
was not embodied in a legally binding document and was qualified with the 
assumption that other developed countries made similar commitments (Haigh 
1996:162). “However, as Grubb and Hope (1992) point out, attempts to reach 
agreement on sharing the target never really got off the ground” (Collier 1997:51). 
Some commentators have called this agreement an “ambiguous supranational 
concoction” (Collier 1997:51)
The work done in 1990 in the various Community institutions demonstrated the 
Community’s political commitment to policy making on climate change to the 
international community. Haigh asserted that these political decisions influenced the
negotiations in Rio and led to the adoption of binding commitments for Annex I 
countries (Haigh 1996:162). These political statements also provided the commission 
the encouragement it needed to develop an approach to climate change that was 
centred at the Community level (Haigh 1996:162).
Reaching agreement on C 0 2 targets proved “relatively easy compared to the 
subsequent discussions about drawing up a C 0 2 strategy” (Collier 1997:51). Details 
of the development of this policy have been discussed at some length by other 
authors (see eg (Skjserseth 1994; Haigh 1996; Heller 1998). Two commissioners, Ripa 
di Meana (DG Environment) and Cardosa Cunha (DG Energy), prepared a draft 
Communication to the Council which claimed C 0 2 reductions of 15-20% could be 
achieved without significant macroeconomic costs. It also called for the 
strengthening of the energy efficiency programme (SAVE), the establishment a 
programme on renewable energy (ALTENER) and action in the transport sector. It 
was also in this document that the proposal for an eco-tax first appeared.
This draft Communication was leaked in May 1991(Skjserseth 1994:28). It identified 
four major policy elements: a regulatory approach, burden sharing, fiscal policy, and 
action at the national level. The concept of burden sharing was eventually abandoned 
and the carbon/energy tax became the cornerstone of the commission’s climate 
change policy (Haigh 1996:163).
The United Nations’ Conference on Environment and Development in Rio placed a 
self-imposed deadline on the EU to finalise a climate change strategy. The EU’s 
desire to be seen as an international leader required that it have some “policy flesh to 
put on the bones of the political decision to stablize (sic) C 0 2 emissions” (Haigh
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1996:164). In June 1992, just before the Rio Conference, the commission announced
its climate change strategy entided A  Community strategy to reduce C 02 emissions'. It 
stated that:
To stabilise C 0 2 emissions within the necessary time, a reduction in 
the energy demand is required as well as an increase in energy 
efficiency and a modification of the energy sources used. This 
objective involves therefore all households and companies and can 
only be achieved effectively by stimulating technological as well as 
transport and energy infrastructure development at the same time and 
by changes in behaviour” (European Commission 1992).
The strategy consisted of four elements:
• SAVE program - A framework directive on energy efficiency; this
programme was “intended to promote further improvements in end-use 
energy efficiency in the Community through a range of provisions” 
(Haigh 1999:14.5-1);
• ALTENER program - A decision on renewable energies; this
programme was to “promote the development and use of renewable 
energy through the provisions of EC funding” (Haigh 1999:14.4-1);
• A directive on a combined carbon and energy tax; and
• A decision concerning a monitoring mechanism for C 0 2 emissions.
With Rio over and a strategy for combating climate change within the EU, the 
commission moved on to try to implement its plans. The European Union ratified 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in December 1993.
During the 1990s the EU and Member States took significant steps to address 
climate change domestically beyond their international obligations. Most member 
states adopted climate change plans and to a greater or lesser extent have 
implemented those plans. An EU-wide emissions trading scheme has been approved
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by the Council of Ministers and is due to begin trading in 200528;29 and the 
monitoring mechanism is up and running more effectively since amendments in 
1999. Further amendments have been proposed to bring the monitoring mechanism 
up to date with the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol (European Commission 
2003d). The carbon tax makes regular appearances on the policy agenda; the 
commission sees the carbon tax as essential to meet its climate change objectives so 
the proposal is repeatedly withdrawn or modified to try to reach some sort of 
consensus on a programme. In early 2004 discussions continue about how it might 
work and be made acceptable to those Member States still opposed to the idea.
E U  Climate Change Programmes
The European climate change programme isn’t a single programme, but a grouping 
of policies, some new and some old, which have the overall aim of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions in the EU and improving energy efficiency. The policies 
that the commission includes in its climate change programme are:
• European Climate Change Programme;
• Monitoring Mechanism;
• C 0 2/Energy Tax;
• Emissions Trading; and
• Renewable Energy Programmes — Renewable Energy Directive, SAVE 
andALTENER.
The development of these policies will be reviewed in the remainder of this chapter. 
The framework for these policy objectives first began to take shape in early 2000.
28 The first trade took place between Nuon Energy Trade and Wholesale and Shell Trading, a part o f  
Shell Oil, on the 27 February 2003 (European Council for an Energy Efficient Economy. (2003). 
"Shell and Nuon first C 02  traders." Retrieved 11 December 2003, 2003, from
http://www.eceee.org/latest_news/2003/news20030311.lasso.)
29 Since this thesis was submitted the EU ETS has commenced trading. Phase 1 is nearing the end o f  
its trading period; Member State requests for Phase 2 allocations have been made and acted upon by 
the Commission and negotiations over the design o f Phase 3 have begun.
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The commission published two documents that it intended as the launching point for 
the Community’s climate change programme. The first was a communication on 
policies and measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions which launched the 
European Climate Change Programme (ECCP) (COM (2000)88). The second was a 
Green Paper on an EC emissions trading scheme (COM (2000)87) (Haigh 1999:14.2- 
6).
1. E u r o p e a n  C l im a t e  C h a n g e  P r o g r a m m e
The commission launched the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP) in 
March 2000 with the goal of identifying and developing all the necessary elements of 
an EU strategy to implement the Kyoto Protocol. This process involved “all the 
relevant groups of stakeholders working together, including representatives from the 
commission’s different departments (DGs), the Member States, industry and 
environmental groups” (European Commission 2002).
With the initial focus on energy, the transport industry and flexible mechanisms, six 
working groups30 were set up in the summer of 2000 to recommend cost-effective 
options for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
The Environment Council adopted Conclusions Concerning Community Policies and 
Measures to Limit Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in October 2000 (Environment Council 
2000). This confirmed the framework of the ECCP, but also set priorities in the 
fields of transport, energy efficiency and industry sectors taking into account the
30 The working groups were Flexible Mechanisms, Energy Supply, Energy Consumption, Transport, 
Industry - including a sub-group on fluorinated gases - and Research.
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environmental impact and cost-effectiveness of the measures. The European 
Parliament also adopted a resolution on the ECCP that confirmed the policies, 
whether adopted at the national or community level, which were the priorities of the 
EU climate change strategy (European Parliament 2000b).
The ECCP interim report issued in November 2000 confirmed the “uncertainties 
and difficulties” (European Commission 2000a:4) that many Member States faced in 
meeting their Kyoto commitments. The commission found that this reinforced the 
important role of the EU measures and policies to “supplement” (European 
Commission 2000a:4) the Member States’ climate change strategies. This interim 
report also identified measures under discussion by the various working groups 
which were elaborated in annexes and additional reports prepared by the working 
groups.
The final report and those of the working groups were published in June 2001. The 
working groups’ report identified 42 possible measures, which could lead to some 
664-765 M tC02 equivalent emissions reductions that could be achieved against a cost 
lower than €20/tonne C 0 2eq (European Commission 2001 c:45). This is about 
double the emissions reduction required for the EU in the first commitment period 
of the Kyoto Protocol. However, the commission noted that at the time this report 
was published the EU was between 6.6% and 8% from its Kyoto target (European 
Commission 2001 c:5). The ECCP was considered a “launch pad” for the overall EU 
strategy, not a “final destination” (European Commission 2001 c:45). This final report 
did not analyse all EU programmes that may have some effect on greenhouse gas 
emissions. However, it was linked to these initiatives and comments were provided 
when appropriate.
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The follow-on from the final report was a communication from the commission on 
the implementation of the ECCP. This Action Plan outlined the priorities the 
commission set for itself to implement in 2002 and 2003 (European Commission 
2001a). These priority actions represented an emissions reduction potential of 122- 
178 M tC 02eq. It also set out the basis for additional research the commission 
planned to undertake in other areas, such as C 0 2 sequestration (sinks) in agricultural 
soils and forests.
At the same time, the commission put forward a proposal for a Council decision on 
the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (European Commission 2001 f). The Council 
decision was issued on 25 April 2002 (European Council 2002). The ratification 
process was completed on 31 May 2002 with the depositing of the ratification 
instrument with the Secretariat of the UNFCCC (European Commission 2002).
The second phase of the ECCP was to run between 2002 and 2003. Its objective was 
to implement the priorities identified in the first phase of the ECCP. Various 
working groups were also examining how the EU could make the best use of flexible 
mechanisms and sinks. A final report on this phase of the ECCP was published in 
May 2003 (European Commission 2003e). It reported on the implementation of 
Phase 1 commitments and outlined the future plans for action under the ECCP.
2. T h e  M o n i t o r i n g  M e c h a n is m
The monitoring mechanism was “the first item of EC legislation to be adopted that 
specifically deals with global warming” (Haigh 1999:14.2-1). The Directive was
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adopted on 24 June 1993 by the Council of Environment Ministers (European 
Council 1993:31). It established a monitoring mechanism in the Community for 
anthropogenic C 0 2 and other greenhouse gas emissions not controlled by the 
Montreal Protocol. The Directive had two objectives: firstly to provide the 
commission with a mechanism to monitor progress towards the target of stabilisation 
of C 0 2 emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000 and to fulfil the reporting 
requirements under the 1992 Climate Convention; and secondly, to require each 
Member State to “devise, publish, implement and periodically update national 
programs for limiting their anthropogenic emissions of C 0 2” (European Council 
1993:Art 2.1). The purpose of this is to allow the commission to make annual 
evaluations of the Member States’ climate change programmes. This provides the 
basis for the assessment of the Community’s progress towards the stabilisation 
objective.
Under the original directive two evaluation reports were issued. The first was issued 
on 10 March 1994 and covered the period 1990-1993 (European Commission 
1994:6). The second report was issued on 14 March 1996 (European Commission 
1996:1). In these reports the commission concluded that the information provided 
was still not sufficient to evaluate progress towards the Community stabilisation 
target in a satisfactory way.
Nigel Haigh argued that the title does not convey the full importance of this piece of 
legislation because it required the commission to “evaluate data on greenhouse gases 
reported by the Member States but Member States are to devise, publish and 
implement national programmes for limiting their anthropogenic emissions of C 0 2 
and other greenhouse gases in order to contribute to commitments in the Climate
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Change Convention and Kyoto Protocol and to an EC target” (Haigh 1999:14.3-1). 
While the monitoring mechanism in its initial form promised great things towards 
meeting the EU’s internal commitment and obligations under the UNFCCC, in 
practice it was almost a total failure. Member States virtually ignored the reporting 
requirements and the evaluations of national programmes and assessments of 
progress towards the stabilisation goal have been treated in the same way (Hyvarinen 
1999:193).
The Monitoring Mechanism, Decision 93/389/EEC, was revised in April 199931 
(European Council 1999) to allow for the updating of the monitoring process in line 
with the inventory requirements incorporated into the Kyoto Protocol. The 
amendments were intended to strengthen the reporting programme requirements for 
the Member States. The Member States’ reports must include (a) information on 
actual progress and (b) information on projected progress. Member States are 
required to submit by 31 December inventory data for the two previous years, any 
updates of previous years (including the base year 1990) and their most recent 
projected emissions for the years 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2020 (Lacasta, Dessai et al 
2002:384). It was envisaged that the monitoring mechanism would play a key role in 
ensuring that the EU and Member States stay on track towards their targets under 
the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. It is also a recognition of the role that 
Member States must play in the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
The first progress report under the revised Monitoring Mechanism, Decision
31 As a follow-on to this revision the Commission put forward a directive which established a scheme 
to monitor the average specific emissions o f  CO2 from new passenger cars (European Commission 
(1999b). Directive 1999/94/E C  o f the European Parliament and o f the Council o f 13 December 1999 
relating to the availability o f consumer information on fuel economy and C 0 2  emissions in respect o f  
the marketing o f new passenger cars: p. 16.)
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99/296/EC, was released in November 2000 (European Commission 2000d). In this 
report the commission found Member States making progress in reporting emission 
inventories and on national policies/measures and projections. This good news was 
tempered with the note that much remains to be done with regard to the 
completeness, accuracy and comparability of the data, especially those on projections. 
The report confirmed that the EU was likely to stabilise emissions at 1990 levels by 
the year 2000 as required by the UNFCCC. Most of these reductions have been the 
result of the reunification of Germany and the unintended consequence of the "dash 
for gas" resulting from privatisation in the UK’s energy sector (Grubb, Vrolijk et al 
1999:81). However, the commission also noted that compliance with the ambitious 
Kyoto target of -8% would prove much harder for the EU and its Member States. It 
concluded that common and coordinated policies and measures at EU level would 
become an increasingly important element to supplement and reinforce national 
climate strategies. These policies and measures are found in the ECCP.
The second progress report (European Commission 2001g) told much the same 
story. “The Community’s greenhouse gas emissions were 4 per cent lower than 1990 
levels, and that at best with current measures only a stabilisation of emissions will 
have been achieved by 2010” (Haigh 1999:14.3-5).
The third progress report was released on 3 February 2003 (European Commission 
2003d). In this report the Commission confirmed the EU had met its greenhouse gas 
stabilisation target as required by the UNFCCC. However, the aggregate Member 
States’ projections suggest that existing policies and measures will not be sufficient to 
reach the Kyoto target. The 'business-as-usual' scenario (with existing measures)
72
suggests that in 2010 EC emissions will have decreased by only 4.7% leaving a gap of 
3.3% to the Kyoto target (European Commission 2003d:4).
Two days after the third progress report was released, on 5 February 2003, the 
commission presented a proposal for a decision for a revision of the monitoring 
mechanism (European Commission 2003a). This proposal expands upon the 
previous decisions to include the flexible mechanisms and registries. It is intended to 
increase the transparency of the Member States’ emissions and forecasts.
3 . Ca r b o n / E n e r g y  T a x
The idea of an EU-wide carbon/energy tax was first raised in 1991 (European 
Commission 1991). This document laid out the framework for the proposed tax. 
This proposal began the series of concessions the commission would make to try and 
get agreement on the proposal over the years. The initial tax rate was proposed at 
US$ 3 per barrel in 1993 rising to US$ 10 per barrel over a seven-year period; it 
allowed for special treatment of energy-intensive industries and the revenues were to 
be used to offset other taxes. (Delbeke and Bergman 1998:3). Further refinements 
were introduced in 1992 (European Commission 1992).
Angela Liberatore, a European Commission project officer and former academic at 
the European University Institute, has put forward several possible political reasons 
for the carbon/energy tax. One is the need or desirability for the European 
Community to take a leading international role in climate change. Second is that it 
would demonstrate the EC’s commitment to reduction of C 0 2 emissions. Third is 
that the tax would represent “a fundamental precedent for increasing the power of
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Community institutions in the fiscal arena” (Liberatore 1995:66). Fourthly, as in the 
United Kingdom, a reason for the choice of a tax over emissions trading was 
“institutional familiarity and the lack of experience/familiarity” with the latter 
(Liberatore 1995:66); the commission assumed it was easier to modify existing 
institutions than create new ones.32
Ute Collier, from WWF, suggested two other possible reasons for the continued 
attempts to introduce the tax. The first was that it was introduced to internalise some 
of the external cost of energy. The second was that it was the commission’s desire to 
harmonise taxes for proper functioning of the single market (Collier 1997:53).
Pressure for the tax came from Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands. They 
threatened to introduce the tax unilaterally which would have interfered with the 
commission’s desire to harmonise taxes across the EU. However, there was stiff 
opposition and “considering the EU’s difficulties in the fiscal policy area in the past, 
it was clear that this was not going to be a measure on which agreement would be 
reached easily” (Collier 1996:7).
Early objections came from the UK and France. The UK vehemently opposed any 
European intervention in tax matters, while France wanted a pure carbon tax to 
protect its nuclear industry.
The United Kingdom opposed the carbon/energy tax on the basis of subsidiarity, 
arguing that taxes were best dealt with at the national level (Dahl 2000:217), although
32 The EU later recognized that the best way for it to make its Kyoto commitments was to create a 
new institution and adopt an emissions trading scheme.
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there is “little doubt that a main reason for objecting to the tax was not a true belief 
in subsidiarity, but a general reluctance to surrender decision making powers to the 
EU, especially on such important matters as taxes” (Collier 1997:55; Dahl 2000:217).
The original proposal was “finally laid to rest at the Essen summit in December 
1994. The European Council’s rather bland statement instructed the ECOFIN 
Council to consider common parameters to enable every Member State to apply a 
carbon/energy tax ‘if it so desires’” (Collier 1996:8). Since that time several new 
proposals have been submitted, including a voluntary proposal in 1995 and the so- 
called Monti Directive in 1997 (European Commission 1997).
In June 2001 potential agreement on an energy tax failed when the UK and Spain 
insisted on liberalisation of all EU energy markets before implementation of an EU 
energy tax (Center for a Sustainable Economy 2001). Only a year later, in May 2002, 
it was the Spanish who attempted to revive plans for an EU energy tax. The Spanish 
proposal contained a long list of exemptions that the EU Tax Commissioner Frits 
Bolkenstein likened to Gruyere cheese, saying that the commission preferred “an 
Edam cheese, which has a lot of cheese and not any holes” (Jucca 2002).
A few months later, the Dutch Institute of International Affairs and the Institute of 
Local Government Studies urged the Dutch Government, the holders of the EU 
Presidency, to abandon the idea of an energy tax as it was a “hopeless battle” (Center 
for a Sustainable Economy 2002). The Dutch did not give up. They worked hard 
through the autumn of 2002 to get finance ministers to agree to a new EU energy tax 
system. Reuters reported in October 2002 that they hoped to have agreement by the 
end of the year (Reuters News Service 2002c). However, Margot Wallstrom, EU
Environment Commissioner, had litde faith in the ability to reach an agreement 
saying she’ll “believe it when [she] see[s] it” and some EU diplomats considered the 
bill a tall order (Reuters News Service 2002c).
The Dutch were no more successful than any other European Country. In December 
2002, the French and the Italians blocked agreement. They wanted to maintain 
reduced tax rates for diesel used by road hauliers (Planet Ark 2002b). Germany 
opposed the concessions because it has the highest fuel duties in the EU and it felt 
this would disadvantage Germany road hauliers.
Greece took over the Presidency of the EU in January 2003 and with it the lead in 
the batde for an EU energy tax. In February 2003 Greek Finance Minister Nikos 
Christodoulakis said that with regard to a potential agreement on the carbon/energy 
tax “never in the past have we been as close as now in reaching final agreement” 
(Jucca 2003). But they did not reach an agreement; and with the imminent expansion 
of the EU the unanimous decisions required to alter taxation rules will make the 
adoption of a carbon tax almost impossible.
4 . E m is s io n s  T r a d in g
The EU initially opposed the inclusion of emissions trading in the Kyoto Protocol33. 
This opposition stemmed from the belief that it would provide the US with 
economic and practical advantages because of the US’s experience with trading
33 The rules for emissions trading require unanimous agreement by the EU Council o f  Ministers. 
Thus, proponents o f  emissions trading must understand how the EU is attempting to build a unified 
position on the issue, as well as the roles o f key actors, institutions and member states in that process 
(Chasek, P (1998). Working Paper on European Union Views on International Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Trading. Environmental Policy Studies. New York.)
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systems. There was a fear that emissions trading would dilute the unique advantage 
the EU achieved through the “Bubble Group”, which the EU believed made its 
aggregate reductions less of an economic challenge ('Economist 1997:16). “The EU 
wanted to ensure that flexible measures [did] not give Annex I countries, the US in 
particular, the means to exploit cost-effective options that would give them an 
economic advantage over the EU (or at least erase the EU’s perceived advantage 
under the bubble)” (Chasek 1998:5).
This opposition did not last long. Three months after signing the Kyoto Protocol the 
Council of Environmental Ministers indicated that the EU was not completely 
opposed to emissions trading as an option for Annex I nations to meet Kyoto 
obligations. The Council of Ministers did express its desire that the US and Japan 
should not be able to buy their way out of real emissions reductions, and 
recommended that a ceiling be placed on the use of flexible mechanisms (Council of 
Ministers 1998). The G-8 environment ministers meeting may have gone some ways 
towards mitigating the Council of Ministers concern when it agreed “not to use 
emissions trading to evade painful domestic reductions in greenhouse gas emissions” 
(Boulton 1998:3). G-8 environment ministers stated that flexible mechanisms should 
be “supplemental to domestic action” (Boulton 1998:3).
In 1999 the European Commission suggested that the best way for the Community 
and its Member States to get acquainted with the Kyoto mechanisms would be to 
develop their own emissions trading scheme (European Commission 1999a). In 
March 2000 the commission published a Green Paper on greenhouse gas emissions 
trading within the EU for wider consultation with stakeholders (European 
Commission 2000b). Ninety comments - overwhelmingly supporting emissions
trading - were received from governmental organisations, businesses and NGOs 
throughout Europe (European Commission 2000c). The first proposal for a 
framework directive was released just before COP7 (2001) as part of the EU climate 
package. Neither industry nor the NGOs were happy with the proposal and it was 
ultimately withdrawn. Lionel Fretz described it as a “good example of government 
not listening” and said that it had no relation to what had been discussed and 
proposed in the EU working groups on emissions trading (Fretz 2001 Inf). Although 
Garth Edwards really liked it, and described it as “hard core”, it was his feeling that it 
was withdrawn because German industry was not happy with the proposal (Edwards 
2001 Inf). Many people felt that this proposal was placed in the public domain before 
it was ready, to show that the EU was doing something ahead of COP6 at The 
Hague (Cameron 2001 Inf).
The second proposed directive on greenhouse gas emissions trading was issued on 
23 October 2001 (European Commission 2001 e). The trading system is expected to 
start in 2005. National Allocation Plans are now being drawn up by the Member 
States that tell industry how much carbon dioxide they it be able to emit. It is the 
commission’s hope that it will allow the private sector to find the most cost-effective 
ways to reduce its C 0 2 emissions (European Commission 2002). The final proposed 
directive took into consideration all six greenhouse gases; however, the initial 
programme will only allow trading in C 0 2.34 It is hoped that methane and the rest of 
the basket of greenhouse gases will be added to the trading scheme by 2007 or 2008 
(Cameron 2002 Inf).
34 Carbon dioxide accounts for 80% o f EU emissions and relative to the other five gases is easy to 
monitor, report or verify.
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The commission has proposed a cap-and-trade approach covering heavy industry 
sectors across the EU.35 This proposal revolves around two key concepts: a 
greenhouse gas "permit" and a greenhouse gas "allowance." All installations under 
the scheme will be required to have permits that will lay down monitoring, reporting 
and verification requirements in respect of direct emissions of greenhouse gases 
specified in relation to those activities. Member States will allocate allowances to all 
installations holding permits that can then be transferred to other companies 
(European Commission 2001 e).
The current estimate is that this directive, accounting for approximately 46% of EU 
carbon dioxide emissions, covers 12,000 installations. However with 27 countries36 
participating in the scheme there may be more that 15,000 installations affected. The 
industries covered include power generation, refineries, iron and steel, coke ovens, 
cement, glass and ceramics, pulp and paper, and any combustion plant with over a 20 
megawatt capacity37. Chemical and waste incinerators are exempted. Fines for 
exceeding emissions allowances start at €50 per tonne of carbon dioxide in the lead- 
in phase, rising to €100 thereafter.
The scheme will run between 2005 and 200738, before the Kyoto Protocol's first 
commitment period starts. The Member States rather than the EU will decide on
35 This directive also covers most power plants that only provide power on an individual industrial 
site, so called Inside The Fence power plants.
36 The countries participating in the scheme are the 15 current member states, the 10 prospective 
member states, and Norway and Switzerland.
37 This 20 megawatt capacity is for thermal energy input, not electrical power output. The electrical 
power output o f these combustion plants may be as little as 7 or 8 megawatts.
38 Phase 1 o f  the EU ETS is nearly completed and the Commission has made the allocations for Phase 
2. As o f 10 August 2007 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia have filed 
lawsuits against the Commission and Lithuania is threatening to do so with regards to their allocations 
in Phase 2 o f the EU ETS. Lithuania expects to make a decision the week o f 13 August 2007 on
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initial allowances. Ninety-five percent of the allowance will be allocated free, the 
other five percent may be auctioned at the discretion of the Member State 
government. The Member States may choose to exempt certain power plants 
assuming they were making equivalent cuts in their emissions. And if “market 
conditions” justify, Member States could award companies extra permits at no cost. 
Any potential abuses of the allocation process will be scrutinised by the EU 
competition authorities. The Monitoring Mechanism in conjunction with national 
transaction registries will perform the tracking of traded allowances. Only carbon 
dioxide emissions will be covered in the beginning of the scheme because they 
represent 80% of the Community’s greenhouse gas emissions (Lacasta, Dessai et al 
2002:391-393).
The German government called the carbon dioxide emissions trading system as 
proposed “bureaucratic” and claimed that it had “the features of a centrally-planned 
economy” (ENDS Environment Daily 2002). Germany made these comments as it 
prepared to negotiate concessions for German industry. Germany along with the UK 
sought certain changes to be made before the emissions trading directive is approved, 
including: allocation of emissions permits had to be free of charge; industry 
associations would be able to make the trades; and there should be an opt-out clause 
for the first compliance period. Germany’s reason for wanting these concessions was 
that its industry had already made significant reductions in emissions as a part of 
Germany taking on the largest reduction in the “Bubble Group”, industry has long 
running voluntary agreements to reduce greenhouse gases, and any further demands 
would place German industry at a competitive disadvantage.
whether to proceed with litigation. The Commission and the Member States are currendy working on 
the design o f Phase 3 o f the EU ETS.
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On 9 December 2002 the Environment Ministers from the Member States approved 
the creation of the EU’s emissions trading system. Germany and the UK received 
several of the concessions they were seeking in that they will be able to opt out of the 
first phase but they will have to participate beginning in 2008 and companies will be 
able to create pools to trade as one entity (Dombey and Houlder 2002). In late June 
2003, the Parliamentarians agreed the final changes to the emissions trading 
legislation. It was approved without any problems on 1 July 2003 and was expected to 
be rubber stamped by the Council of Ministers. It is expected that the European 
emissions trading market will be approximately US$ 1 billion in 2005 rising to up to 
US$ 8 billion in 200739 (Planet Ark 2002a). However, it may also lead to increased 
power prices as the costs of trading are internalised in the cost of producing 
electricity (Platts 2003).
All of this means that the UK was not as successful as it would have hoped in its 
lobbying effort to make the EU scheme a framework into which existing Member 
States’ schemes could be slotted. Despite the concessions discussed above, the UK 
emissions trading schemes will have to be scrapped or modified to conform to the 
EU system. The main differences between the two schemes is that the EU scheme is 
mandatory while the UK system is voluntary and in the United Kingdom the 
electricity sector is only partly covered, but it is included in the EU scheme.40
39 This is the estimated value o f the amount traded, not the value o f the allocation which is much 
more.
40 Steve Sorrell provides further analysis o f the implications for the main UK climate change policies 
with the adoption o f the EU emissions trading directive (McKinsey Consulting (2002). Climate 
Change For Europe's Utilities. The McKinsey Quarterly.
, Sorrell, S (2003). Back to the Drawing Board? Implications o f the EU Emissions Trading Directive 
for UK Climate Policy. Brighton, SPRU Environment and Energy Programme: 76.)
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Implementation of the EU scheme is beginning. The national allocation plans 
(NAPs) which set out the emissions caps for the end of 2007 for each installation 
covered by the EU emissions trading scheme had to be published by 31 March 
2004.41 The UK was the first country to publish its NAP. It will require a 16.3% cut 
in emissions (Point Carbon 2004). This target exceeds the UK’s commitment to the 
“Bubble Group” of a 12.5% reduction. Reaction to this target has been mixed 
(Planet Ark 2004).
5. R e n e w a b l e  E n e r g y  P r o g r a m m e s
The European Union has had renewable energy programmes since the early 1990s. 
While these programmes were not specifically set up to combat the effects of climate 
change they are mentioned as a part of the EU climate change programme. It should 
be noted that they are complementary but separate policies.
Renewable Energy Directive
The Council approved the renewable energy directive on 7 September 2001 
(European Commission 2001b). It is intended to promote an increase in the 
contribution of renewable energy sources to the production of electricity on the 
internal market, and lay the foundations for a future Community framework in this 
area.
To this end, the directive requires Member States to set national targets for their 
future consumption of electricity from renewable energy sources, ensure guaranteed
41 Several countries will miss this deadline which the Commission has said it will strictly enforce.
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access to renewable forms of electricity with accurate and reliable certification of its 
source, improve and expedite the authorisation procedures applying to power plants 
generating green electricity, and ensure that the method for calculating the 
connection costs for new producers is transparent and non-discriminatory. The 
directive also stipulates that the commission is to check that the national targets are 
consistent with the EU target of 12% of gross inland energy consumption by 2010 
coming from renewable sources and that the commission may propose mandatory 
national targets if the national targets are likely to be inconsistent with the overall 
target.
The directive does not propose a harmonised Community-wide scheme for aid for 
electricity from renewable energy sources, but it does require the commission to 
report on the different national support schemes and, where appropriate, make a 
proposal for a Community framework for support schemes.
Special Action Programme for Vigorous Energy Efficiency (SAVE)
The SAVE programme was first adopted in 1991 and lasted until 1995. It was 
specifically aimed at improving energy efficiency throughout the Community. Initially 
the programme estimated huge efficiency savings, but many of these had to be 
abandoned under the subsidiarity principle (Dahl 2000:216). This resulted in SAVE 
being limited to general principles leaving the Member States to take specific action. 
This is another example of where the lack of control over energy policy has meant 
the Community has been unable to take its desired action.
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Its successor programme, SAVE II, was adopted by the Council in December 1996 
(96/737/EC) for a period of five years (1996-2000). In February 2000 SAVE was 
integrated into the Energy Framework Programme which outlines the Community’s 
strategy for the five year period 1998-2002 (European Parliament 2000a).
ALTENER
ALTENER is the only community programme that focuses exclusively on the 
promotion of renewable energy sources. The overall aim of the ALTENER 
programme is to make an essential contribution to increasing use and market share of 
renewable energy sources, which are environmentally sustainable and constitute a 
major component of the Community strategy to abate greenhouse gas emissions. 
ALTENER's specific objectives are:
• To implement and complement EU measures designed to develop the 
renewable energy resource potential;
• To encourage harmonisation of products and equipment in the renewable 
energy market;
• To support pilot actions on infrastructures that will increase investor 
confidence, stimulate the take-up of renewable energy technologies and 
improve their competitiveness;
• To improve information dissemination and co-ordination at the 
international, EU, national, regional and local level, thereby increasing 
investor confidence and market penetration;
• To support targeted actions designed to speed up investment in 
renewable energy technologies and to increase operational capacity for 
energy production from renewable energy sources; and
• To implement the EU renewable energy strategy (European Commission 
2003f).
Both SAVE and ALTENER were incorporated into the commission proposal for a 
multiannual programme for actions in the field of energy called “Intelligent Energy for 
Europi\ 2003-2006 (European Commission 2001d). The European Parliament and
84
Council adopted this programme on 23 June 2003 and it came into force on 4 
August 2003 (European Commission 2003c)
Conclusion
The EU as a unique institution faces unique challenges when addressing climate 
change. It must cope with the constant struggle for power between the Member 
States and the commission, the problems associated with areas of mixed competence 
and the ability of an individual Member State to block a policy supported by all other 
Member States. It also faces similar challenges to other governmental entities. It has 
institutions that don’t communicate, political compromise affects every proposal, and 
it wants to be a leader in the international arena.
Through the issue of climate change Community institutions are maturing. With 
disputes in many areas over the expansion or contraction of Community 
responsibilities, the commission see climate change as a possible area for it to extend 
its authority. One such area is the power to tax. Currently, tax remains the 
responsibility of the individual Member States, but for many years the commission 
has sought to institute a carbon/energy tax (even if it comes in zero-rated). This may 
well be the most efficient way to cut carbon emissions, but it would mean Member 
States ceding a lot of authority to the Community. This is something with which 
many Member States are not comfortable.
There is also the idea of a co-ordinated energy policy, something the founding fathers 
of the European Union sought; the commission occasionally proposes variations on 
this theme, but they are regularly rebuffed. This constant tension between what the 
commission and some Member States want and what other Member States oppose is
central to how the Community operates. With 15 Member States policy making can 
be slow and at times it appears that the only interest is the national interest with the 
best interest of the Union taking a back seat. With the imminent expansion to 25 
Member States, this process is destined to get worse unless there is some change in 
the policy-making procedure.
Despite these challenges, or more probably because of them, the European 
Commission has been addressing climate change issues for more than 15 years. It has 
put forth various legislative proposals that have had varying levels of success, but it is 
currently not on track to make its Kyoto commitments. It has recognised that to 
meet its goals the EU needs the co-operation of the Member States. The European 
Commission acknowledged in its climate change programme that “it is clear that 
action by both member states (sic) and the European Community needs to be 
reinforced if the EU is to succeed in cutting its greenhouse gas emissions to 8% 
below 1990 levels by 2008-2012, as required by the Kyoto protocol” (European 
Commission 2002).
With the increase in number of Member States and the commission regularly 
proposing new policies and rules (there are some reports that estimate 70% of a 
Member State’s new laws come from Brussels) lobbying of the commission is 
becoming more common. The international obligation to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by 8% and Member States’ failure to address the issue at the domestic level 
will result in continued pressure from Brussels in the form of new legislation in 
climate-change-related areas. Business has recognised the importance of regulations 
emanating from Brussels and the ultimate effect they will have on Member States’ 
domestic law. As a result “in the eyes of many lawyers Brussels has become the
Washington DC of the east, where it is necessary to have a presence in order to 
lobby the Commission” (Flood 1996:384). This does not mean the lobbying is 
straightforward; there are differences between the ways Americans and Europeans 
approach their lobbying. Coming out “guns blazing” is not effective in Brussels; the 
name of the client is rarely disclosed to the commission and everything must be 
handled very delicately. One commentator has described “lobbying the European 
Commission [as] like trying to push a jelly with a blancmange” (Flood 1996:384).
The introduction of emissions trading is predicted to help reduce the EU’s emissions. 
As the likelihood of the EU meeting its Kyoto commitments became more remote 
the EU came to recognise the importance of the flexible mechanisms they once 
opposed. This is a lovely paradox: emissions trading was a US idea and it was 
fundamentally rejected by the European Union at the Kyoto negotiations. But when 
the EU had to figure out how to meet its commitments its internal analysis showed 
that emissions trading was the most effective way. That a huge institution was able to 
make a 180-degree change in position and take up an idea it had previously 
vehemently rejected says a lot about the character of the institution.
The emissions trading scheme will allow the EU to take the position that all 
governments seek: that of an international leader. It can act as a prototype for a 
future international scheme, giving the EU a strong negotiating position and 
companies in the Member States invaluable experience in trading greenhouse gas 
emissions.
Over the last 15 years EU climate change policy has had a very limited effect on 
Member States’ climate change policies. The United Kingdom and Germany had the
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largest percentage reductions in the EU and those reductions were unrelated to EU 
policy. The Scandinavian countries also have low emissions, but they rely heavily on 
natural gas for their energy needs. The introduction of emissions trading, a new 
monitoring mechanism, and the renewable energy requirement will change this. The 
United Kingdom’s emissions trading scheme has already been affected and, with up 
to 70% of a Member State’s new legislation coming from the European Community, 
there should be more European law on climate-change-related issues in the future. 
The lack of authority in crucial areas such as energy and tax may slow this progress 
but not stop it.
Development of the European Climate Change Programme in the past has been an 
inexact science, with some programmes having greater success in achieving their 
objectives than others. This is not necessarily down to the quality of the policy but 
more often than not to very difficult political situations that are unrelated to climate 
change. This may change in the future with the introduction of the emissions trading 
programme, although this too is experiencing political difficulties with the 
development of the National Allocation Plans. Many Member States and the 
Community as a whole are not on target to meet their Kyoto commitments 
(European Commission 2003b).
Chapter 5 -  The United Kingdom’s Approach to Climate
Change
The United Kingdom considers itself a world leader in the climate change debate 
(Marshall 1998a:2, 12, 16; Blair 2000; Leggett 2000:4). The current government has 
set ambitious targets for the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions and its climate 
change programme looks set to deliver reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in 
excess of its international commitments.
Most people seem to think the UK has been lucky and its success in cutting 
emissions has been solely down to “the dash for gas”. This was precipitated by 
Margaret Thatcher’s stand off with the coal miners’ union in the mid-1980s, when 
unprofitable mines were shut down and electricity producers were encouraged to 
switch from coal to natural gas to run their power stations. Mike Molitor of PWC 
suggested, “UK reduction in emissions is a hiccup, not a change in strategy” (Molitor 
2001 Inf). This is a strong statement when you consider some of the innovations, 
such as the Climate Change Levy, emissions trading and the Carbon Trust, 
introduced by New Labour since it came to power in 1997.
Gabrielle Edwards of the Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions 
(DETR) argued that “the dash for gas” represented only about one-third of the 
reason for the UK’s success in reducing emissions. She pointed to changes in the UK 
economy from a manufacturing economy to a service economy, the increase in the 
use of nuclear power and a change in government as other reasons for the UK’s 
success (Edwards 2001 Inf). UK governments may have been able to introduce 
policies which led to these reductions because “there was no serious business
opposition to action on climate change because of high level discussions” between 
business and the government (Cameron 2001 Inf).
Climate change is not a new issue for the United Kingdom government; Margaret 
Thatcher was one of the first world leaders to recognise the importance of the issue. 
She spoke publicly on climate change as it was rising to prominence on the 
international political stage. This does not mean climate change was high on Mrs 
Thatcher’s domestic agenda. However, unlike other leaders around the world she was 
talking about it and that meant there was discussion in the newspapers.
In the United Kingdom, business and government have worked closely together to 
discuss the various policy options available to combat climate change and the 
feasibility of implementing those policies. The government then developed policies 
and again took those to consultation with the interested parties. The views on the 
responsiveness of government to the opinions offered during the consultation varied 
depending on whom I spoke to and the subject area on which the consultation was 
taking place.
H istory of U K Climate Change Policy to the Election of the Labour 
Government
M a r g a r e t  T h a t c h e r ’s G o v e r n m e n t
Climate change was an issue Thatcher could take to heart. She thought of herself as a 
scientist and felt she was able to talk scientists’ language (Macrory 2001 Inf). So in 
1989 when Sir Crispin Tickell, her United Nations Ambassador, suggested she make 
a speech on the increasingly prominent international issue of climate change,
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Thatcher took to it immediately. While her first speech on the issue did not initially 
attract much media attention, one passage subsequendy led to a lot of debate:
For generations, we have assumed that the efforts of mankind 
would leave the fundamental equilibrium of the world’s 
systems and atmosphere stable. But it is possible that with all 
these enormous changes (population, agriculture, use of fossil 
fuels) concentrated into such a short period of time, we have 
unwittingly begun a massive experiment with the system of this 
planet itself . . .  In studying the system of the Earth and its 
atmosphere we have no laboratory in which to carry out 
controlled experiments. We have to rely on observation of 
natural systems. We need to identify particular areas of 
research which will help to establish cause and effect. We need 
to consider in more detail the likely effects to consider the 
wider implications for policy — for energy production, for fuel 
efficiency, for reforestation . . . We must ensure that what we 
do is founded on good science to establish cause and effect 
(Thatcher 1993: 640-641).
Climate change was an issue that Thatcher would take to heart in what remained of 
her time in office. Perhaps she recognised it as “an opportunity for the United 
Kingdom to stay at the top of the international leadership stage” (Macrory 2001 Inf). 
Or perhaps she saw it as a way to respond to the Green Party which made a late 
surge in the 1989 European elections. It was fortuitous that Thatcher had a senior 
civil servant in Sir Crispin Tickell who understood the issue and had written a book 
on it in 1978 (Tickell 1978). For her, climate change was a leadership issue, not 
something to be dumped off on to the environment department.
Thatcher’s next opportunity to tell the world about the potential problem of climate 
change came from Dr Houghton, the chairman of the IPCC and the director-general 
of the Meteorological Office. In May 1990, the IPCC had gathered under the 
chairmanship of Dr Houghton, in Berkshire, to put the finishing touches to its first 
report “one of the most important scientific reports ever compiled”(Leggett 2000:4).
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Dr Houghton provided Thatcher with a pre-release briefing on the report. The day it
was released Thatcher held a press conference at the Met Office, near to where the
scientists had been meeting.
‘Today’, she told the scribbling British press, ‘with the 
publication of the report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, we have an authoritative 
early-warning system: an agreed assessment from 
some three hundred of the world’s leading scientists 
of what is happening to the world’s climate. They 
confirm that greenhouse gases are increasing 
substantially as a result of man’s activities, that this 
wall warm the Earth’s surface wtith serious 
consequences for us all’ (Leggett 2000:4).
This speech led to banner headlines in the UK popular press. The Daily Express, a 
pro-Conservative-government paper, led with ‘Race to Save Our World — Britain takes the 
lead in the crusade against greenhouse effecf (Leggett 2000:4). Climate change had landed on 
the breakfast table of the UK with the science accepted by both the government and 
the press. Thatcher had told people that she had studied the issue and that the best 
scientists in the world had studied it and they believed that there would be serious 
consequences for mankind if something were not done (Thatcher 1993:641). There 
was a short period of discussion within the press on the science, but this did not last 
long. The newspapers agreed with Thatcher that the risks were too high and the 
initial science convincing.
Margaret Thatcher’s final contribution to the debate surrounding climate change 
came just days before she was to leave office. She was one of two heads of state to 
attend the Second World Climate Conference in November 1990; the other was from 
Tuvalu (Cameron 2001 Ini). She spoke of the importance of the world addressing 
climate change on a global scale and at the all important backroom discussions she
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“banged heads together” (Cameron 2001 Ini) in order to get a Ministerial declaration 
of substance42.
Jo h n  M ajo r’s G o v e r n m e n t
John Major succeeded Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister in November 1990. He 
continued to assert the United Kingdom’s leadership in the international climate 
change arena by being the first G-7 leader to commit to attend the Earth Summit in 
Rio (Major 1999:510). His government ratified the Climate Change Convention on 8 
December 1993 and it entered into force as UK law on 4 December 1994.
At the same time as ratification of the UNFCCC the Government introduced the 
UK’s first climate change strategy, Climate Change: The UK Programme (Department of 
the Environment (UK) 1994). For most of the previous year the government 
consulted with the various interest groups. The government issued a discussion paper 
in January 1993 that identified the target of saving 10 Million tons of Carbon (MtC) 
and created the Energy Savings Trust which had the formal objective of reducing 
carbon dioxide emissions by at least 2.5 MtC (Department of the Environment (UK) 
1993b). The discussion paper was followed by an addendum in April 1993 that 
outlined some of the issues raised by the 240 responses the government received 
(Department of the Environment (UK) 1993c). It then held a conference in May 
1993 to discuss the findings of the discussion document and other meetings held 
around the country. The purpose of this conference was to discuss further measures 
for the reduction of carbon dioxide (Department of the Environment (UK) 1993a). 
All this consultation is not unusual for the UK government. It consults, holds
42 A declaration that led to the terms o f reference for the negotiation the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (Leggett, J (2000). The Carbon War. London, Penguin Books,)
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conferences and meets on issues. Alastair Cooke in his television series “America” 
noted in respect of the problems governing the Virginia colony “What does an 
Englishman do when he has a problem? He forms a committee" (Cooke 1970).
The major criticism of the government proposals was that they called primarily for 
voluntary action, with only secondary involvement from the government. Michael 
Howard, the Secretary of State for the Environment, denied this, noting that the 
government believed climate change demanded a partnership and that it expected 
action from others beyond the proposed legislative and fiscal framework (Tindale 
2001 Inf).
Interestingly, it was Major’s government that laid the groundwork for New Labour’s 
future Climate Change Levy.43 The introduction in 1996 of the landfill tax “signalled 
the Treasury’s willingness to accept the concept of tax shift44” (Tindale 2001 Ini). The 
landfill tax was designed to “send a tough signal to waste managers to switch to less 
environmentally damaging alternatives”(HM Customs and Excise (UK) 2001).
L a b o u r  i n  O p p o s it io n
While the Conservative government was beginning to address the United Kingdom’s 
greenhouse gas emissions and implement polices designed to reduce the emissions as 
agreed at the Earth Summit, the Labour party was recovering from a surprise loss in
43 The Labour party confirmed its acceptance o f the concept o f  a tax shift soon after its election in 
1997 with the “Statement on the intent to use environmental taxes” (HM Treasury (UK) (1997). 
Government Policy on Environmental Taxation. London, HM Treasury.)
44 A tax shift is when the government shifts the tax burden from an environmental good to an 
environmental bad.
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the 1992 election. In response to this loss the then leader Neil Kinnock resigned and 
was replaced by John Smith.
Smith believed that the environment would be critical to winning the next election, 
so he formed a policy committee composed of key shadow ministers, individuals and 
advisors, including Robin Cook (Shadow Trade and Industry Secretary), Chris Smith 
(Shadow Environment Secretary), Andrew Smith (Shadow Deputy Secretary for 
Treasury Affairs), and John Prescott (Shadow Transport Secretary to Oct 1993 and 
Shadow Employment Secretary from Oct 1993) (Tindale 2001 Inf). The purpose of 
this committee was “to review and develop, as appropriate” Labour Party 
environmental policy and integrate environmental considerations into other Labour 
party policies (Labour Party (UK) 1994:53).
The result of the committee meetings was a report entitled In Trust For Tomorrow. It 
recommended a business energy tax but called for the exemption of domestic energy. 
The Conservatives’ introduction of VAT on home heating fuel had resulted in a 
significant public backlash; Labour was therefore keen to avoid any tax on domestic 
heat supply. In Trust for Tomorrow also laid out the target of a 20% reduction of C 0 2 
emissions on 1990 emissions levels and having 10% of the country’s energy needs 
met through renewable energy by 2010 and 20% by 2025. Many people I interviewed 
believed these targets were chosen because the Conservatives had a goal of a 10% 
reduction in C 0 2 emissions and the Liberal Democrats were aiming for a reduction 
in C 0 2 emissions of 30%. Stephen Tindale admits most people think the targets 
“came to him in the bath” but the idea for these targets actually came from the
Toronto Conference declaration45 (Tindale 2001 Inf). These targets were chosen 
because the Labour Party believed them to be possible and achievable. They 
conducted no economic modelling to see the possible effect of the targets, and the 
targets were intended to drive policy rather than vice versa (Tindale 2001 Inf).
John Smith rejected the report because of the effect he thought it would have on 
business and of business’s potential reaction to the report (Tindale 2001 Inf). He sent 
the committee back to the drawing board. John Smith died suddenly on 12 May 1994 
about a week after he rejected the report. Margaret Beckett, who was elected interim 
leader, was not remotely interested in the environment.(Tindale 2001 Inf)46 The 
report was resubmitted to her and she accepted it. It is Stephen Tindale’s opinion 
that In Trust for Tomorrow would “never have become Labour Party policy if it to the 
had not been accepted during the interim leadership of Margaret Beckett” (Tindale 
2001 Inf). It was published the same week as Blair was elected leader of the Labour 
Party. In Trust for Tomorrow clearly lays out what the targets will be, but it provides no 
indication as to how these objectives would be achieved.
The Labour Party’s environmental manifesto for the 1997 election came from In 
Trustfor Tomorrow. It included the target of a 20% reduction in C 0 2 emissions but not 
the 10% renewable energy target (Labour Party (UK) 1997). The Shadow Ministers 
responsible for the energy and environment manifesto commitments were Michael 
Meacher (Environment) and John Battle (Energy). Both supported the
45 See discussion o f history o f the science o f climate change in chapter 2.
46 This is especially interesting because as o f  31 March 2004 she is currently Secretary o f State for the 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and a big supporter o f  action to combat climate change 
(Cameron, J (2002). Interview. O f Counsel, Baker & McKenzie; Chairman Carbon Disclosure Project; 
Chairman Advisory Board Climate Change Capital.)
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commitments47 and worked hard for their inclusion in the manifesto. Michael 
Meacher’s strong lobbying inside the Labour Party ensured the C 0 2 commitment 
was included (Tindale 2001 Ini). John Batde was not as successful with his internal 
party lobbying for the renewable energy target (Tindale 2001 Ini). However, outside 
the Labour Party, Battle’s strong personal commitment to the target ensured that 
people generally believed the 10% renewable energy target was part of the manifesto 
commitment (Tindale 2001 Ini).
The inclusion of the C 0 2 commitment in the Labour Party manifesto was very 
important because it again demonstrated the United Kingdom’s willingness to lead 
the international community and the European Union from the front (Tindale 2001 
Ini). Only Germany had a higher commitment to the reduction of carbon dioxide 
emissions.
Six months before the Labour party was elected to office in May 1997, Robin Cook, 
then Shadow Foreign Secretary, formed an important advisory group, the Green 
Globe Task Force48. The purpose of this task force was to introduce environmental
47 He talked about the importance o f  the target at every opportunity and consulted on it widely with 
business and the N G O  community Tindale, S (2001). Interview. Greenpeace.
48 Hugh Raven originally convened this taskforce with: James Cameron, Barrister; O f Counsel to 
Baker & McKenzie, Chicago; Duncan Brack, Head, Sustainable Development Programme, Royal 
Institute o f  International Affairs; Michael Grubb, Professor o f Climate Change and Energy Policy, 
Imperial College; Associate Fellow, Energy and Environment Programme, Royal Institute o f  
International Affairs; Richard Sandbrook, Senior Fellow, International Institute for Environment and 
Development; Jonathan Poritt; and Graham Wynne, Chief Executive, Royal Society for the Protection 
o f  Birds. From time to time it has also included David Baldock, Director, Institute for European 
Environmental Policy; Margaret Brusasco-Mackenzie, Vice Chair, U N ED  Forum; Fanny Calder, 
Associate Fellow, Sustainable Development Programme, Royal Institute o f  International Affairs; 
Beatrice Chaytor, Senior Lawyer, Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development; 
Hilary Coulby, Consultant; Felix Dodds, Director, U N ED  Forum; Paul Jefferiss, Head o f  
Environmental Policy, RSPB; Nick Mabey, Economics and Development Officer, WWF-UK, 
currently on secondment at the Environment Policy Department, Foreign & Commonwealth Office; 
Peter Madden, Head o f  Policy, Environment Agency; Robert Napier, Chief Executive, WWF-UK; 
Derek Osborn, Chair, U NED Forum; Nick Robins, Head o f Research, Socially Responsible 
Investment Team, Henderson Global Investors; Francis Sullivan, Director o f Conservation, WWF-
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arguments into the operational activities of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO). The Task Force continued to operate after Labour came to power. Climate 
change was and is the top item on the agenda of the Task Force. This established the 
importance and relevance of climate change in international diplomacy as already 
existed in the United States through the State Department.
Labour in Government
The Labour Party won a landslide victory in May 1997. The new cabinet now had to 
deliver on its manifesto commitments. In July 1997 the government issued a 
statement of intent on the use of environmental taxation (the tax shift). It recognised 
in this statement that:
“Just as work should be encouraged through the tax system, environmental 
pollution should be discouraged.
To that end, the Government will explore the scope for using the tax system to 
deliver environmental objectives - as one instrument, in combination with others 
like regulation and voluntary action. Over time the Government will aim to 
reform the tax system to increase incentives to reduce environmental damage. 
That will shift the burden of tax from “goods” to “bads”; encourage innovation 
in meeting higher environmental standards; and deliver a more dynamic economy 
and a cleaner environment, to the benefit of everyone” (HM Treasury (UK) 
1997).
The statement then went on to outline the tests that would be applied to all taxes 
including environmental taxes. The new ministers responsible for environment and 
tax recognised from the outset that they would have to look at all options available to 
them to meet their climate change goals.
UK; Koy Thompson, Head o f Policy, ActionAid; Stephen Tindale, Director, Greenpeace UK; Peter 
White, Associate Director, Corporate Sustainable Development Department, Procter & Gamble; 
Rebecca Willis, Director, Green Alliance.
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Meanwhile back at DETR one of the challenges facing the new ministers was the 
civil service (Tindale 2001 Ini). Environment officials in the newly created DETR 
were used to working with John Gummer; he did a lot of posturing but he did not 
have much power within the Conservative Party and was rarely able to ensure the 
environment department’s proposals made it past the DTI or the Treasury (Tindale 
2001 Ini). With the arrival of John Prescott and Michael Meacher49 a change of 
mindset was required for the senior civil servants. For the first time they were part of 
a powerful department. Now when a new policy was suggested they knew that 
Prescott would back them up (Tindale 2001 Ini). This change of mindset was 
essential because the officials in DETR would spearhead many changes in the UK’s 
climate change programme. With signature of the Kyoto Protocol not far away the 
UK and the other industrial nations would have specific and enforceable targets of 
greenhouse gas emissions to meet.
Ky o t o  Sig n e d
The Kyoto Protocol was signed seven months after New Labour was elected to 
government.50 Some commentators would say that this was John Prescott’s finest 
hour. His union-style table bashing for higher percentage targets worked. Prescott is
49 John Prescott was a former union official and known as a deal maker. The press often depicts him 
as a bulldog. In international negotiations he would bang on tables demanding stronger action be 
taken. Michael Meacher on the other hand is a quiet man who would come in after Prescott got 
through banging on the table and pickup the pieces. They worked well together and the “good 
cop/bad cop” routine was successful in many negotiations.
50 For a more detailed discussion o f  the Kyoto Protocol and the events surrounding its adoption see 
Chapter 3 on the International Politics o f Climate Change.
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a union man and he understood this style of negotiation and it may well have led to 
higher targets being set51.
The UK is a part of the European Union “Bubble Group”52 which is committed to 
reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 8% by the end of the first compliance period 
in 2008. The United Kingdom’s portion of this commitment is a reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions of 12.5% from 1990 levels over the period 2008 — 2012, 
the first compliance period. The United Kingdom ratified the Kyoto Protocol on 31 
May 2002.
M a r sh a l l  R e p o r t
Gordon Brown announced the Marshall Task Force in March 1998 during his first 
pre-budget speech after the government released its policy on environmental 
taxation. The objective of the consultation was “to examine whether economic 
instruments have a role to play and if so how they might best be made to work while 
maintaining the competitive advantage of UK industry and how industry can best 
contribute to tackling climate change” (Marshall 1998b).
The Marshall Task Force was not what the government had originally intended. 
Gordon Brown, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and John Prescott had agreed the 
basic structure of the Climate Change Levy and it was due to be announced in the
51 Ironically, this may well have damaged the chances o f US ratification. Rob Reinstein (Head o f the 
US delegation in Rio in 1992) told George W Bush that the Kyoto targets were impossible for the US 
to meet Cameron, J (2004). Interview. O f Counsel, Baker & McKenzie; Chairman Carbon Disclosure 
Project; Chairman Advisory Board Climate Change Capital.
52 The “Bubble Group” is a group o f  countries, in this case the European Union, that have agreed to 
fulfil their commitments as agreed in the Kyoto Protocol jointly (Kyoto Protocol to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1997).)
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March 1998 pre-budget speech. It was only at the last minute that it was replaced 
with the Marshall Task Force and the possibility of a tax. It was essential that 
Meacher and Prescott got Brown to follow through on his commitment to the tax 
shift. As a supply-side labour economist Brown was interested in cutting labour taxes 
and the Climate Change Levy allowed him to do this.
The analysis for this type of tax came from a Jacques Delors White Paper for a 
proposed EU carbon tax.53 (Tindale 2001 Ini) While the Labour Party did not accept 
the concept of the EU carbon tax Gordon Brown accepted the analysis laid out in 
the white paper (Tindale 2001 Ini). Various British NGOs also prepared papers54 
including those by future Labour Party advisor Stephen Tindale that called for an 
energy tax. The Climate Change Levy was a win-win for Gordon Brown. He was able 
to lower labour taxes and increase taxes on those with high C 0 2 emissions.
Gordon Brown decided to announce the Climate Change Levy/Marshall Report in 
his first pre-budget speech for two reasons. First, the Labour Party had a manifesto 
commitment to cut C 0 2 emissions by 20%. Second, the Advisory Committee on 
Business and the Environment55 (ACBE) had just published its report Climate Change: 
A  Strategic Issue For Business. The report recognised the role of the energy tax, but 
wanted it to be set up alongside emissions trading.
53 For a discussion o f  the proposed tax see Chapter 4 on the EU climate change programme.
54 New environmental polity instruments in the UK by Stephen Tindale and Chris Hewett; Green Tax Reform: 
Pollution Payments and Labour Tax Cuts by Stephen Tindale and Gerald Holtham; Britain in Europe edited 
by Elizabeth Barrett and Stephen Tindale.
55 ACBE was established in 1991 to engage in a strategic dialogue with business on environmental 
issues. Members are joindy appointed by the Secretary o f State for Trade and Industry and the Deputy 
Prime Minister and serve in a personal capacity. Membership consists o f  senior business leaders, 
drawn from a range o f  sectors.
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Gordon Brown asked Sir Colin Marshall, Chairman of British Airways and President 
o f the Confederation of British Industry, to chair the task force; he was “a good 
appointment because no one was proposing to tax British Airways so he was 
considered neutral” (Tindale 2001 Ini). Marshall’s review was to examine how 
economic instruments could be used to improve the industrial and commercial use of 
energy. The task force studied “whether or not new economic instruments, such as 
an industrial energy tax and/or other market mechanisms, should be introduced to 
help curb emissions, and, if so, how” (HM Treasury (UK) 1998:Section 6). Marshall 
was assisted by a task force of senior civil servants from HM Treasury, DETR, 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), and HM Customs and Excise (Marshall 
1998b:2). Marshall was to report back to the Chancellor in November 1998.
In June 1998 Marshall issued a consultation paper in which he sought views on 
“ jh]ow industry and commerce can best make their contribution to tackling climate 
change”(Marshall 1998b:2). This consultation paper outlined the various “ways by 
which the government might seek greenhouse gas emissions reductions from 
industry and commerce” (Marshall 1998b:4). It then went into a detailed description 
of emissions trading and taxation. The Task Force assumed that any instruments 
used should be fiscally neutral. Reponses to the consultation paper were due by 31 
July 1998.
Marshall received 143 responses from organisations and individuals.56 Responses 
were received from the energy industry, business organisations, energy intensive 
users, general industrial or commercial energy users, energy savings and other
56 A list o f  the respondents can be found in Table A.3 to Marshall’s Final Report issued in November 
1998.
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environmental technology industries, the financial sectors, environmental NGOs, 
academics, consultancies and regulators, local authorities and individuals (Marshall 
1998a:A.5).
Despite soliciting input from the trade unions they failed to respond (Marshall 
1998a:28). This was not unusual; in fact the trade unions have not participated in any 
of the policy making around the climate change programme. They did want to 
participate in the negotiations of the side agreements for the Climate Change Levy, 
but business excluded them (Field 2001 Inf). No one was able to give me any reason 
for the lack of union participation.57
In November 1998, Marshall delivered his report to Gordon Brown. “No clear 
consensus emerged from [the] consultation as to the right solution” (Marshall 
1998a:6). But having reviewed all the evidence presented, Lord Marshall concluded 
that economic instruments had a role to play in the United Kingdom’s efforts to 
meet its climate change commitments. He called for a mixed regulatory approach to 
meeting the government’s carbon emissions reduction targets (Marshall 1998a:8). He 
noted how “unlike regulation or negotiated agreements, economic instruments 
provide a continuing financial incentive to reduce emitting activities and expand 
beneficial activities, rewarding innovation through the bottom line” (Marshall 
1998a: 10). He briefly reviewed the different policy options available: regulation, 
voluntary agreements, negotiated agreements, subsidies and economic instruments.
57 I contacted the Trades Union Congress, but was told they did not have anyone available to speak to 
me.
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With regard to emissions trading Marshall concluded “that it may not be sensible for 
Government to introduce a statutory scheme in the UK at this stage” (Marshall 
1998a:16). He recommended, “that Government should step up its consultation with 
interested parties focusing especially on resolving the issues identified above. Strong 
business input into design of international trading would be essential. Such 
consultation should inform the UK’s negotiating position as well as developing 
expertise domestically so that British firms are ready and our financial institutions 
well positioned to lead in these new markets” (Marshall 1998a: 16).
Marshall found the idea of a tax most attractive. He relied heavily on ACBE’s 
acceptance that “an economic instrument in the form of a tax may be necessary to 
meet the Government’s target” (ACBE 1998:15; Marshall 1998a: 17). He did however 
recognise that any tax would have a greater impact on energy intensive firms and 
therefore it may be necessary to offer some form of special treatment for these firms 
(Marshall 1998a: 19). Despite this he concluded “that there probably is a role for a tax 
if business of all sizes and from all sectors are to contribute to improved energy 
efficiency and help meet the UK’s emissions targets” (Marshall 1998a: 19). From this 
conclusion he made three recommendations:
• The revenues are recycled in full to business;
• Consideration be given to special treatment of energy intensive industries; 
and
• Any measures are subject to detailed consultation about their design 
(Marshall 1998a:19).
The government's initial response to Lord Marshall's report was set out in the 1998 
Pre-Budget Bxport.
“The Government will be considering Lord Marshall’s recommendations very 
carefully in developing its strategy on climate change, and will continue work and 
consultation on the further design issues identified in his report. The 
Government will take into account any potential impacts on competitiveness in
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seeking to find the most cost-effective means of meeting its targets for 
reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases” (HM Treasury (UK) 1998:Chap 5 
Para 5.38).
All this being said, according to Stephen Tindale, “The Marshall Report was a stitch- 
up” (Tindale 2001 Ini). The result was predetermined; the government was going to 
introduce the Climate Change Levy no matter what business thought. Gordon 
Brown and John Prescott had agreed the Climate Change Levy for the March 1998 
budget, but it was allegedly blocked by the Prime Minister’s office because it feared 
upsetting the business community. So instead the Marshall Task Force was 
announced along with the possibility of a tax (Tindale 2001 Ini). The task force was 
given very specific instructions on what it was to look at and how long it had to 
report. Dinah Nichols, Director General, Environmental Protection at DETR, had a 
reputation for being very good at delivering her agenda. In this case, her agenda was 
that there should be an energy tax (Tindale 2001 Ini). The Marshall Report gave the 
government the support and the protection from business it needed to proceed with 
the taxes it had planned while the consultation process gave the Prime Minister’s 
office the confidence to proceed with the tax (Tindale 2001 Ini).
Cl im a t e  Ch a n g e  L e v y
Gordon Brown announced the Climate Change Levy in the March 1999 budget.
“We will now implement Lord Marshall’s recommendations and introduce a levy 
on business use of energy from April 2001. And it will be brought in, after 
further consultation with industry, on a revenue neutral basis, with no overall 
increase in the burden of taxation on business. Because we intend at the same 
time to cut the main rate of employers’ national insurance contributions from 
12.2 to 11.7 per cent.
We also intend to set significandy lower rates of tax for energy intensive sectors 
that improve their energy efficiency. Today we are inviting them to submit their 
proposals. In pursuit of our policies for sustainable development we will also
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allocate an extra 50 million pounds to encourage business to invest in the new 
environmental technologies and in renewable fuels” (HM Treasury (UK) 1999b).
This announcement launched one of the most important and controversial aspects of 
the climate change programme. The Climate Change Levy was designed to “play a 
major role in helping meet the UK's targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions . .
. [to] promote energy efficiency, encourage employment opportunities, and stimulate 
investment in new technologies” (HM Treasury (UK) 1999). The Treasury claimed 
that there would be “no increase in the tax burden on business as the revenues will 
be recycled in full to business” (HM Treasury (UK) 1999a). The revenue was 
recycled principally through a 0.5% cut in employers’ national insurance.58 It was 
expected that the Climate Change Levy would lead to savings of 1.5 million tons of 
carbon per annum by 2010. “The first evaluation of the Climate Change Levy’s 
effects showed that it added 0.9 per cent to industry’s costs in April, the Office of 
National Statistics (ONS) said” (Duncan and Buckley 2001).
Unfortunately for the government the hoped-for protection of the Marshall Report 
did not materialise; it was attacked from all sides. The Guardian, a left-leaning daily 
national newspaper, called it “Labour’s poll tax” harking back to Margaret Thatcher’s 
extremely unpopular tax that led to rioting in London (Cowe and Gow 1999). “It 
unleashed a storm of protest”(Houlder 1999) in the business community with the 
chairman of BG, a gas transmission company, calling the tax “perverse” (Gribben 
1999a) and the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) warning that “there would be 
extremely damaging long-term consequences for important parts of the UK’s 
manufacturing base and jobs” (Houlder 1999). While no one was surprised when the
58 It should be noted that the reduction in employers’ national insurance given as a part o f  the Climate 
Change Levy was taken away in the April 2002 budget when the Chancellor increased employers’ 
national insurance contribution by 1%.
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Climate Change Levy was announced, what was surprising was the level of taxation 
(Mogford 2001 Inf). The Royal Society59 believes that the Climate Change Levy is 
“flawed because it taxes energy use and not pollution from carbon dioxide” (Reuters 
News Service 2002a).
Not everyone was upset by the proposed tax. Friends of the Earth “seized on the 
measures as evidence that the Government had accepted the logic of using the 
Budget to affect behaviour” (Cowe 1999). Cambridge Econometrics claimed that the 
levy would be more effective than the government had predicted and would have 
minimal impact on costs in most sectors (Cambridge Econometrics 1999). “Charles 
Secrett, executive director of Friends of the Earth, also thinks it could go further. 
‘The Climate Change Levy is a good thing because it discriminates against polluters.’ 
‘The problem with the levy is that on the one hand it doesn’t go far enough, - it 
would be much better to introduce a carbon tax across all energy users - and 
secondly it is complicated and it has not been very fairly applied’” (BBC News 
2001b).
Members of Parliament even got in on the act. During a debate on the Climate 
Change Levy Conservative MP John Bercow (Buckingham) called it part of the 
“Government’s policy of taxation by stealth”(Hansards 1999:col 411). In the Trade 
and Industry Select Committee report on the Climate Change Levy they referred to it 
as a “blunt instrument” and were “disturbed by the unprecedented scale of the 
reaction to the Government’s proposal” (Trade and Industry Select Committee (UK) 
1998-99). MPs were disappointed that the government failed to consult on several
59 The Royal Society is the United Kingdom’s national academy o f science.
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key decisions determining the design of the levy and added that they "remain[ed] to 
be convinced" that the Treasury ha[d] not seen the energy tax as an opportunity for 
the Chancellor to offer the majority of the business and commercial sectors a 
significant tax cut” (Gribben 1999b). And “that the Climate Change Levy, as 
presendy designed, sits easily with that strategy. . .  . The Government is right to make 
a bold commitment to meeting its Kyoto target, but that target must not be met at 
the expense of British manufacturing industry” (Trade and . Industry Select 
Committee (UK) 1998-99).
The government responded to these challenges by emphasising the revenue neutrality 
of the proposed tax and that it was considered an essential part of the government’s 
plan to meet the Kyoto targets (Hansards 1999:Col 411-412). But Terry Carrington, 
Climate Change Policy Advisor at the Department of Trade and Industry, recognised 
that “the Government may have claimed that the Climate Change Levy was revenue 
neutral but this hid anomalies” (Carrington 2001 Ini). Companies with a large labour 
force benefited from the decrease in national insurance while energy-intensive users 
usually employ very few people so they paid more tax without the benefit of a large 
decrease in national insurance. Stephen Tindale thinks that the mistake the 
government made was that it believed the civil servants at Customs and Excise when 
they said it would be difficult, if not impossible, to exempt renewable energy from 
the Climate Change Levy (Tindale 2001 Ini). Therefore when the tax was announced 
renewable energy was not exempt. Gordon Brown did however say that he would 
listen to any proposals on how to exempt it from the tax.
A consultation document was published by Customs and Excise on the day that 
Gordon Brown announced the Climate Change Levy. The aim of the consultation
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was “to design the levy in a way that maximises its environmental effectiveness whilst 
safeguarding the competitiveness of UK business” (HM Customs and Excise (UK) 
1999a:para 6.32). This consultation document also gave the government the 
opportunity to make changes in the proposed tax and respond to the criticism it 
faced.
While the Marshall Report leant towards a carbon-based energy tax, Customs and 
Excise recommended the tax be based on the more administratively simple energy 
content (HM Customs and Excise (UK) 1999c:5). This had the benefit of avoiding 
further disadvantage to coal, but meant that renewable energy and combined heat 
and power (CHP) were taxed at the same rate as coal and oil. This conflicts with the 
government’s stated goals of a doubling of CHP output by 2010 and increasing the 
proportion of electricity supplied from renewables to 10%. In an attempt to reconcile 
this conflict the government has investigated whether it can overcome EU state aid 
rules and grant a full exemption to CHP from the Climate Change Levy.
The consultation document asked the respondents to answer mostly administrative 
questions about how the tax should operate, be enforced and be collected. There 
were a few exceptions on the treatment of combined heat and power or renewable 
energy.
It was Terry Carrington’s feeling that the consultations on the Climate Change Levy 
worked because business was able to make some changes in what was proposed 
(Carrington 2001 Inf). In contrast Pete Chamely of NatWest felt that Customs and 
Excise did not really understand the policy (Charnely 2001 Inf). Customs and Excise 
noted in its summary of the consultation process that many of the responses it
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received were outside the scope of the consultation document (HM Customs and 
Excise (UK) 1999b:5).
As a result of the consultation process, on 9 November 1999, the Chancellor 
announced further details of and revisions to the design of the Climate Change Levy:
“As we pursue our ambitions for growth and jobs, we can and must keep our 
environmental commitments. Under my Right Hon. Friend the Deputy Prime 
Minister, Britain took the lead in successfully negotiating the Kyoto agreement, 
and I am today announcing the results of our consultation with business on the 
climate change levy. Our original proposal was to cut environmental pollution by 
1.5 million tonnes a year by 2010. Our consultation has shown that we can cut 
environmental pollution even further by 2010—by more than 2 million tonnes a 
year—and at the same time cut the levy from £1.75 billion to £1 billion.
I have decided that renewable energy sources and combined heat and power will 
be exempt from the levy. The main rate per kW hour will be cut from 0.21p to 
0.15p, and there will be an 80 per cent discount to energy-intensive sectors 
signing energy efficiency agreements. Taken together, those changes approach a 
90 per cent discount on the levy published at Budget time in return for agreed 
industry action to cut emissions.
All the revenues raised will be recycled to business. I can confirm that every 
business will receive a tax cut of 0.3 percentage points in employer national 
insurance contributions. I have ensured not only that that package is revenue 
neutral for business and revenue neutral between manufacturing and services, but 
that even after the national insurance change there will be no gain to the public 
purse.
In the run-up to the Budget, we will consult on a new 100 per cent first-year 
investment allowance for companies moving from environmentally unfriendly to 
environmentally friendly technologies and processes. I propose to make available 
not, as originally announced, £50 million, but in the first year a total of £150 
million to support energy efficiency in British industry. With all those measures 
taken together, Britain is on track to meet our country's Kyoto target” (Hansard 
1999:Col 889).
From industry’s point of view the announcements made by the Chancellor were seen
as significant concessions. The Chemical Industries Association commented:
“Although there are still some detailed issues to be resolved, the big threat to the
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competitiveness of our wealth-creating industry seems to have been removed” 
(House of Commons Library 1999:43).
At the same time as the Customs and Excise consultation process was happening the 
DETR was beginning to negotiate side agreements with the energy-intensive users. 
Discounts were allowed only for those companies covered by the Integrated 
Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) legislation.60 The purpose of these 
agreements was to lower the rate of the Climate Change Levy paid by these groups in 
exchange for improvements in energy efficiency. Because of the business 
community’s reaction to the Climate Change Levy the government was forced to 
agree significantly lower rates for energy-intensive users that agreed targets for 
improving their energy efficiency. Negotiations with trade associations of the energy 
intensive users and individual companies were conducted by the DETR with the 
participation of DTI and Treasury. In the end the government agreed 48 of these 
side agreements, each of which had to be approved by DG Competition to ensure 
that the government was not giving UK industry an unfair advantage over European 
competitors.
Garth Edwards, formerly of NatSource and now of Shell, felt that a company or 
trade association had to be “dumb in the negotiations not to have gotten a good 
deal.” (Edwards 2001 Ini). He expects most companies will meet or exceed their 
targets.
60 Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control legislation covers pollution output rather than 
greenhouse gases, so many large energy users that do no pollute are not eligible for the negotiated 
reductions.
I l l
There was some debate between the government departments as to the consultation 
that took place. Andrew Field, formerly of DETR and currendy working on 
environmental tax issues at the Treasury, felt that Gabrielle Edwards and her team 
developing the UK Climate Change Programme were kept up-to-date on what was 
happening with the Climate Change Levy. It was developed in parallel to the 
programme and then could be slotted into the programme when it was ready. While 
the Treasury has the lead on all tax issues, DETR had a full opportunity to make 
representations (Field 2001 Inf). DETR and DTI disagreed with the Treasury; they 
felt they were given a done deal on the Climate Change Levy. The Treasury may have 
told them roughly what it was doing, but there was no opportunity to see how it 
fitted within the overall climate change programme or what effects the Climate 
Change Levy might have had on the other policies that were being proposed.
Interviewees repeatedly told me that the Climate Change Levy was “a mess” 
(Cameron 2001 Inf). Garth Edwards, then of Natsource and now of Shell Trading, 
called the Climate Change Levy a “goof’ (Edwards 2001 Inf). Lionel Fretz of 
EcoSecurities and now of Climate Change Capital, an environmental finance 
company, felt that the Climate Change Levy owes more to chaos theory than policy 
development (Fretz 2001 Inf). Professor David Pearce from University College 
London on a BBC news programme, said: “This is a complete dog's breakfast of a 
tax. If the government really wanted to use the tax to protect the environment they 
would plough back most of the proceeds into improving energy efficiency - not 
cutting National Insurance” (Harriban 1999). Dr Dieter Helm, a fellow of New 
College Oxford and director of Oxford Economic Research Associates Ltd. 
(OXERA), asserted that the Climate Change Levy is “bizarre” and was not done to 
affect climate change emissions, but “to protect the coal industry” (Harriban 1999).
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Its introduction was not co-ordinated with the rest of the UK’s climate change 
programme. So despite Dawn Primarolo’s61 assertion to the House of Commons 
Environment, Transport and Regions Committee that “it is in no one’s interest that 
we give green taxes a bad name by choosing a hasty or ill-considered measure” 
(Minutes of Evidence taken before the Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs 
Committee (UK) 1998:Para 2) it seems to be a consensus opinion of the people I 
interviewed that the tax was ill conceived and does not accomplish the government’s 
stated aims.
It was most probably done because of the government’s commitment to tax 
environmental bads, and because it met “a lot of objectives: to send a signal, 
government wanted to give exemption to energy intensive industry, where to put the 
tax (not covering generators because this would lead to the tax being applied to 
domestic users)” (Carrington 2001 Inf). It also gave the government a lot of 
credibility in Europe (Edwards 2001 Inf).
The limited consultation that Treasury made with the climate change teams in the 
DTI and DETR made formation of climate change policy in the United Kingdom 
very fractured. The complicated structure which Andrew Field claimed was 
“deliberate to give business choice in meeting targets” (Field 2001 Inf) has most 
probably made the entire climate change programme more complicated than it need 
be and may well have led to the emissions trading programme having to be scrapped 
in favour of the European Community scheme. That being said, one important thing
61 At the time this comment was made Dawn Primarolo was the Financial Secretary to the Treasury.
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about the Climate Change Levy that is not often recognised is that it helped to 
establish a price for carbon.
C l im a t e  Ch a n g e  P r o g r a m m e
The UK began work on a new climate change programme not long after the Kyoto 
Protocol was signed. To gather public opinion on what should be done a 
consultation paper was published in October 1998. It was designed to “stimulate a 
national debate on how [the UK] might meets [its] targets” (DETR (UK) 1998). It 
was all about potential — how the United Kingdom should deal with the issue of 
climate change (Edwards 2001 Inf).
Because of the introduction of the Climate Change Levy, the UK climate change 
programme was not produced in a logical and ordered way. DETR was not able to sit 
down and determine the size of the policy gap, then do a thorough analysis of the 
issues and policy options available and finally produce a package. The policies were 
dropped in at different times. The Treasury decided it was going to go ahead with the 
Climate Change Levy and that caused “a huge amount of problems as far as the 
emissions trading scheme is concerned” because of the Climate Change Levy 
agreements (Edwards 2001 Inf). “The CBI thinks it was a logical process and I am 
not sure I want to disabuse them of this” (Edwards 2001 Inf).
After describing the commitments made in Kyoto the consultation paper identified 
the central government framework within which the policy would be made, the 
options available for reducing emissions and a first attempt at a cost benefit analysis 
of the potential savings (DETR (UK) 1998:2). The government received 607 written
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responses to this consultation document (DETR (UK) 1999b:5). In addition to these 
responses DETR and other consulting bodies in the devolved administrations of 
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland held seminars around the country. Officials 
across a “number of government departments” (DETR (UK) 1999b:5) reviewed 
these responses; Ecotec was employed to analyse a sample of the responses. The 
information received through this process was used in the preparation of the draft 
climate change programme that was published in March 2000.
The draft programme invited comments on any aspect of the document. It also asked 
four specific questions:
• How might the government strengthen the signal about the need for change, 
and start to prepare the UK for making significant emission reductions in the 
future?
• Were there are any obvious gaps in the draft programme?
• What other action that could reinforce the programmes are stakeholders 
taking?
• What should the priorities be for the government and the devolved 
administrations in developing strategies to adapt to climate change?
The DETR had originally planned to publish the draft climate change programme in 
the late fall of 1999, but it was delayed because of the introduction, consultation and 
subsequent modifications to the Climate Change Levy. At the time, it was in the 
process of evaluating the options available, but it had not yet reached the stage of 
stacking up the various options and deciding which would be best to use for business 
to contribute to reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. The debate was effectively 
pre-empted by the introduction of the Climate Change Levy. “Ever since then it has 
been sort of catch-up to put [the climate change programme] all together” (Edwards 
2001 Inf).
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Instead the DETR issued a progress report in the form of Tackling Climate Change in 
the UK. The document recognised that the UK had achieved cuts in greenhouse gas 
emissions “primarily through ‘fuel switching”’ (DETR (UK) 1999b:3). It also noted 
that the government and business worked together to develop a domestic emissions 
trading scheme which should give the UK businesses and government a valuable 
head start when it comes to an international scheme, and it should also help to 
establish the City of London as a centre for international carbon emissions trading” 
(DETR (UK) 1999c:5).
Four months after the modifications to the Climate Change Levy were announced 
DETR published the draft climate change programme.
Over the next five months consultations were held by DETR, and the Parliamentary 
Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee took evidence and 
deliberated on the draft climate change strategy. The government’s response to the 
committee’s report was published in August 2000. Three months later, in November 
2000, the final climate change strategy was published.62 The strategy sought to 
explain:
• Why the climate is changing and what its impacts might be;
• How the international community is working to ensure a global response, 
with agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol;
• The leading role the UK plays internationally and in Europe;
• The UK's legally binding targets under the Kyoto Protocol to reduce its
greenhouse gas emissions to 12.5% below 1990 levels by 2008-2012 and 
its domestic goal of a 20% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions below 
1990 levels by 2010;
• The progress the UK has already made in cutting its greenhouse gas 
emissions;
62 At the same time the initial emissions trading consultation paper was published.
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• New measures the government and the devolved administrations are 
introducing to reduce emissions further and achieve the UK's climate 
change targets;
• The important role of key stakeholders, such as business, local 
authorities, representative groups, trade unions and each of us as 
individuals;
• The more significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions that will be 
needed beyond 2010, and how the government is preparing the UK to 
make a major transformation toward a low carbon economy; and
• How climate change is expected to affect the UK, how we might need to 
adapt, and the action the government and the devolved administrations 
have started to take to prepare for this (DETR (UK) 2000:5).
It is the government’s belief that the UK will benefit from strong action to tackle 
climate change. It believed the policies set out in the climate change programme 
would deliver reductions that are part of a wider drive for a better quality of life as 
well as economic modernisation.
The government “strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions formfed] the core of 
the [climate change] programme. [They] estimate[d] that the proposal in this 
programme could reduce the UK's greenhouse gas emissions to about 23% below 
1990 levels in 2010. This is well beyond Kyoto targets and means the UK will be 
ready to ratify the Kyoto Protocol when the government, in discussion with its 
partners in the European Union, decides the time is right” (DETR (UK) 2000:7). 
The government policies for the reduction greenhouse gas emissions are:
• The Climate Change Levy — a tax on energy use by business;
• Domestic emissions trading;
• The Carbon Trust;
• Exemption of good quality combined heat and power and renewables 
from the Climate Change Levy;
• Energy labels and standards;
• To increase the proportion of electricity provided by renewable sources 
to 10% by 2010, subject to the cost to consumers being acceptable; and
• A doubling of combined heat and power capacity by 2010.
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Climate Change Levy
Although the Climate Change Levy is technically part of the government’s climate 
change programme it was announced as a separate programme, the consultations 
were held independendy, and DETR was given the final levy as a done deal. For this 
reason it has been discussed separately above.
Emissions Trading
In line with Lord Marshall’s desire to see the City of London as a leader in emissions 
trading, the United Kingdom was one of the first countries to get a Kyoto compliant 
emissions trading scheme up and running. After the international rules for emissions 
trading were agreed in Bonn in July 2001 it was hoped that the United Kingdom’s 
scheme would “lead to the City of London being the major player in the global 
system of trading carbon” (Brown 2001).
The impetus for the emissions trading scheme came from ACBE in its report Climate 
Change — A  Strategic Issue for Business, which recommended that “flexible international 
mechanisms such as trading should be established as soon as possible on a business- 
to-business basis. The UK should take an active role in establishing these 
mechanisms and stay closely involved in the international negotiations on trading and 
joint implementation” (ACBE 1998:16).
In March 1999, during the initial consultations on the climate change programme, 
John Battle, Minister for Energy and Industry said “emissions trading could prove to 
be a key environmental tool of the 21st century, tackling pollution and sustaining
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business simultaneously. Out of that will come many opportunities for new business 
and for exports, including renewable energy aiid other power projects” (DETR (UK) 
1999a).
The process for establishing an emissions trading scheme in the UK began in June 
1999 when the Advisory Committee on Business and the Environment (ACBE) and 
the Confederation of British Industry set up the UK Emissions Trading Group 
(UKETG). The UKETG is comprised of “over 100 leading companies - both 
emitters and service providers - trade bodies, and representatives of three UK 
Government Departments, ie DEFRA (formerly DETR), DTI and HM Treasury” 
(UKETG 2002). The purpose of this group was to work with government to 
“determine all the opportunities that can be attained through emissions trading, [and 
to] establish the mechanisms for delivering environmental gain at least cost, thereby 
maintaining competitiveness amongst UK companies” (Emissions Trading Group 
1999). BG seconded Margaret Mogford to chair the UKETG, and UKETG 
submitted papers on mechanisms for and issues surrounding emissions trading to the 
government in October 1999 and March 2000. These formed the basis of the 
consultation document that was published in November 2000 with responses due in 
January 2001.
This was a short consultation period but “the UK government was good at getting 
information because the [UK]ETG heard business” (Edwards 2001 Ini) and the 
UKETG had been successful in getting everyone in the business community and 
government to work together (Mogford 2001 Ini). The Government received 89 
responses to the consultation document, all of which endorsed the concept of an
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emissions trading regime, but questions were raised about the specific rules proposed 
P E T R  (UK) 2001:1).
Many people I spoke to suggested that the introduction of the Climate Change Levy 
slowed down the emergence of the emissions trading scheme. This was denied by 
government officials (Carrington 2001 Int; Edwards 2001 Inf) but according to 
Margaret Mogford, the individuals who had been working on emissions trading 
issues were recalled by their companies to explain and then try to understand the 
potential effect of the Climate Change Levy on their businesses (Mogford 2001 Inf).
Following further consultation with the business community and other government 
departments DETR announced a voluntary emissions trading programme in August 
2001. It was designed to provide those companies with Climate Change Agreements 
(CCA) as a part of the Climate Change Levy the option to buy allowances were they 
to have difficulty meeting their targets or to sell allowances where the targets are 
exceeded. The scheme was also open to companies which did not have a CCA, but 
wished to take on caps and make trades or simply open an account to buy and sell 
allowances p E F R A  (UK) 2001). The government made available £215 million over 
a five-year period as an incentive for companies to join the scheme. When asked by 
BBC News Online why the government would be paying industry to join the scheme, 
Mr Meacher replied: ‘W hat company will take on caps on its emissions without 
incentives? We don't want to impose additional mandatory targets on industry at this 
stage” (BBC News 2001a).
There have been many criticisms of the United Kingdom’s scheme. James Cameron 
thinks it is not simple enough, big enough or robust enough to last through the
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voluntary portion (Cameron 2001 Inf). Stephen Tindale argued that emissions trading 
was “a blocking scheme to buy three or four years for business. The scheme is 
voluntary and government money has been offered to encourage people to 
participate” (Tindale 2001 Inf). Stephen Tindale believes for these reasons the UK 
Emissions Trading Scheme will not be as successful as the Government anticipates.63 
CIMA argues “Almost three out of four [finance directors] believe that the emissions 
trading proposals, part of a raft of measures signed up to by the UK government at 
the environmental summit in Kyoto, will be a bureaucratic nightmare” (Chartered 
Institute of Management Accountants 2001:4).
The first trade was recorded in September 2001 when Dupont sold 10,000 year 2002 
greenhouse gas emissions allowances to MIECO, a unit of Japanese trading company 
Marubeni Corp. The deal was struck on a forward basis as the emissions trading 
regime did not come into effect until April 2002 (Reuters News Service 2001b). At 
the start of trading not many big companies had participated, but this was probably 
because they are still verifying their emissions (Chatterjee 2002).
Despite all of the work the government and business put into the emissions trading 
scheme Margot Wallstrom, the European environment commissioner, warned that 
Britain would eventually have to drop its carbon emissions trading scheme or make it 
conform to the proposed Europe-wide system64 (Buchan 2001). Tom Delay, Chief 
Executive of the Carbon Trust, acknowledged that the current version of the 
emissions trading scheme might not be the last word on the issue. "No new venture
63 Mr Tindale is Executive Director o f  Greenpeace UK and the N G O s had sought a mandatory 
scheme that was not ultimately accepted by the Government.
64 For a detailed discussion o f the EU emissions trading programme and how it was developed see 
chapter 4.
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as bold as emissions trading can be expected to be perfect first time. Learning by 
doing will help put the UK in the lead in this exciting area of climate change policy, 
and we can and must make sure the UK system develops constructively along with 
wider European proposals. This initiative should be welcomed by everyone who 
wants to see a mix of market, fiscal and regulatory instruments play their respective 
parts in tackling climate change” (Carbon Trust 2002).
The UK’s emissions trading scheme did not comply with the EU programme and 
therefore will be allowed to expire at the end of the first trading period. Participants 
in the scheme have the right to opt out of the EU programme during the first 
compliance period.
The Carbon Trust
The Carbon Trust was launched in March 2001 and is charged with persuading 
business to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. The government estimates that the 
Carbon Trust and energy efficiency measures under the Climate Change Levy will 
result in a savings of 0.5 million tonnes of carbon (DETR (UK) 2000:72). Exactly 
how much money has been allocated to do this has been very difficult to determine.
Every time the government made an announcement regarding the establishment of 
the Carbon Trust it announced a different budgetary figure. The initial 
announcement July 2000 gave it funding of £21 million (Houlder 2000). The Prime 
Minister in October 2000 at a speech to the Green Alliance said that it would have 
“up to £50 million a year developing low-carbon technology, pardy funded from the 
Climate Change Levy” (Blair 2000). One month later a DETR press release in
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advance of COP6 said it would have “£130 million of Climate Change Levy receipts 
to accelerate the take-up of low carbon technology” (DETR 2000). In March 2001 it 
was given £200 million to distribute over two years with £33 million of its £50 
million annual budget coming from the Climate Change Levy (The Times of London 
2001b). So it is very difficult to tell exacdy how much it has to spend and on what. So 
it is unclear how much it has to spend and on what. Interviews with several specialist 
commentators and the Carbon Trust itself, indicate its annual budget is 
approximately £50 million.65
The confusion over the Carbon Trust’s annual budget is indicative of the confusion 
over the Carbon Trust itself. The Carbon Trust was an Advisory Committee on 
Business and the Environment (ACBE) recommendation (Edwards 2001 Ini). In 
October 1999 ACBE proposed a body known as the “Carbon Trust” which would 
“run an integrated programme to accelerate the take up of existing low-carbon 
technologies and other measures” (ACBE 1999). ACBE made this proposal at the 
request of a government that was looking for suggestions on how best to help 
businesses take advantage of certain climate-related opportunities. The consultations 
on the establishment of the Carbon Trust were carried out by ACBE (DETR (UK) 
2000:29). On the surface ACBE appears to be a business-led organisation but 
according to Stephen Tindale it is very difficult to get people to serve on it and it is 
essentially a civil-service-led organisation (Tindale 2001 Ini). I f  this is true then the 
Carbon Trust was essentially a government-proposed idea painted to look like a 
business idea.
65 In its 2002/03 Annual Report the Carbon Trust said DEFRA and Devolved Administrations made 
available £56.4m for their activities o f which £36.3 was actually drawn-down.
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The appointment of a CEO was a protracted process, taking approximately 18 
months, but ultimately Tom Delay, whose background includes work at McKinsey & 
Co, Shell and the Global Energy Practice of AT Kearney, was appointed in June 
2001.
In November 2001 the Carbon Trust published its draft strategy document. It had 
the following key objectives:
• “To ensure that UK business and the public sector contribute fully to 
meeting ongoing targets for greenhouse gas emissions;
• To improve the competitiveness of UK business through resource 
efficiency; and
• To support the development of a UK industry sector that capitalises on 
the innovation and commercial value of low-carbon technologies 
nationally and internationally” (Carbon Trust 2001a).
Delivery of these objectives will be integrated over time to ensure appropriate 
support over the Carbon Trust’s short (up to 5 years), medium (10 -15 years) and 
long term (20 - 50 years) time horizons” (Carbon Trust 2001b). The Carbon Trust 
will develop and implement:
• A programme to accelerate the take up of existing energy efficiency and 
other low carbon technologies building on the successful Energy 
Efficiency Best Practice Programme (EEBPP) the enhanced capital 
allowances scheme, and other incentive schemes as necessary;
• A Low Carbon Innovation Programme (LCIP) deploying a range of 
financial instruments and support for new and emerging technologies to 
the point where they are self-sustaining. LCIP will draw in other funding 
partners to create a “funding continuum” across the innovation chain66; 
and
66 The innovation chain refers to the process o f  development and deployment o f technologies. It 
ranges from early “blue skies” research through development, demonstration and early market take-up 
to commercial exploitation. It is often described as a linear, sequential process although this can be far 
from true in reality.
124
• Other programmes and studies to inform the Carbon Trust and hence 
enable it to carry out its roles and deliver its remit and objectives (Carbon 
Trust 2001a:7).
Despite these very specific proposals, many of the people I spoke to did not know 
exacdy what the Carbon Trust was supposed to do. Stephen Tindale, former special 
advisor to Michael Meacher, described it as a “farce” and said that it was created 
because people were unhappy with the Energy Savings Trust67 and the way that it 
was spending money (Tindale 2001 Ini). Initial impressions of the Carbon Trust were 
that it was just another government initiative that would get in the way of business. 
Several people suggested that it could be really useful, but until it is clear exacdy what 
it will do there will be scepticism (Edwards 2001 Int; Fretz 2001 Ini)
While many of the people I interviewed were not very positive about the Carbon 
Trust at the time of the interviews, it was a new institution. It was something that had 
never been tried in the United Kingdom and as such it took a long time to get going. 
It has made a real effort to hire good quality people and develop a well-respected 
board. One year after its formation James Cameron called it a “good example of an 
institution making the connection between policy and investment” (Cameron 2002 
Ini).
Conclusion
Climate change is a long-term issue that makes political planning very difficult. 
Politicians often have trouble looking beyond the next election. Climate change is an
67 “The Energy Savings Trust was set up after the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, to help 
reduce CO2 emissions in the UK. It is a non-profit organisation funded by governments and the 
private sector” (Energy Savings Trust. (2002). "Energy Savings Trust Website." Retrieved 22 July 
2002, from http://www.est.org.uk/.)
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issue that does not allow for this; a policy may not have any significant measurable 
results for years or even decades.
The UK government has chosen a fairly aggressive policy stance towards climate 
change with the introduction of the Climate Change Levy, emissions trading, the goal 
of a large increase in renewable energy, and the establishment of the Carbon Trust. 
Whether these are good policies or the right policies is the subject of much debate 
and there are arguments on both sides, but that is not what I am trying to determine. 
Through this case study, I ’ve tried to understand the process through which the 
United Kingdom has selected policy instruments.
The current government came to power with a manifesto commitment to reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions by 20% from 1990 levels and strong rhetoric in favour of 
increasing the use of renewable energy. But it had no firm plans for how to meet 
these commitments. The United Kingdom’s political system and the Labour Party in 
particular strongly favour consultation processes so, not knowing exactly how to go 
about meeting these goals, it issued a consultation paper and asked for input. On at 
least one occasion the outcome of the consultation process appears to have been 
predetermined. This fact does not seem to have had any significant bearing on the 
other consultation processes or affected the level of trust that exists between 
business and the government.
There is a relatively high degree of trust between the government and business. This 
may be due, as Margaret Mogford believes, to the fact that the government has no 
experience in business and thus relies on business for help on how to make things in 
the business world work, or it may be a long standing and deeper thread running
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through British political culture, where government has generally been trusted to “do 
the right thing” for the country.
Some of the difficulties with the UK method of determining policy are also what 
helps to ensure a longer outlook for policy. While each new government may create 
new policies in theory the civil service is there to give a long-term outlook. However, 
civil servants often change jobs every two to three years. This results in a loss of 
institutional memory and requires that new trusting relationships be established 
between the key representatives of the civil service and the business and NGO 
community.
One thing that has been very important for the development of climate change policy 
in the United Kingdom is that it has always had a champion within the government 
starting with Margaret Thatcher and continuing through successive environment 
secretaries to John Prescott, Michael Meacher and Tony Blair. With each of these 
individuals climate change policy has been able to progress and develop. This has 
happened for many of the same reasons that other policies are created. The difficulty 
with climate change is that a government may not see whether the policies it has 
selected have had the desired effect and, if governments change, the policies could 
well change irrespective of the long-term outlook of the civil service.
In the United Kingdom power hierarchies may well have slowed down the 
development of climate change policies. Certainly many people outside the 
government feel that the introduction of the Climate Change Levy had materially 
affected the development and introduction of emissions trading. These inter­
departmental rivalries are probably due to the cultural differences within the
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departments. These cultural differences define the hierarchy within government. 
Stephen Tindale noted the difficulties John Prescott and Michael Meacher faced 
when working with the senior civil servants in the newly created DETR. It showed 
up again in the different interpretations of how much communication there was 
between the Treasury and other departments around the Climate Change Levy.
These hierarchies have resulted in the dominant role in development of climate 
change policy being played by the Treasury. This is due solely to the introduction of 
the Climate Change Levy. While the Treasury believed it consulted with the DETR 
and DTI, and in its view telling the DTI and DETR what they were doing probably 
was consultation, the DETR and DTI did not believe there was much of a 
consultation process. The DETR was handed the Climate Change Levy as a done 
deal and had to fit it into the climate change programme. This forced a re­
examination of all of the other policies that were being developed.
This has placed an unexpected player in the dominant role of developing climate 
change policy. Intuition would tell you that domestic climate change policy would be 
developed by the environment or energy departments or co-ordinated through the 
cabinet office but not by the department charged with developing fiscal policy, but in 
the United Kingdom that is exactly what happened. While the Treasury has had a 
direct interest in only one policy none of the other ones would have been developed 
in the way that they were without the Climate Change Levy. It was the Treasury’s 
influence that dominated the discourse at the initial stages of planning. And while the 
other policies would certainly have still existed, they would have been different. The 
Treasury has been and remains the most powerful department in the United
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Kingdom’s government. If it decides that it is going to do something there is litde 
anyone else can do about it.
In trying to understand how any policy is formed it is essential to know who the 
dominant player is. In the United Kingdom if the Treasury is involved it is likely to 
be the Treasury. In the design and deployment of climate change policy it set the 
structure and everyone else followed. This may sound unduly harsh and is certainly 
not meant to belittle the hard work put in by people outside the Treasury; but I think 
they would have had a much easier time and probably better policies without the 
Treasury influence but that did not happen and won’t ever happen if the Treasury is 
involved.
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Chapter 6 -  United States Climate Change Policy
The US federal government has developed an extensive research network and 
voluntary emissions reductions programmes with industry for a no-regrets emissions 
reductions policy.68 These policies have been the subject of much criticism for many 
years. People may not like what the US federal government is currently doing on the 
international scene and not doing on the domestic side, but the federal government 
does have and has had climate change policies since the mid 1980s. These policies 
have centred on continued research and voluntary emissions reductions. Unlike in 
the United Kingdom, there has been no political leader who has been willing to go 
out on a limb and demand that something be done to address the growing problems 
associated with climate change. This lack of political leadership in the past has 
allowed a significant and vociferous opposition to build up, and it has fought very 
hard to stop any mandatory caps on emissions.
The lack of political leadership is in the process of changing. Senators McCain and 
Lieberman succeeded in getting their Climate Stewardship Act to the floor of the 
Senate for a vote. And while it did not pass it did show that many in the Senate want 
action to be taken to curb climate change, including many Senators who did not vote 
in favour of the bill. While this activity at the federal level is important it is essential 
when examining US climate change policy to remember that the federal government 
is one of limited authority. Thus policy decisions taken at the state level must be 
included in any discussion of US climate change policy.
68 For a discussion o f the role and structure o f  the policy making process in the United States o f  
America see Appendix 3.
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While there is little likelihood of federal action for the foreseeable future work on 
research and the voluntary programmes continues. The Fiscal Year 2003 budget 
request for research was US$ 1,714.2m69 (U.S. Global Change Research Program and 
Climate Change Research Initiative 2002:Appendix A). This budget request 
exemplifies US climate change policy since the late 1970s when the federal 
government began co-ordinating scientific research. The history of US climate 
change policy is one of research, research and more research with a few voluntary 
programmes for industry. Irrespective o f the discussions occurring on the 
international stage, domestically the federal government has tried to avoid placing 
any restrictions on business. As we review the history of domestic US climate change 
policy it will become clear that the political affiliation of the president has had little 
effect on the direction of policy.
US activities on climate change before George Bush Sr. became 
President
The early days of US climate change policy centred around research and what ought 
to be studied (Hart and Victor 1993:664). Very little legislative or administrative 
action was taken to limit the release of ozone-damaging substances. In 1977 
Congress amended the Clean Air Act (CAA) to allow the administrator of the EPA 
to regulate “any substance . . . which in his judgement may reasonably be anticipated 
to affect the stratosphere, especially ozone in the stratosphere and such effect may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare”70. This was enacted to
69 As o f  November 2003 the relevant appropriations bills had not passed Congress. This figure does 
not include research undertaken by the Department o f  Defence.
70 CAA § 157(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7457(a) (1988), repealed by Clean Air Act Amendments o f 1990, Pub. L. 
No. 101-549, sec. 602, § 601,104 Stat. 2399, 2648 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7671 (West Supp.1991)). 
A new § 615, that is, in relevant part, identical to old § 157(a), was added to the CAA by § 602 o f the
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respond to the threat of CFCs to the ozone layer (Shimberg 1991:2183). It has never 
been used to force the EPA to take action; the list of substances covered has been 
amended several times including during the first Bush administration when the Clean 
Air Act was amended.
The National Climate Program Act (National Climate Program Act 1978) marks the 
beginning of the US domestic climate change policy. Under this act climate research, 
application and services were co-ordinated under the National Climate Program 
Office within National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Morrissey 2000:3; 
Weart 2003:97). This brief flurry of legislative activity on climate change ended and 
climate researchers had to defend their federally funded resources against the need to 
balance the federal budget.
When Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency environmental issues were considered 
to be liberal rants aimed at stopping the growth of US business (Weart 2003:143). 
Senator A1 Gore, future vice-president under Bill Clinton, held hearings to question 
the Reagan administration decision to slash federal funding of climate change 
research. Following this the New York Times ran its first-ever front page story on a 
report prepared by Dr James Hansen, soon to be famed for declaring that global 
warming had begun, which said that the planet was noticeably warmer71.
1990 Amendments. Clean Air Act Amendments o f 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, sec. 602, § 615, 104 
Stat. at 2699 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7671n). Shimberg, S J (1991). "Stratospheric Ozone and 
Climate Protection: Domestic Legislation and the International Process." ENTL 21: 2175-2216.
71 Dr Hansen’s funding was cut as a result o f this report and he was forced to lay o ff five members o f  
his research staff Weart, S R (2003). The Discovery o f Global Warming. Cambridge Massachusetts, 
Harvard University Press.
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At the request of Congress, the National Academy of Science spent three years 
studying the impacts of rising C 0 2. In 1983, it issued a report saying it was “deeply 
concerned” about global warming, but there ought to be more research to 
understand the problem better before anything was done (Weart 2003:145). EPA 
issued its own report three days later, declaring the potential catastrophic 
consequences of climate change. Consistent with how US administrations would 
react 20 years later, the EPA report was criticised as alarmist and the more reassuring 
report of the National Academy of Science was preferred (Weart 2003:146). The 
debate continued in much the same way for another five years. US scientists did not 
get much support for their research in the US so they turned to their international 
colleagues. They attended the Villach and the Toronto Conferences72 and they 
worked to try and get politicians to sit up and take notice of what they believed was 
about to happen.
US climate change policy under George Bush Sr.
George Bush Sr entered office in January 1988 just months before climate change 
would hit the front pages of most US newspapers. In June 1988 during a severe 
national drought James Hansen testified to the US Senate Committee on Energy and 
Natural Resources that it was 99% probable that global warming had begun. The 
next year, in June 1989, Gallup released a survey which suggested 63% of the 
American public was worried “a great deal” or “a fair amount” about the greenhouse 
effect. At the same time the major national newspapers, the Washington Post (8 
February), the Wall Street Journal (10 April) and the New York Times (13 December) 
were expressing deep scepticism about global warming and its potential impacts. This
72 For more detailed discussion o f  these conferences and their ramifications on the international 
political process see chapter 3 on the History o f the International Politics o f Climate Change.
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contrasts with the UK where the press was not sceptical about the science (Jamieson 
1992:140).
Internationally the IPCC process was just getting started and progress would be slow 
until June 1990 when it met to finalise its First Assessment Report (FAR). At the 
Second World Climate Conference in November 1990 where the FAR of the IPCC 
would receive its final approval the Bush Administration stood virtually alone in the 
world in opposition to specific targets and timetables for stabilizing C 0 2 emissions 
(Jamieson 1992:141; Leggett 2000:22-23). The International Negotiating Committee 
for a Framework Convention on Climate Change was formed and “charged with 
drafting can effective framework convention on climate change containing 
appropriate commitments’ ” at the conference (Bodansky 1993:493).
Early in 1990 the DOE prepared a series of four reports on climate change at 
Congress’s request. These reports were to analyse the economic effect of various 
methods to cap energy-related COz emissions at 20% below 1990 levels by 2000 and 
at 50% below 1990 levels by 2010. The last of these four reports, Limiting Net 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the United States, found that the Bush Administration’s 
National Energy Strategy (NES) would hold C 0 2 emissions at a 25% increase over 
then current levels, with stabilisation achieved by 2015 (Berg 1992:26). The NES had 
as one of its objectives to increase the production and use of renewable energy.
As a part of the programme to understand global climate change better George Bush 
initiated the US Global Change Research Program73 (USGCRP). This programme
73 This is the programme that George W Bush added to with his Climate Change Research Initiative.
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was meant to coordinate research between federal departments and to liaise with the 
office of the President74 (Global Change Research Act of 1990 1990). This 
programme was established just as the international debate was beginning in earnest. 
And it was created to aid the US participation in the IPCC process75 (Morrissey 
2000:3). This programme had little new funding for climate change research. It was 
to provide a cross-departmental understanding of the research the federal 
government was funding on climate change and to give the United States a 
coordinated front at the up-coming international negotiations.
In June 1992 George Bush went to Rio with 150 other leaders from around the 
world for the UN Conference on Environment and Development. There he signed 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change committing the US 
to the aim of returning “to 1990 levels the anthropogenic emissions of carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol” 
(UNFCCC 1992:Art 4(2)b). The US signed this treaty despite a battle in the White 
House over whether to do something on climate change was foolish and 
economically harmful to the US. George Bush probably signed the treaty because it 
was substantially weaker than many people in the international community had 
hoped for and his advisors believed the goals of the Convention were achievable.76 
However, achieving the objectives would not be his problem. George Bush lost the 
next presidential election to William Jefferson Clinton.
74 These departments are the Departments o f Agriculture, Commerce (National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration), Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Interior (U.S. Geological 
Survey), State, and Transportation; the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration; the National Science Foundation; and the Smithsonian 
Institution, the Office o f Science and Technology Policy, and the Office o f  Management and Budget.
75 For further discussion o f the IPCC process see chapter 2 on the History o f the Science o f Climate 
Change and chapter 3 on the History o f  the International Politics o f Climate Change.
76 Interestingly the Senate ratified the Convention very quickly. The Bush Administration and its 
advisors did not have to fight any significant Senate opposition.
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The Clinton Presidency
On Earth Day, 21 April 1993, just months after Clinton came to office, he committed 
the United States to reducing its emissions of greenhouse gases to 1990 levels by the 
year 2000, and ordered federal agencies to establish a plan to achieve this goal.
This plan, the Climate Change Action Plan, was released five months later. It 
recommended 52 new and expanded voluntary measures to meet the previously 
announced emissions reduction goal. In launching his plan, in October 1993, 
President Clinton opened a one-day conference in Washington DC by saying 
“bluntly but realistically [that] raising energy prices ‘either won’t pass the Senate or it 
won’t pass muster with the American people’ ” (Global warming meets the prodigal 
eagle 1997). “The nature of the initiatives in the plan [were] not unlike those that 
might have been expected from a second-term Bush administration, with their 
emphasis on voluntary programs, government industry cooperation, cost- 
effectiveness, use of market incentives, and minimal mandatory government 
intervention” (Hahn, Cavanagh et a l2001:37).77 While the policies may not have been 
much different, the Clinton administration’s attitude towards climate change was 
different. It had set targets, which had not happened before, and it engaged at the 
international level with increased vigour. However, this complex set of voluntary
77 “In 1993, the Administration established the U.S. Initiative on Joint Implementation under the 
Climate Change Action Plan. Joint implementation arrangements allow firms or other entities in one 
country to meet part o f their greenhouse gas reduction commitments by financing mitigation in 
another country. The U.S. Initiative through 2000 had approved 26 arrangements whereby U.S. firms 
agreed to finance projects in 11 other countries” (Hahn, R W, S M Cavanagh, et al (2001). National 
Environmental Policy During the Clinton Years. AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper No. 01- 
09: KSG Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP01-027. Washington DC.)
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initiatives had relatively little effect. By 1995, the US acknowledged that it would fall 
short of its goals by at least 50% (Hahn, Cavanagh et al 2001:37).
The second Conference of the Parties78 saw a substantial change in US international 
climate change policy when Tim Wirth, Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs, 
the chief of the US delegation, issued a statement supporting legally binding targets 
and timetables for greenhouse gas emissions reductions for 34 industrialised 
countries (and no targets for the 154 other nations).79
However Clinton had problems at home. He made several speeches on climate 
change including to the UN General Assembly where he said, “The science is clear 
and compelling. We humans are changing the global climate” (Anderson 2000:8); and 
at a White House conference on climate change where the president said CfWe see the 
train coming, but most Americans in their daily lives can’t hear the whistle blowing” 
(Anderson 2000:8). So while he and his administration were talking about doing 
something about climate change the rest of the federal government was not 
interested.
The US Senate responded to the administration’s actions in June 1997. Anticipating 
the December 1997 meeting in Kyoto, Senator Byrd introduced, with Senator Hagel 
and 44 other cosponsors, a resolution stating that the United States should not be a 
signatory to any international climate change agreement which would:
78 The Second Conference o f  the Parties (COP2) was held in Geneva in July 1995.
79 “The position statement released at COP-2 also noted U.S. acceptance o f the scientific findings on 
climate change summarized by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its Second 
Assessment Report, released in 1995, and rejected uniform harmonized policies in favor o f flexible 
policy instruments, including market-based instruments” Morrissey, W A (2000). RL30522: Global 
Climate Change: A Survey o f Scientific Research and Policy Reports. Washington DC, Congressional 
Research Service, Resources, Science, and Industry Division: 27.
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“(A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce [GHG] emissions for the Annex 
I Parties [i.e. industrialised countries], unless the protocol or other agreement also 
mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce [GHG] emissions 
for developing country parties within the same compliance period, or 
(B) result in serious harm to the economy of the United States.” (S. Res. 98, 105th 
Cong. "Bryd-Hagel Resolution" 1997).
The Senate passed this resolution by a v-ote of 95-080 in July 199781 (S. Res. 98, 105th 
Cong. "Bryd-Hagel Resolution" 1997). It has been cited since it was passed as the 
reason for the US’s failure to take action on climate change.
Five months after passage of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution the Kyoto Protocol was 
agreed. This was made possible at least in part because US Vice-President Al Gore 
arrived in Kyoto with new instructions from Washington “to show increased 
negotiating flexibility if a comprehensive plan can be put into place” (Oberthiir and 
Ott 1999:86). The industrialised nations agreed to legally binding emission 
reductions, with the United States agreeing to reduce its emissions 7% below 1990 
levels by the compliance period, 2008-2012.82 “However, because the Protocol clearly 
did not meet the Senate’s stipulations as outlined in the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, the 
Administration made clear that it did not intend to submit the Protocol to the Senate 
for ratification” (Hahn, Cavanagh et al 2001:38).83 Senator Byrd has subsequently 
derided both sides of the climate change debate for distorting his resolution, saying 
“While those on both sides of the issue have attributed many interpretations and
80 The following Senators did not vote on this resolution: Bryan (D-NV), Feinstein (D-CA), Grams 
(R-MN), Harkin (D-IA), Reid (D-NV).
81 Senate resolutions are non-binding. They provide guidance on the Senate’s thinking on the issue 
addressed in the resolution.
82 Because o f economic growth, it was anticipated that this 7% reduction would translate into 
approximately a 30% reduction below baseline emissions, i.e. what they would be in the absence o f  
policy action.
83 The US Constitution gives the President the power to make treaties but for them to become law 
two thirds o f the Senate must agree (US Const. Art. II,.).
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misinterpretations to S. Res. 98, no one has misrepresented and misconstrued S. Res. 
98 more so than [the George W Bush administration]” (US Congressional Record 
2003b:S13585). In a debate on the McCain/Lieberman Climate Stewardship Act in 
2003 Senator Byrd said “Senate Resolution 98 was intended to guide [the US at the 
Kyoto negotiations] rather than kill that effort” (US Congressional Record 
2003b:S13585). It was “an effort to strengthen the hand of the administration as it 
undertook international negotiations” (US Congressional Record 2003b:S13585).
Appropriations bills in fiscal years 1999, 2000 and 2001 restricted certain 
departments (the EPA, Energy, Agriculture, State, and the Agency for International 
Development) from proposing or issuing rules, regulations, decrees, or orders 
implementing the Kyoto Protocol; this was known as the Knollenberg restrictions. 
(Pew Center on Global Climate Change 2002b:5-6). Congress justified this by citing 
the Byrd-Hagel Resolution.84
Negotiations on the rules for the flexible mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol began in 
1998 at COP4. Despite agreeing to the inclusion of the flexible mechanisms the EU 
strongly objected to the proposed US rules. The disagreements persisted through 
COP6 where the talks collapsed, in part, over disagreement about the role of carbon 
sequestration and emissions trading. While the international negotiations continued 
to grind on not much was happening at the domestic level. In his final State of the 
Union address President Clinton acknowledged global warming as “the greatest 
environmental challenge of the new century” (Clinton 2000).
84 The George W Bush administration requested continuation o f  the Knollenberg restriction, but the 
language was challenged and ultimately struck from all FY 2002 appropriations bills” (Pew Center on 
Global Climate Change (2002b). Climate Change Activities in the United States. Washington DC, Pew 
Center on Global Climate Change: 38.)
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Eileen Claussen, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International 
Environmental and Scientific Affairs for the Clinton administration, felt that the 
administration took the issue seriously, as a mention in the State of the Union 
Address would confirm, but no one had the guts to do anything about it (Claussen 
2002 Ini). And while the analysis that was done for the international negotiations was 
very thorough, there was no equivalent at the domestic level (Claussen 2002 Ini). In 
fact it would be possible to argue that by continuing the international negotiations 
despite acknowledging there was no possibility of Senate ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol, Clinton managed to keep climate change off the domestic agenda thus 
obviating the need for concrete domestic action.
When Clinton left office in January 2001 there was no agreement on the rules 
governing implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, no action towards ratification in 
the United States, and no significant domestic initiatives, other than the voluntary 
programmes of the administration’s 1993 Climate Action Plan.
George W  Bush elected
January 2001 saw George W Bush sworn in as the 43rd president of the United States 
of America. During the presidential campaign he made several statements on climate 
change and carbon dioxide emissions. He acknowledged the seriousness of climate 
change, but argued that the Kyoto Protocol was not the solution. Echoing the Byrd- 
Hagel Resolution George W Bush claimed the lack of developing country 
participation made the treaty fatally flawed. However, he also promised:
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“With the help of Congress, environmental groups, and industry, we 
will require all powerplants to meet clean air standards in order to 
reduce emissions of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, mercury and 
carbon dioxide within a reasonable period of time. And we will 
provide market-based incentives, such as emissions trading, to help 
industry achieve the required reductions”("U.S. Rejection of Kyoto 
Protocol Process” 2001:648).
Six weeks after he was sworn into office George W Bush responded to a letter from 
four senators saying he opposed the Kyoto Protocol because “it exempts 80 percent 
of the world, including major population centers (sic) such as China and India, from 
compliance, and would cause serious harm to the U.S. (sic) economy” (Bush 2001b). 
He also reversed his campaign pledge to limit carbon dioxide emissions from power 
plants. Two weeks later that the administration announced its intention to withdraw 
from the Kyoto Protocol.
Ari Fleischer, George W Bush’s press secretary, at his daily press briefing on 28 
March 2001 was asked a question about whether the US intended to withdraw from 
the Kyoto Protocol. He responded that there was nothing to withdraw from since it 
had not entered into force and the president had no intention of submitting the 
Protocol for Senate approval as would be necessary for it to come into force in the 
US85 (Fleischer 2001).
The administration did not consult anyone before it made the announcement. It was 
told “it would be a below the fold story” (ie no one would pay any attention) 
(Claussen 2002 Ini). But that did not happen; reaction from around the world was 
swift and angry (Drozdiak and Pianin 2001). The European Parliament condemned 
the withdrawal calling it “appalling and provocative” (Agence France Presse 2001);
85 At the time this statement was made only one Annex 1 country had ratified the Kyoto Protocol, 
Romania.
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Michael Meacher, British Environment Secretary, called it “exceptionally serious” 
(Europe criticises US threat over Kyoto 2001). However, the US withdrawal from 
the Kyoto Protocol may have been the thing that got the rest of the world to reach 
agreement and finalise the details of the Kyoto Protocol (Diringer 2001). Congress 
also responded to this surprise announcement. It had begun to take climate change 
more seriously and expected the administration to do the same. It quickly introduced 
resolutions that supported engagement in the international climate change 
negotiations and more than 50 climate change related bills were introduced in the 
107th Congress (2001-2002), up 100% from the previous year and more than 600% 
from 1997-98 (Pew Center on Global Climate Change 2002b).
After this unexpected backlash the administration immediately began to soften its 
language on climate change and the need for the US to address the issue. A cabinet 
level working group was established and met weekly in what amounted to “climate 
101” (Revkin 2001). The working group called experts from all sides of the issue, 
including scientists Dr James Hansen and Dr Richard Lindzen as well as leading 
economists.
This has led Eileen Claussen, an outspoken critic of the Administrations policies, to 
say this is “the best informed cabinet” on the issue of climate change (Claussen 2002 
Ini). It was this group that requested the National Academy of Science report to get a 
“balanced view of what we know and don’t know about the science of climate 
change” (The White House 2001:1).
The Administration requested the National Academy of Science to review the IPCC’s 
Third Assessment Report on whether there are “any substantive differences between
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the IPCC Reports and the IPCC Summaries” and “to identify the areas in the science 
of climate change where there are the greatest certainties and uncertainties” 
(Bridgeland and Edson 2001). The report concluded, “Greenhouse gases are 
accumulating in Earth’s atmosphere as a result of human activities causing surface air 
temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures to rise. Temperatures are, in fact, 
rising. The changes observed over the last several decades are likely mostly due to 
human activities, but we cannot rule out that some significant part of these changes 
are also a reflection of natural variability” (National Academy of Sciences 2001:1).
Eileen Clausen felt that “people knew what they were going to get from this report, 
but now that the science has the US stamp on it, it will be accepted” (Claussen 2002 
Inf). While it may have upset many people around the world that the US did not 
accept the IPCC report that would not be the US way of doing things. In the US, the 
IPCC is a group of unknown international scientists, so why should they be trusted? 
Both sides of debate had things that they could take away from the report. The 
administration focused on the things not known about the science of climate change 
(Bush 2001a), while proponents of action to address climate change quoted the 
acknowledgement that changes observed in the climate over the last several decades 
are “likely mostly due to human activities” (National Academy of Sciences 2001:1).
In June 2001 the cabinet level working group issued an interim report that outlined 
what action the federal government had taken and where it intended to go (The 
White House 2001). Despite promises to produce an alternative to the Kyoto 
Protocol for COP6bis in July 2001 nothing appeared.86
86 As o f  November 2003 the US still had not produced an alternative to the Kyoto Protocol (US 
Congressional Record (2003b). 149: S13572-01.)
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In February 2002 the administration released its Clear Skies Plan. Its key objective 
was the reduction of US greenhouse gas intensity by 18% over 10 years. This was to . 
be achieved through a series of voluntary programs. It is generally agreed that this 
represents nothing more than a business-as-usual approach (Menz 2002; Pew Center 
on Global Climate Change 2002a).
“In addition, the plan directs the Secretary of Energy in consultation 
with other key agencies, to “substantially improve the emission 
reduction registry”, to upgrade the voluntary emission reduction 
program under section 1605(b) of the 1992 Energy Policy Act, to 
bring about enhanced measurement accuracy, reliability, and 
verifiability. Other measures include providing for protected, 
transferable emission reduction credits, increased funding of US$
700m in total climate-related spending, and a new management 
structure to coordinate climate change and technology research. 
Domestic policies such as tax incentives for renewable energy and 
new technology, development of fuel-efficient vehicles and cleaner 
fuels, and carbon sequestration were also proposed, along with 
several international bilateral initiatives and relatively modest 
increases in foreign assistance” (Justus and Fletcher 2002:10).
It took a long time for the Clear Skies proposal to appear because there was cross- 
departmental co-operation (Thomas 2002 Inf). Initially, the administration brought in 
experts from across government and outside government to provide advice on 
climate change science and possible policy responses. After it got the information it 
wanted it sent everybody back and developed the policy in secret; it did not want any 
leaks.
The US Senate made history in October 2003 when a bill to cap C 0 2 emissions was 
debated on the Senate Floor (US Congressional Record 2003b). The 
McCain/Lieberman bill, the Climate Stewardship Act (S 139, The Climate 
Stewardship Act of 2003 2003), required mandatory emissions reductions from the
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electricity, transportation, industry, and commercial sectors (S 139, The Climate 
Stewardship Act of 2003 2003:Sec 3 Para 3). These sectors were required to reduce 
their emissions to 2000 levels by 2010. The legislation relied on a cap and trade 
system similar to one used to combat acid rain in the 1990s. And while this bill did 
not pass87 Senators were forced to put on record where they stood on the need to 
address climate change. Even Senator Byrd spoke out in favour of regulation. He 
chastised the Bush Administration over its failure to act over climate change and for 
misrepresenting and misconstruing S Res 98 (US Congressional Record 
2003b:S13585).
Conclusion
The US has a history of acting on its own. When it declared independence from 
Great Britain in 1776 it did so with no international support, an economy that was 
almost wholly dependent on Great Britain for many essentials and no army or navy 
to speak of, especially when compared to what was then the greatest military force in 
the world. The new United States of America used its resources and sheer 
determination in its belief that it was right and there was no other option but to 
follow its own path. In many ways that is what the federal government is doing now. 
The George W Bush administration has decided that the Kyoto Protocol is “an 
unrealistic and ever-tightening regulatory straightjacket, curtailing energy 
consumption” (Dobriansky 2003). And whether the rest of the world agrees or wants 
to support it is irrelevant. This is not to say the US does not care what other nations
87 The final vote was 43 in favour and 55 against. The two senators who did not participate in the vote 
later indicated in the Congressional Record they would have voted in favour o f  the bill had they been 
available to vote (US Congressional Record (2003c). Washington DC, US Senate. 149: S13651-05.
, US Congressional Record (2003a). Washington DC, US Senate. 149: S14264-01.)
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think: it does. It would like the rest of the world to come over to its point of view, 
but if it won’t then the US will continue down the path it has chosen.
The policies the US has formulated to address climate change have evolved from the 
mid 1970s. The research into the causes and effects of climate change have expanded 
from a side interest of a few government-funded scientists to numerous government 
departments, university institutions and private research centres dedicated to 
understanding the extent to which humans are affecting the changes in the Earth’s 
climate and developing technologies to respond to any changes. US policies are 
almost exclusively focused on research and voluntary measures. And while the 
current policies have been criticised as a failure to take climate change seriously they 
are not significandy different from those policies developed over the previous ten 
years, the major difference now being that George W Bush’s administration has 
openly withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol as opposed to continuing to negotiate at 
the international level while doing very little domestically. This is not to say that the 
criticisms as to the quality of the programmes and the level of emissions reductions 
are unfair. But the federal government does have policies and it is addressing issues 
in a way that no other government is able to do by spending US$ 1.7 billion per year 
on research.
The domestic debate over the future of US climate change policy may be changing. 
The McCain/Lieberman bill has brought the issue back onto the federal agenda. The 
vote was much closer than many people expected and many senators who voted 
against the bill spoke out in favour of a stronger federal response to climate change. 
The fact that many states have also started to reduce emissions and formulate climate 
change policies will eventually force the federal government to focus on climate
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change. It is important to recognise this state activity. It reaffirms the federal 
government as a government of limited power. If  the federal government fails to act 
the states can and will act and then companies will face a myriad of different 
regulations. This will lead companies to demand that the federal government take 
action, and so the federal government will track what the states are doing to try and 
understand what is the best and most acceptable policy response.
The current US focus on research and technology development is consistent with the 
general feeling in the US that technology, if given enough time and support, will be 
able to solve most problems. This belief exists at both the state and federal level. 
Californian officials believe that if they set a policy the technology will develop to 
meet those requirements (Greenwood 2002 Ini), while the federal government 
meanwhile believes that they must support the development of new technologies to 
change the ways energy is produced and consumed (Dobriansky 2003).
147
Chapter 7 — California’s Climate Change Policy
“Go West, Young Man!”. The west coast of the United States has always been about 
new and exciting things. About pushing the boundaries. About shedding the old and 
having new and exciting challenges. This encouragement rings true today as much as 
it did 150 years ago when Horace Greeley uttered it88. Californians are weird, 
Californians are loony. Look, they elected an actor with no political experience as 
governor, again. The rest of the nation does not understand California or what drives 
it; that’s OK with Californians, it’s not their problem. And I suspect the rest of the 
US kind of likes it that way too. It gives them something to laugh at. Americans like 
the weird and wacky; they just don’t want to do it themselves, so what’s better than 
to have a whole state that will do it for you. This wackiness or willingness to push the 
boundaries has placed California at the forefront of policy development in many 
areas.
Like the United Kingdom, California sees itself as a leader in environmental policy89 
(Lipper 2002 Int; Pulling 2002 Int; Stevens 2002). “California has led the nation in 
developing common-sense approaches to climate issues. The state was the first in the 
nation to develop government-sponsored initiatives to study potential climate 
impacts and develop response strategies, including hosting public workshops aimed 
at educating the public about climate change” (Greenbiz.com 2003). In 2002 
California responded to the federal government’s failure to address the issue of 
climate change with the passage of AB 1493(Pavley) that classified C 0 2 as a pollutant
88 Horace Greeley was the editor o f the Chicago Tribune. Greeley popularized the phrase “Go west 
young man and Grow with the nation” in reference to the westward expansion o f the nation in the 
19th century. It has subsequendy been used when you want someone to expand their horizons.
89 For a discussion o f the role and structure o f  the policy making process in California see Appendix 4.
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thus allowing the state to regulate it.90 Many states91 have subsequently looked at 
whether they will be able to do something similar (Lynch 2002 Inf). This is just one 
example of where California has led the nation in adopting far-reaching policies to 
improve energy efficiency, reduce energy costs, improve transportation, and mitigate 
the adverse impacts on the environment of energy production and use. Many of the 
policies that help to reduce California’s emissions were originally intended to solve 
California’s persistent air pollution or transportation problems (California Energy 
Commission 1998).
A survey in July 2003 by the Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) found that 
despite the recession Californians remain committed to environmental issues 
(Baldassare 2003:vi). The PPIC survey found:
“Two in three Californians (68%) believe that increased carbon 
dioxide and other gases released into the atmosphere will, if 
unchecked, lead to global warming. Forty-five percent of state 
residents —  and 54 percent of those ages 18-34 —  believe that global 
warming will pose a serious threat to them in their lifetime. Nearly 
three in four (73%) believe that immediate steps should be taken to 
counter the effects of global climate change. What are they willing to 
do about it? Majorities say they are willing to make major lifestyle 
changes to address the problem (69%), believe that the federal 
government should set new legally-binding industrial standards to 
limit emissions thought to cause global warming (66%), and think the 
federal government should work with other nations to set standards 
for the reduction of greenhouse gases (52%). Again, there are strong 
partisan differences: Democrats (77%) are more likely than 
Republicans (49%) to believe that global warming exists” (Baldassare 
2003:vi).
90 For a full discussion on AB 1493 (Pavley) see later in this chapter.
91 As o f February 2004 five states have adopted similar legislation, New York, New Jersey, Maine, 
Massachusetts and Vermont.
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This survey shows one reason why California legislators are taking the issue of 
climate change seriously. The potential ramification for California’s snow pack, 
agricultural production and coastline are enough to make even the most sceptical 
legislator take notice of the problems posed by climate change.
Carbon dioxide emissions account for nearly 84%92 of California’s greenhouse gases, 
in line with national proportions (California Energy Commission 2002b:21). 
However, California's emissions sources differ somewhat from the rest of the nation. 
Nationally, in 1999, electricity generation sources accounted for 39% of carbon- 
related emissions, industry 17%, and transportation 32%. In comparison, California's 
electricity generation sector (utility and non-utility) produced only 16% of emissions 
in the state, and industry 12%, but transportation produced nearly 59%, with 
commercial and residential emissions account for 9% and 4% respectively (California 
Energy Commission 2002b:27). “Nationally, and particularly in the West, emissions 
from the transportation sector are growing the fastest” (California Energy 
Commission 1998:3-4). California accounts for approximately 2% of worldwide 
greenhouse gases (Planet Ark 2001). So over 1% of worldwide greenhouse gas 
emissions come from California’s transportation sector. This is the reason that 
PG&E supported the Pavley bill (AB1493). PG&E wanted to make clear that in 
California energy generation was not the largest contributor of greenhouse gas 
emissions (Pulling 2002 Inf).
“In 1994, California's per capita CO2 emissions were nearly 40 percent lower than the 
U.S. average. While a major portion of this difference is due to California's climate,
92 This figure excludes marine bunker fuels as required by US EPA and recommended by the IPCC.
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it has fewer high-energy consuming industries, higher reliance on natural gas, and 
negligible coal consumption” (California Energy Commission 1998:4). It is the 
Energy Commission’s assertion that policies to reduce statewide energy use can be 
credited for about 10 — 15% of the difference93. Since the 1970s California has been 
promoting energy efficiency, encouraging natural gas generation, and supporting the 
development of renewable energy resources for electricity generation. The hills to the 
east of San Francisco are covered with windmills built originally partially because of 
tax schemes used to encourage the production of wind energy. “While California's 
energy policies were adopted primarily to meet the most stringent standards for 
criteria air pollutants in the nation, and to promote economic and environmental 
benefits, many of these policies have had concurrent benefits for reducing CO2 and 
other greenhouse gases. On the other hand, the state's extensive transportation 
infrastructure produces emissions from this sector that are over 20 percent higher 
than the national average” (California Energy Commission 1998:4).
H istory o f Climate Change Policy in California
California has experienced air pollution problems for more than 60 years, that is just 
under half of its existence as a US State.94 The first recognised problem of air 
pollution was in the Los Angeles Basin in 1943 (California Air Resources Board 
2003a). It was only a short time before the public demanded the politicians do 
something about the problem. Just as the “killer fog” struck London, California 
began to regulate air pollution in 1947 with the Air Pollution Control Act. This
93 The Energy Commission does not provide any support for this claim.
94 California became a state on 9 September 1850. It was the thirty-first state admitted to the Union.
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authorised the creation of an Air Pollution Control Districts in every county in the 
State (Ashby and Anderson 1981; California Air Resources Board 2003a).
California, in 1960, was the first state in the nation to mandate automotive emissions 
control requirements (California Air Resources Board 2003c). The California Air 
Resources Board (CARB) was created in 1967 to “promote and protect public health, 
welfare and ecological resources through effective and efficient reduction of air 
pollution while recognizing and considering the effect on the economy of the State” 
(California Environmental Protection Agency 2003). The CARB oversees the 
activities of 35 local and regional air pollution control districts. These districts are 
responsible for stationary sources of emissions, although measures introduced by 
them may affect mobile sources of emissions (California Air Pollution Control 
Officers Association 2003). To meet their responsibilities they have authority over 
emissions control, monitoring, compliance, permitting, complaints, planning and 
research, and public outreach (California Air Pollution Control Officers Association 
2003).
It established the first air resources board in the United States in 1967 under 
Republican Governor Ronald Reagan. In hindsight this act was extremely fortuitous. 
The federal Clean Air Act passed in the same year provided a framework for defining 
"air quality control regions" based on meteorological and topographical factors of air 
pollution. It included a waiver for California to set and enforce its own emissions 
standards for new vehicles based on California's unique need for more stringent 
controls. California is the only state with this exemption. However, the other states 
are allowed to follow California’s lead and adopt similar legislation to California
(Motor Vehicle Mfrs Assoc of the US v NY State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation 1994; 
Clean Air Act 2003).
In 1989, the Energy Commission, in advance of its making recommendations to the 
governor and the legislature on appropriate policy responses by the State, held a 
Symposium on Global Climate Change. This symposium was attended by all of the 
members of the Energy Commission and leading scientists from around the US. 
Sessions were held on both the science of climate change and possible policy 
responses. Speakers included leading sceptics Professor Richard Lindzen and Dr 
Fred Singer and leading supporters of the science behind climate change Dr Irving 
Mintzer and Dr Daniel Lashof.
As would be expected Dr Singer advocated no action because unilateral action would 
be a waste of time (California Energy Commission 1990:94). The other three 
scientists who spoke on possible policy responses all advocated taking some action, 
including Dr Mintzer who said “we’re not on the edge of an imminent climate 
catastrophe, but [that] we are facing substantial, significant and cascading 
uncertainties from the science and [that] we ought to make some decisions that 
reflect both our ignorance and those uncertainties” (California Energy Commission 
1990:104).
This symposium led to the report entitled Global Climate Change Potential Impacts and 
PoUy Recommendations.95 The report provided the governor and the legislature with
95 A further discussion o f  this report is found in the next section under AB 4420.
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specific policy recommendations for the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions, 
methane emissions and the production and use of CFCs.
The PPIC survey found that 58% of California’s population felt that air pollution 
posed a serious threat to their families’ heath (Baldassare 2003:5). Nearly half (47%) 
believe that vehicle emissions are the major contributor to air pollution (Baldassare 
2003:6). However they do not recognise that their driving contributes to the problem 
(Baldassare 2003:8).
R e n e w a b l e  E n e r g y
“California’s policy not to depend on fossil fuel has been with us for a long time” 
(Sher 2002 Inf). The Renewable Energy Program was created in 1996 to support the 
development of renewable electricity generation technologies and to expand the 
renewable energy market in California (Renewable Energy Program 1996). Originally 
authorised for the period 1998-2001, it has been extended through 2006. The money 
for the Renewable Energy Program comes from the ratepayers. There are five 
elements to the Renewable Energy Program:
• Existing Renewable Facilities Program;
• New Renewables Program;
• Emerging Renewables Program;
• Consumer Credit Initiative; and
• Consumer Education Program.
California currently gets 12% of its electrical power from renewable energy, more 
than any other state (Los Angeles Times 2001).96 In September 2002, the Renewable 
Portfolio Standard was set. This requires that California electricity suppliers increase
96 This figure includes the use o f  hydroelectric power.
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their procurement of renewable energy by 1% per year so that it is 20% of retail sales 
by 2011?1 California utilities lead the nation in the purchase of renewable energy and 
purchase a combined total of 23,000 GwH per year; Florida ranks second purchasing 
5,000 GwH per year. A total of 78,000 GwH per year of renewable energy is 
purchased by utilities in the US (SolarAccess.com 2003).
The PPIC survey found that 81% of the population supports the requirement that 
the state double its use of renewable energy in the next decade (Baldassare 2003:24). 
It did not ask if the support would continue if it leads to higher energy costs.
D e r e g u l a t io n  o f  t h e  E l e c t r ic it y  In d u s t r y  AB1890(1996)
In 1996, California deregulated its electricity industry in an attempt to lower 
electricity prices. The deregulation separated generation from the grid 
(transportation), so the companies that deliver to consumers are grid only, with no 
generation (production). The grid companies (Southern California Electric, PG&E 
etc) buy power from the generators in California and neighbouring states. As we all 
know now, it did not work. In the summer of 2001 California suffered from rolling 
blackouts.
The basic issue is that the grids were restricted from paying extra to buy power long 
term. So, when California power demand shot up in 2001 with the economic boom 
they had to scramble to buy all of their power on the spot market, so there was a 
shortage. Power generators upped the price and the grid companies had to pay. The
97 For further details o f this legislation see earlier in this chapter.
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rates the grid companies could charge consumers were capped - so they had to buy at 
spiking prices, and sell at lower prices. They were instandy bankrupt.
To try to combat these blackouts the energy companies asked people to conserve 
and gave them money back on their bills if they managed to reduce consumption by 
a given percentage over the previous year. Consumers did it. They reduced 
consumption by 20% (Reuters News Service 2001a). It is anticipated that one-third 
of this reduction will continue through 2003 (California Energy Commission 2003:1). 
An unexpected side effect of California’s deregulation was that President Bush used 
these blackouts as the basis for abandoning his election commitment to cap C 0 2 
emissions (Time Magazine 2001).
No power plant applications were filed with the Energy Commission between 1994 
and 1998 because there was so much uncertainty during the restructuring of the 
electricity industry. This may well have contributed to the problems California has 
been experiencing. Nimbyism is rife in California and building power plants despite 
the blackouts is still very difficult (Michels 2001).
The bill regulating the electricity industry established the public goods charge to help 
renewable energy companies; SB 1038 (Sher) extended the charge for another 10 
years in 2002. This charge is a line item on the ratepayers’ bill. It funds “cost- 
effective energy efficiency and conservation activities, public interest research and 
development, and development of renewable resources technology” (SB 1038 
Chapter 515 2002).
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T r a n s p o r t a t io n
Californians love their cars and as the PPIC survey demonstrated they do not seem 
to make the connection between their individual vehicle emissions and air pollution 
(Baldassare 2003:8). California is a big state98 that grew in the mid part of the last 
century along with the rapid expansion of car use. In the 1930s and 1940s transit 
companies such as National City Lines, Pacific City Lines and American City Lines 
acquired electric public transit companies. They then scrapped the electric vehicles 
and replaced them with buses made by General Motors. General Motors, Firestone 
Tire & Rubber, Standard Oil of California, Philips Petroleum and Mack Truck 
funded these transit companies (St Clair 1981:580; Doyle 2000:48). The companies 
recognised that it was in their long-term interest to ensure that the public 
transportation system failed and people became reliant on their cars. Initially, people 
used the buses, but because they were smelly, uncomfortable and unreliable people 
switched to private cars and the bus systems were rarely used (Sustainable Energy 
Institute 2003). Since then Californians have become dependent on their cars. They 
are part of the family and generations of songwriters have written about Californians 
and their cars.
California has tried many things to combat the air pollution caused by transportation. 
One of the more controversial is enactment of the zero emissions vehicle 
programme (ZEV). The ZEV programme, enacted 1990, required 2%, 5% and 10% 
of all vehicles sold by a large manufacturer to emit zero tailpipe emissions by the
98 California is 404,815 sq km. In the European Union only France (543,965 sq km) and Sweden 
(449,790 sq km) are bigger. The UK is 244,755 sq km, and Germany is 356,840 sq km (The Times 
Atlas o f the World Comprehensive Additions (1994). London, Times Books.)
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years 1998, 2001, and 2003 respectively." The auto industry lobbied hard against this 
law and continues to claim that it is draconian, will force Californians into less safe 
vehicles, and make cars more expensive to cover the cost of the ZEVs (Doyle 
2000:376-377), while the California legislators saw it as a way to force technological 
development (Peak 2002:140). The arguments of both sides are similar to those made 
regarding AB 1493 (Pavley), the tailpipe emissions bill passed in 2003.
To move Californians out of their cars has proved extremely difficult. Greg 
Greenwood noted that while 68% of California’s emissions are transport related that 
number may be inelastic and therefore difficult to change (Greenwood 2002 Inf). 
Perhaps it would be better to focus on other areas that do not appear to be as big a 
problem, but you might be able to make larger reductions. This is especially 
important given the relative intensity of the six main greenhouse gases. To date 
California has not done this extensively, but it is beginning work in this direction.
Policies California H as Used To A ddress Climate Change
Given that California’s legislators and civil servants have taken air pollution seriously 
for so many years, it cannot be surprising that they have addressed climate change 
with the same tenacity. A population that supports action on environmental issues, 
and businesses that want to be seen as proactive contribute to the belief that 
California is and should remain a leader both nationally and internationally on climate 
change. Many of the policies California has developed over the years to combat the
99 The 1998 and 2001 requirements were repealed in 1996. The initial legislation has been modified 
several times (Peak, M (2002). "Improper Incentives: Modifying The California Zero Emission Vehicle 
Mandate With Regards To Regulatory, Technological, And Market Forces: 1990 - 2001." Georgetown 
Public Policy Review(7): 137.)
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scourge of poor air quality have the secondary benefit of controlling greenhouse gas 
emissions. As these policies were not originally conceived to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions I have not studied why they were developed. I have focused instead on the 
four policies that were specifically devised to combat climate change.
A B 4 4 2 0 100 - St u d y  o f  P o t e n t i a l  R a m if ic a t io n s  o f  C l im a t e  
C h a n g e  o n  Ca l i f o r n ia ’s E c o n o m y
California’s first specific climate change bill was introduced in 1988 at the same time 
as other nations were starting to get to grips with the problems of climate change 
themselves. Senator Byron Sher101 introduced the bill as a result of a seminar held by 
Scripps University in the late 1980s (Sher 2002 Ini). Most people in the state were not 
interested in climate change, but Sher recognised the significant effect it could have 
on the Californian economy (Sher 2002 Ini).
California was the first state in the nation to study the potential impacts of climate 
change on the state and develop strategies to respond in all sectors (California 
Climate Action Registry 2003:7). AB4420 directed the California Energy 
Commission102 to study the potential impacts of global warming trends on the state's 
energy supply and demand, economy, environment, agriculture, and water supplies 
and to develop policies for reducing these impacts. With the assistance of other
100 In California legislation is regularly referred to by its bill number because bills often makes changes 
in different codes and therefore it is impossible to use a single code reference to identify a piece o f  
legislation.
101 Senator Sher has long been an advocate o f addressing climate change. Senator Sher has introduced 
all o f California’s climate change legislation with the exception o f the most recent bill. The Senator is 
due to retire at the end o f this term, as a result o f  term limits, and there must be a question as to who 
will lead California in addressing climate change in the future.
102 The Energy Commission was chosen as the lead agency because it was the only one that 
volunteered and the governor’s office was not interested. They were also ideally suited to data 
collection, which was primarily what this bill required Lipper, K (2002). Interview. California Senate.
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concerned state agencies103, the Energy Commission submitted its final report, 1991 
Global Climate Change: Potential Impacts and Polity Recommendations, to the governor and 
legislature in November 1991. Other Californian agencies, federal agencies, other 
states, businesses, trade organisations, environmental interests groups, and the 
research community reviewed and commented on this report before it was submitted 
(California Energy Commission 1998:4). This report was an early example of 
Californian government agencies working together to address climate change. This 
has continued up to the present and is one of the strengths of California’s climate 
change programme.
Between 1988 and 2000 there was no direct climate-change-related legislation. 
However, state agencies continued to work on the issue and clean air and energy 
efficiency laws were passed. These had the secondary benefit of addressing emissions 
of greenhouse gases. These include the Zero Emission Vehicle legislation that 
became law in 1990 and originally mandated that manufactures sell specified quotas 
of zero emissions vehicles beginning with 2% in 1998. This has subsequently been 
amended.104
103 The agencies that worked with the Energy Commission were the California Air Resources Board 
(CARB), Department o f  Forestry, Coastal Commission, Department o f Food and Agriculture, and 
Department o f Water Resources, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Livermore Laboratory, and 
Envirosphere and Accurex corporations.
104 For further information and updates, see Peak, M (2002). "Improper Incentives: Modifying The 
California Zero Emission Vehicle Mandate With Regards To Regulatory, Technological, And Market 
Forces: 1990 - 2001." Georgetown Public Policy Reviewf7): 137.
, California Air Resources Board. (2003b, 6 October 2003). "California's Zero Emission Vehicle 
Program." Retrieved 7 October 2003, 2003, from
http://www.arb.ca.gov/m sprog/zevprog/zevprog.htm.
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SB 1771 -  C a l i f o r n ia  C l im a t e  A c t i o n  R e g is t r y  H&S C o d e  
§42800 ET SEQ AND REQUIREMENT FOR GREENHOUSE GAS 
INVENTORY
In November 2000 Senator Sher sponsored SB 1771 (Sher) to establish the California 
Climate Action Registry (CCAR or the Registry). This was an important step in 
California’s response to climate change. The bill was introduced and passed as a 
direct result of business coming to Senator Sher with a problem and a possible 
solution. California companies came to the Senator looking to the future and 
potential federal regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. They wanted some place 
that had the official California stamp to register their emissions, but they wanted it to 
be voluntary. Most importandy, they wanted California to be the first to act so they 
could influence national policy (Sher 2002 Inf; Wittenberg 2002 Inf).
The Registry is a voluntary non-profit organisation whose objective is to help 
companies with operations in California to establish baseline emissions against which 
any future greenhouse gas emissions reductions can be applied. The Registry will 
require the reporting of only C 0 2 emissions for the first three years of participation, 
although participants are encouraged to report the remaining five GHGs covered in 
the Kyoto protocol (CH4, N 20 ,  HFCs, PFCs, and SF6). The reporting of all six gases 
is required after three years of Registry participation (California Climate Action 
Registry 2000a). Initially participants only have to report emissions from within 
California. But they are encouraged to report emissions nationwide as “those 
participants with emissions in other states that report California emissions only may 
not be able to receive equal consideration for their emissions records in future 
national or international regulatory regimes relating to greenhouse gas emissions”
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(California Climate Action Registry 2000b). All of the information registered with the 
Registry is publicly available (California Climate Action Registry 2000d).
The purpose of the CCAR is to explore non-regulatory ways business could be 
encouraged to voluntarily monitor and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It is based 
on the notion that under any future regulatory scheme the participants will have high 
quality emissions which have been quantified in a transparent, certifiable and 
verifiable manner (Wittenberg 2002 Ini). The Registry is meant to be an honest 
broker of information.
The formation of the CCAR was consultative. After the governor signed the 
legislation regular meetings were held with representatives of government, NGOs 
and industry to discuss the status of the Registry, what it was going to do and how it 
was going to do it.
The CCAR also works with the State to respond to global climate change concerns. 
To do this it will:
• Track greenhouse gas emissions within the state;
• Provide the public with information about climate change; and
• Assist the state in developing policies which will aid in reducing global 
greenhouse gases emissions (California Climate Action Registry 2000c)
In October 2002 the CCAR opened its doors with 23 members (California Climate 
Action Registry 2002). It has developed protocols and software tools to help 
members easily track their greenhouse gas emissions. On 1 July 2003 it filed its report 
with the governor and the legislature, California Climate Action Registry Biennial Report to 
the Governor and Legislature, as required under section 42860 of the Health and Safety 
Code. Members were only just filing their emissions data at this time, so it is not yet
possible to estimate what proportion of state emissions the members represent 
(California Climate Action Registry 2003:4).
As a part of its formation process the CCAR learned that one possible objection by 
companies to joining is that they operate in many jurisdictions and they were 
concerned that they might be required to join other registries in other states with 
different standards. In attempt to solve this problem the CCAR is working with the 
eight north-eastern states that participate in New England States for Coordinated Air 
Use Management105 to develop a pilot multi-state registry (California Climate Action 
Registry 2003:10-11; Miura 2003).
This all bodes well for the future success of the CCAR, but more time will be needed 
to tell if it will succeed. There is some suspicion among industry that the CCAR will 
translate into mandatory regulation (Sher 2002 Ini). But Bob Stevens believes that 
companies are participating because they see that mandatory reporting of stationary 
source emissions is not far off and they want to establish a baseline early on (Stevens 
2002).
SB 1078 (2002) R e n e w a b l e  e n e r g y  o b l ig a t io n
This is another Sher-sponsored bill. In September 2002 Governor Gray Davis signed 
SB 1078 which requires California retail sellers of electricity supplies to procure at 
least 20% of their electricity from renewable energy by 2017. At the time this bill
105 These states are Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Rhode Island, and Vermont.
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became law California got approximately 10%106 of its energy from renewable 
sources. According to Kip Lipper the goal of 20% was chosen because it was “a nice 
round number” (Lipper 2002 Ini). He thinks this is a relatively modest target, but 
admits it was somewhat arbitrary (Lipper 2002 Ini). It was the highest number 
discussed during the planning and negotiations of the bill (Stevens 2002). The 
governor and his office worked very hard for this bill; they were very worried about 
the possibility of a new energy crisis (Sher 2002 Ini).
This bill was hard to get through the legislature because the original legislation 
applied to all power generators. The local municipal utility districts were worried 
about having the Public Utility Commission (PUC) involved in their affairs. The 
PUC will monitor compliance with this requirement, and the local municipal utility 
districts who are not currently regulated by the PUC saw this bill as a slippery slope 
that may eventually lead to their regulation by the PUC (Sher 2002 Ini). The 
exemption of the local municipal utility districts was an important political 
compromise.
This bill also authorises carbon sequestration in forestry. This is an economic benefit 
to the big logging companies that own huge swaths of Northern California. It is also 
considered “critical to making serious inroads into climate change” (Stevens 2002); 
and while most people think that renewable power is more expensive than natural 
gas, that was “clearly not the case during 2001” (Lipper 2002 Ini). Unlike in the UK 
where one of the objections to renewable energy is the cost of connecting it to the 
grid, that was never given as a reason to oppose this bill. It is estimated that this bill
106 This includes electricity generated from hydropower.
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will lead to up to US$ 11 billion in economic development in the form of jobs and in 
state spending.
Bob Stevens believes there were three reasons for the success of this bill. First, 
AB1493 (Pavley) became law just before the bill was passed. Second, the PPIC 2002 
environment survey came out just after the AB1493 (Pavley) was signed and found 
that 81% of Californians support legislative action on climate change. Third, it was 
an election year and Governor Davis and the legislature wanted to appear active on 
the issue of climate change (Stevens 2002). This bill also fit a typical California 
pattern: “There is an assumption that we put out an aggressive goal with a reasonable 
timeframe to achieve it and the technology will develop to meet those goals” 
(Stevens 2002). This may be the case. Southern California Edison has already 
exceeded the 20% requirement, 14 years early (SolarAccess.com 2003; Southern 
California Edison 2003)
AB1493 -  P a v l e y  B il l  -  C 0 2 D e c l a r e d  a  P o l l u t a n t
In the fall of 2000 nothing was happening in Washington DC on climate change. The 
US was in the middle of a presidential election and climate change was not high on 
the domestic agenda. The Bluewater Network, a small NGO in San Francisco, 
recognised this and decided to focus their legislative efforts on California. Research 
revealed that C 0 2 from transportation was California’s largest source of greenhouse 
gas emissions. This is where they chose to focus.
California, with its special exemption under the Clean Air Act, its high C 0 2 emissions 
and environmentally aware public presented an ideal situation to get C 0 2 declared a
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pollutant. The Bluewater Network proposed the idea to every leading legislator in 
California and was turned down because the idea was allegedly ahead of its time 
(Lynch 2002 Ini). Eventually they asked Assemblywoman Fran Pavley, a freshman 
legislator, and she agreed to sponsor the legislation. The specific justification for this 
legislation was that climate change was one of the most pressing, environmental 
problems the world faces today and, as transportation was one the major 
contributors to California’s greenhouse gas emissions, something had to be done 
about it.
If it had not been for the Bluewater Network’s decision to focus on California and 
then do all the lobbying and leg work, this bill would not have come through the 
legislature and been signed into law (Lynch 2002 Ini). At the outset, no other NGO 
would touch the bill. They thought it was too far ahead and it was not the right time 
to bring it forward (Lynch 2002 Ini). Success in the Assembly Transport Committee 
brought other NGOs on board (Lynch 2002 Ini). There was very little opposition to 
this bill in the assembly because most of the opposition did not believe it would 
succeed (Lynch 2002 Ini) and it was very unusual for a bill to get this far with so little 
opposition (Greenwood 2002 Ini). In working on this bill Eliza Lynch found that 
there was a lot media interest, but not a lot of understanding of the issues raised 
(Lynch 2002 Ini).
Late in the day the auto industry began lobbying against the bill by calling it a 
“driving tax” to try and rally public opposition to the bill (Reuters News Service 
2002b). It backfired. The auto industry has a long history of political activism in 
California and its opposition to this bill helped the bill to develop its own 
momentum in Sacramento. The auto industry has opposed many pieces of legislation
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in California over the last 25 years and every time it has developed a very strong 
political response (Stevens 2002).
AB l493(Pavley)107 instructed the California Air Resources Board to adopt 
regulations that would achieve the maximum feasible, cost-effective, and 
technologically achievable reductions of greenhouse gas pollution emitted by new 
passenger vehicles. These words provide both a lot of wiggle room and the 
appearance of authority (Greenwood 2002 Ini). It would be possible for CARB to do 
very litde. No one is saying this is going to happen. Throughout my interviews, there 
was high praise for the people working at CARB (Greenwood 2002 Int; Lynch 2002 
Ini) so it may be that this vague language was left in place to get the bill through the 
legislature knowing that the institutions will do a good job sorting it out (Greenwood 
2002 Ini).
When Governor Davis signed this bill he proclaimed, “The technology is available. 
It's affordable. And it's widely utilized in other countries. We're merely asking 
business to do what business does best: innovate, compete, find solutions to 
problems and do it in a way that strengthens the economy” (Davis 2002). Bob 
Stevens of Cal EPA sees this bill as a “baby step”, but it formally established climate 
change as an important issue for the state (Stevens 2002). It is not comprehensive: it 
only makes a stab at the problem and it is unclear whether the state will actually see 
any greenhouse gas emissions reductions from this bill (Greenwood 2002 Ini). 
However, it may have made climate change more real for people and may lead to a
107 This bill was originally entitled AB1058.
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bill which will address greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources, which 
account for 45% of California’s emissions (Stevens 2002).
Conclusion
“Whatever starts in California unfortunately has a tendency to spread” (Carter 1977). 
California was the first state in the nation to develop government-sponsored 
initiatives to study potential climate impacts and policy responses (Greenbiz.com 
2003). California’s economy is larger than many nations. Its gross state product 
would rank it fifth in the world and accounts for 13.4% of US national GDP; its 
transport sector represents 1% of global C 0 2 emissions. These facts make it 
important to pay attention to the climate change policy decisions California makes.
California long ago passed the discussion phase of whether to do something about 
climate change. The debate has now moved on to what is to be done and what the 
costs will be. California has a conscious strategy to act and influence national climate 
change policy (Lipper 2002 Ini). Even Washington knows “Dealing with global 
warming is too important to leave solely to Washington” (Jeffords 2002). And as 
former California Governor Gray Davis said in September 2003 “if Washington DC 
will not lead, then the West Coast (sic) of the United States will lead on global 
warming” (Marquez 2003). California and its citizens have been and always want to 
be leaders. It has been the centre of high tech booms, the defence industry and 
aerospace manufacturing. It has also been ahead of the curve on clean air legislation. 
General Motors even admits “California is the center (sic) of the environmental 
regulatory universe” (Hakim 2002). The Pavley bill was just such an example and 
General Motors knew it. Californian legislators said if the federal government is not
going to address the problem of C 0 2 emissions and the resulting greenhouse gas 
emissions then they would.
California’s first action on climate change in 1988 through to its 2002 decision to 
declare C 0 2 a pollutant have always been cutting edge, maybe even proactive. The 
people of the state expect that and more. As well they should, since California has 
the second highest level of C 0 2 emissions in the United States, 97.6 million metric 
tons (Martin 2002). Californians have a history of willingness to look at new ideas 
and to experiment with different ways to try to solve old problems.
They are not sure what the next policy initiative will be. There is litigation with the 
federal government over the regulation of C 0 2 as a pollutant which California filed 
as a pre-emptive strike to stop the Federal Environmental Protection Agency from 
blocking California’s attempt to regulate C 0 2 emissions (Planet Ark 2003). 
Legislators in California would like to look at stationary source emissions — reduction 
of particulate matter air pollution would have greenhouse gas benefits (Lipper 2002 
Inf). It was originally thought that it might happen in 2003 but the gubernatorial recall 
election put a hold on much legislative activity (Lipper 2002 Inf).
People are open to the idea of emissions trading in California, but they are worried 
about how it will work (Lipper 2002 Inf). Eliza Lynch of the Bluewater Nework 
believes emissions trading is on the table in California (Lynch 2002 Inf). But Greg 
Greenwood does not think emissions trading will happen in California because 
people are worried about “an Enron in carbon” (Greenwood 2002 Inf). Nevertheless, 
he is interested to know more about the EU scheme, the rules for participating, and 
whether California might be able to participate. The California Climate Action
Registry seems ideally suited to participate in or form the basis of an emissions 
trading regime, but its executive directive Diane Wittenberg claims this in not on the 
cards, believing the California emissions market is too small to provide a liquid 
market (Wittenberg 2002 Ini).
There will probably never be a state climate change programme - at least not as one 
would be known in Europe, but there may be a sustainability programme. In the late 
1970s and early 1980s under Governor Jerry Brown108 legislation required the state to 
prepare Environmental Management Programmes. For some reason, these 
programmes stopped being produced, but the statute that requires them is still on the 
books and there is no reason why they can’t be produced again. Bob Stevens of Cal 
EPA is trying to build momentum for a state sustainability programme that would be 
a mix of legislative regulation and administrative action. It would be modelled on the 
programmes of Canada, Sweden, New Zealand and Holland (Stevens 2002).
The legislators and the civil servants of the executive branch generally work well 
together. They are used to working cross-departmentally. They have done this since 
California first began studying climate change in 1988. Most state agencies have at 
least one person who has climate change as an area of responsibility, while many 
have more than one. The Joint Agency Task Force on Climate Change has been 
successful in getting different agencies to work together on mutually beneficial 
climate change policies, though Greg Greenwood, the chairman of the task force, 
believes this is down to the individuals on the task force and not the secretary of
108 Jerry Brown is currently mayor o f Oakland, California’s 8th largest city (California Department o f  
Finance (2003). City/ Country Population. Sacramento, California Department o f Finance: 7.)
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state responsible as there has been very little “buy-in” at that level (Greenwood 2002 
Inf).
The retirement of Byron Sher from the California Senate is going to leave a large 
legislative gap in the climate change policy area. But given the strong history that 
California has in leading the nation on clean air and climate change policies it seems 
likely that someone will step in to the breach. People in California believe that despite 
everything they have done in the area of climate change policy in the last few years it 
is still an area where they can do better (Lipper 2002 Inf; Sher 2002 Inf; Stevens 
2002).
It is too early to tell whether California’s regulatory efforts to combat climate change 
will have the desired results, but that is true of all legislative activity around the 
world. California legislators like many others have taken action because they believe 
in the precautionary principle. Climate change is not a short-term problem and short­
term answers will not solve it. Whether it is a registry for companies’ greenhouse gas 
emissions or mandatory maximum tailpipe C 0 2 emissions there will be benefits for 
the state in protecting the environment and human health. If they can lead the US or 
the world in either of these areas, Californians will see themselves as successful.
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Chapter 8 - Conclusion
In concluding this thesis it is necessary to restate some basic propositions that 
underpin it. Although the question of law and legal policy are crucial to the 
formulation of climate change policy, a straightforward dogmatic approach would 
not have captured the intense richness of the climate change field. In order to 
overcome the limitations of the dogmatic approach, a socio-legal study was adopted. 
This type of analysis was appropriate because the development of policy and the 
resultant laws cannot be fully understood unless they are placed in context of the 
society in which they were created. The research therefore has been an analysis of 
the cultural, political and legal issues in the formation of climate change policy, and 
its use in the development of financial instruments, in the United States of America 
and the European Union with specific case studies of California and the United 
Kingdom.
The field of climate change policy is constantly evolving as our understanding of the 
science improves and members of society change their views on how best to respond 
to the challenges presented by the new scientific findings. Because of this, research 
on climate change policy is not suited to legal analysis alone. Legal analysis would 
provide only a partial picture of the policies developed. It is an examination of the 
context in which the policies were created that will allow for a more complete 
understanding of how the field of climate change policy is evolving.
Climate change policy emerges from a struggle among many groups attempting to 
impose their perceptions and interpretations of the issues on the decision makers. 
From this perspective the concept of the field as developed by Bourdieu offers a
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context that allows for the interaction between interest groups to be explained. For 
Bourdieu the field is the site where relations of power are contested.
In this conclusion I will employ Bourdieu’s concept of a field to make clear the 
importance of the interaction between the various members of the field o f climate 
change politics, outline the members of the field, recap on how the science and the 
international politics constrain and define the interactions of the members of the 
field and finally review the results of this research from the subject jurisdictions. 
California and the United Kingdom were chosen as the basis for this research 
because both jurisdictions have a long history of tackling climate change and carbon 
dioxide emissions; the members of the field within these jurisdictions view the 
jurisdictions as leaders in addressing climate change but they have chosen different 
policy instruments to meet their climate change objectives. It is these similarities and 
differences that make these jurisdictions an interesting basis for a study on the 
differential impacts of culture on the selection of policy instruments.
Both California and the United Kingdom took action to understand the potential 
ramifications of climate change on their economies and their geographies long before 
their parent jurisdictions did. In the case of the United States significant scientific 
research has been carried out into the potential affects of climate change on all of the 
different parts of the country, but at the Federal level no action has yet been taken to 
mandate the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions; no single member of the field 
has come to dominate thus resulting in a stalemate in policy formation. In the 
European Union, the structure of the entity limits what it can do and the power 
struggle between members of the field means there has been no action in crucial 
areas such as energy and tax.
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I have used the theories of Pierre Bourdieu to provide a context that allows for the 
interaction between interest groups to be explained. Bourdieu places these interest 
groups in a field which consists of a set of objective, historical relations between 
positions anchored in certain forms of power (capital) (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992). In the area of climate change policy the field consists of governments, 
scientists, accountants, lawyers, businesses, NGOs, the press, anyone who has any 
interest in how this policy develops or is affected by its development. All of these 
groups are struggling over power and who is going to have it. Having this power 
gives them influence over the direction policy development takes. As Bourdieu notes:
Thinking in terms of “field” also allows one to recapture the global 
logic of the new world legal order without resorting to generalities as 
vague and vast as their object. Instead one can observe and analyse 
the more concrete strategies by which particular agents, themselves 
defined by their dispositions (tied to a social position and a trajectory 
in a national field), their properties, and their interests, construct an 
international legal field while at the same time transforming their 
national legal fields (Bourdieu in Dezalay, Garth et al 1996:vii).
Governments and the civil servants and politicians who work in them must be a 
dominant member of the field because they have to write the laws and the policies. 
The power relationship between other members of the field changes over time. In 
the jurisdictions studied in this research, business groups and their advisors are 
emerging as the other dominant member of the field. Having made the decision to 
address the challenges of climate change, governments have recognised it is easier to 
make significant reductions with the business community than with individual voters. 
Business groups, their advisors, and their lobbying organisations have shaped policies 
in both California and the United Kingdom. In California, the Climate Action 
Registry was created at the request of business and the tailpipe emissions bill was
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supported by many different businesses outside the auto industry. In the United 
Kingdom the businesses covered by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme are lobbying 
hard for high allocations of carbon, and the Carbon Trust was created to work with 
the business community to reduce its emissions and develop new technologies.
The press also has significant power although it doesn’t seem to recognise this. Often 
the only thing members of the business group know about climate change is what 
they read in the paper or hear from the TV and radio press. In the belief that they 
must provide both sides of a story the press regularly give the climate sceptics equal 
airtime with the mainstream scientific community. This provides the impression that 
the scientific community is divided about climate change, which it is not. If other 
members of the field believe the scientific community is divided that may affect what 
they think about climate change and what policies they will work to have developed.
I t is difficult to say if there are any members of the field for whom power is waning. 
Climate change policy development is so new that there have not been significant 
changes in policies. Even as governments change, there has been an agreement that 
we need to address the problems the scientists are identifying. If there is one group 
that may be losing power it is the NGO community. Early in the development of 
policy it often called for the implementation of “command and control” legislation. 
This type of policy has fallen out of favour with governments as they tried to give 
business the opportunity to determine for themselves the best way to reduce 
emissions. It would be incorrect to say that governments do not listen to the NGO 
community but their influence is significantly less than those members of the field in 
the business community.
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A review of the current state of scientific research and international negotiations was 
necessary to set the context for the emergence of climate change policy in the 
jurisdictions studied. This provides the background from which the various members 
of the field have based their views on how policies should be developed. Climate 
change as a scientific discipline is not new; it has been studied for more than 150 
years. Initially it did not generate much interest in the scientific community or 
beyond. However, slowly, over the last 50 or 60 years scientist began more in-depth 
studies of the earth’s climate and what they found worried them. Roger Revelle and 
Hans Suess concluded in 1957 that we are conducting “an uncontrolled experiment 
from which there is no going back” (Bernarde 1992:2). And 20 years later in 1977 
four scientists from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the United States 
concluded “[i]f the severe economic and political repercussions that are likely on a 
world scale are to be avoided, a technological commitment must be made in the next 
few years and a world strategy arrived at with enlightment and wisdom. Though 
humanity may not be able to foresee the consequences of the ‘great experiment’ 
clearly enough to control them, we cannot afford not to try!” (Bernarde 1992:3-4). 
These individuals’ exhortations were given litde heed outside the scientific 
community for many years. Perhaps more significandy there was litde or no scientific 
disagreement with them either.
It was only as the international political community began to listen to scientists in the 
1980s that the sceptics began to challenge the scientific findings on climate change. 
The sceptics argued, among other things, that in the 1970s the US National Academy 
of Sciences and the National Research Council were predicting that the climate was 
cooling and this would have potentially disastrous consequences for the economy 
therefore warming must be good for the economy (Singer 1992:400). Another
argument they made was that there was no point in doing anything about climate 
change because it would not be possible to reduced carbon emissions by the amount 
necessary to curb global warming (Lindzen 1992:6). These sceptics have now been 
largely discredited. The IPCC in its three reports has had expert reviewers from both 
sides of the divide and has examined hundreds of scientific research reports from 
around the world. The Third Assessment Report from the IPCC concluded that 
“concentrations of atmospheric greenhouse gases and their radiative forcing have 
continued to increase as a result of human activities” (IPCC 2001a:7).
The IPCC’s findings and that of the national academies of sciences from around the 
world (National Academy of Sciences 2001; Royal Society 2001) is that there is the 
potential for large scale and irreversible damage to natural human systems. This has 
led governments to take the difficult step of negotiating a series of international 
treaties to address the challenges of climate change, challenges that are arguably more 
difficult than the international community has faced before.
The international community set itself the objective to reach agreement on a subject 
which went beyond the need to eliminate a few man-made gases from production. 
The gases covered under the UNFCCC are produced naturally or are byproducts 
from many industries which are central to economies around the world. There is no 
easy substitute for many of them as there were for the gases addressed by the 
Montreal Protocol. These challenges brought new members to the field of 
international climate change politics. Among these new members was the press and 
the press brought a new level of complication: the need to answer to domestic 
political constituencies. Increased domestic political pressure has made policy 
development more difficult.
In the US in particular the press was very sceptical of the claim that man was 
contributing to the changing climate and that urgent action was needed. There was 
the belief that if climate change was regulated at the international level there would 
be significant damage to the US economy. The US Senate passed the Byrd-Hagel 
resolution which many people believe impeded the US’s ability to negotiate in Kyoto. 
Senator Byrd has said on the record that he did not intend the Byrd-Hagel resolution 
to impede the negotiations in Kyoto, only to guide them (US Congressional Record 
2003b:S13585).
The press in Europe was much less sceptical. Many organisations believed from very 
early on that governments had an obligation to do something about climate change. 
The press support has given the European governments support to do something, 
but the question was what should they do and at what level of government should 
they do it? The European Union’s structure, especially as it applies to climate change, 
has made progress in addressing the challenges presented by climate change very 
difficult at both the international level and the domestic level (Oberthiir and Ott 
1999:86-87).
When policies are being developed and implemented there are always winners and 
losers, those that will benefit from the policy and those that will not. With the EU 
emissions trading system the six industrial sectors covered by the directive initially 
appeared not to benefit, thus those members of the field lobbied the Member States 
and the Commission for less stringent targets or increased allocations of free carbon. 
Once the system is up and running it may well prove in the first phase of the EU 
ETS that individual companies benefit because they overestimated their emissions or
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it was easier to make reductions than they had claimed. Another example of where 
industry groups lobbied against the implementation of a specific policy but individual 
companies may well benefit from the policy’s implementation is California’s tailpipe 
emissions bill. The US automakers claimed that the consumers did not want lower 
emission vehicles but the better-than-expected sales of Toyota and Honda’s hybrid 
vehicles is an indicator that this is not true.
Policymakers face the difficult task of trying to sort through the information 
provided to them by the various members of the field that will be affected by the 
policy proposal. They then must also take into account how members of the field 
who they may not have heard from may be affected. They need to do this because 
policies do not exist in a vacuum. Policymakers do not always know how a policy will 
play out in the real world.
The United Kingdom and California provide clear examples of this power struggle. 
How power is shared will either hamper or accelerate policy development. In the 
UK, Treasury appears to have little interest in the development of climate change 
policy, but held up the entire climate change programme with the Climate Change 
Levy. In contrast in California the legislature, in its attempt to understand how 
climate change may affect the state, made a clear attempt to include all of the 
potentially relevant members of the field early in the policy development process so 
no member could hold up the entire process with a specific policy proposal.
In the European Union this power struggle can be seen in the development of a 
number of climate change policies. The structure of makes the European Union 
makes it a government of limited power. The Commission lacks authority over
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energy and tax policy, two subjects that would normally be central to addressing the 
challenges presented by climate change. This means that the Commission as a 
member of the field is in constant struggle with other members of the field to 
develop policy. There are negotiations between the different DGs whose 
constituencies’ will be affected by different policy proposals and between the 
Commission and Member States that may or may not want to see specific European 
policies developed.
The Commission worked for years to introduce a carbon tax. Each new President of 
the European Union said they would make it a priority (European Commission 1997; 
Center for a Sustainable Economy 2002; Jucca 2002; Jucca 2003). It was never going 
to be easy (Collier 1997:55), there was always opposition from someone: the UK 
argued against it on the basis of subsidiarity (Dahl 2000:217); Spain wanted to see 
liberalisation of all EU energy markets first (Center for a Sustainable Economy 
2001); and then the French and the Italians objected because they wanted special 
rules for their road hauliers (Planet Ark 2002b). Now with the Community having 
expanded to 25 members the unanimous agreement that would be required to 
implement a carbon tax would be almost impossible to achieve.
Since the Commission has had no success in what is commonly agreed would be 
easiest areas to reduce carbon emissions, regulating energy production or imposing a 
carbon tax, it has introduced policies that have as their objective to change behaviour 
in other ways: emissions trading and renewable energy programmes. The emissions 
trading scheme will begin operation in January 2005. Negotiating the emissions 
trading scheme was quick by European standards. Member States and the 
Commission agreed in 1999 that the best way to meet their Kyoto commitments was
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an emissions trading scheme and by 2001 the directive was issued. Member States are 
currendy working out their National Allocation Plans. The risk, and it is a risk with 
many European policies, is that if a Member State allocates too many credits or does 
not enforce the emissions limits, the process of punishing it may take years to work 
its way through the European court system. This will undermine the credibility of the 
system and reduce the confidence the participants have in the staying power of the 
scheme.
The EU ETS is a good example of how the different members of the field struggle 
for power and influence over the development of a policy instrument. This policy 
was designed to reduce industrial emissions by giving the covered sectors a cap on 
the level of carbon dioxide they could emit. If they exceeded this cap then they had 
to buy more carbon, if they managed to reduce their emissions then they could sell 
the excess. Members of the field lobbied at the European and Member State level to 
effect who would be covered, what their allocation would be, how the policy would 
be enforced, what the penalties would be: anything they could think of that might 
someday be important when the emissions trading scheme was up and running. 
When policymakers finalised the proposal they had to think about everybody that 
might use this financial instrument and therefore affect the outcome they wanted 
from the instrument: a reduction in carbon emissions at a reasonable price.
Policymakers knew financial institutions would trade these certificates, but they may 
not have anticipated the effect these members of the field would have on the market. 
Financial institutions are not end users of the carbon; they are only buying and selling 
it to make money and they are not just dealing in EU carbon, but carbon from 
around the world and other energy related commodities. So a hedge fund which
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trades commodities such as oil and gas or oil and gas public equities may well trade 
carbon because of the effect they think carbon will have on the value of those 
commodities or those companies. These are members of the climate change policy 
field that the Commission and the Member States probably had little or no contact 
with. Their behavior will be different than the industrial players whom the policy was 
designed to regulate, demonstrating to regulators and policymakers that markets are 
often beyond their control and may behave in ways they could not predict.
The power struggles experienced at the Community level don’t stay there. In order to 
take a position to the European negotiations the United Kingdom needs to develop 
is state level policy. Power struggles can be seen here as well. An early mover on 
climate change, the UK has more experience than many in creating policies designed 
to address climate change. In its most recent climate change programme, developing 
policy should have been very straightforward. DEFRA is the lead agency; it is its job 
to coordinate other departments. But in the UK when Treasury enters the fray all the 
other rules go out the door. Treasury’s decision to institute the Climate Change Levy 
created huge problems for the rest of the programme (Edwards 2001 Inf) and 
resulted in its delay in implementation for more than four months (Edwards 2001 
Inf). People working in Treasury think they were open and worked with DEFRA in 
the formation of the Climate Change Levy and how it would fit within the new 
climate change programme (Field 2001 Inf), but DEFRA did not see it that way and 
neither do the outside observers (Harriban 1999; Cameron 2001 Inf; Edwards 2001 
Inf). This struggle between the various departments has impeded the development of 
climate change policy in the UK. Even if one party says there is no struggle, it 
doesn’t matter because if one member of the field believes their progress is impeded 
by the other, that tension is what forms the legal culture of the jurisdiction.
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The relationship between the US federal government and the states has tension 
similar to that between the Commission and the Member States, only it is more 
explicit as it is set out in the US Constitution. The Federal Government is a 
government of limited power; it can only formulate policy in areas in which the 
Constitution has specifically granted it power to do so. The history of policy making 
in the United States has shown that to try and impose policy from the top will often 
meet with resistance from the states. Climate change policy had this problem. There 
was no impetus at the grassroots level to address climate change; it was easy to point 
out the reasons not to do anything instead of finding reasons to do something.
It is for this reason that George W Bush’s refusal to submit the Kyoto Protocol to 
the Senate for ratification may have done more for US climate change policy than 
any other action since the federal government started funding research in the 1950s. 
By removing the US from the international negotiations as they were then taking 
place he forced the members of the field that wanted to see something done to 
actually do something.
In the months following the announcement, there was increased activity at the state 
level and in Congress. While this means there won’t be a US federal climate change 
policy immediately it means there probably will be one in the coming years and in the 
meantime the states will develop, implement and enforce their own climate change 
policies. These policies will form the basis for a future federal policy, giving the US a 
testing ground of many different variants on policies.
California is the leader in developing these potential policy options. As a government, 
the California legislature has been examining how to solve the challenges of clean air 
and emissions for 50 years. This experience has given the state legislators and the 
civil servants a strong base from which to build various policies. When the legislature 
makes a decision to address an issue and it assigns that responsibility to an agency; 
that agency knows its role in the development of policy and other agencies know 
how to work with it. This understanding of the relationship between the legislature 
and the government departments means there have been limited power struggles 
between the those members of the field; they can then work with the members of the 
field outside government to develop a policy that meets the needs of all of the 
participants while fulfilling the goal of the legislature.
This is how the California Climate Action Registry was formed. Business had an idea, 
the legislature acted and then the various members of the field worked together to 
develop an organisation that met the needs of all of the participants. During the 
formation process there was significant interplay between the various members of 
the field to ensure any registration and verification of emissions was rigorous and 
meaningful. All members of the field would need to accept the CCAR and see it as 
an independent broker of information.
From this research we know there are always power struggles in the development of 
policy instruments. The difficulty with climate change policy is understanding who 
the groups with the most power are. There are more members of the field than in 
most policy areas. The current vogue for economic instruments makes it difficult to 
predict whom all of the potential members of the field will be and how their actions
will affect the policies once they are outside the political vacuum in which they were 
created.
This research also demonstrates the importance of future research into how other 
jurisdictions develop policy. If we understand the socio-legal demands of the 
members of the fields at every level of government it will aid us in the understanding 
of the opportunities and difficulties they will face in attempting to introduce further 
climate-change-related policies.
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The Structure of Policy M aking in the European Union
As a political, economic and legal community Europe is young; it is only 50 years old. 
For an entirely new institution this is not much time to work out the kinks in internal 
operating issues, much less international issues. No one would have expected the 
United States to be a world power when it was 50 years old, and that was in a much 
less complicated world. The Member States all had different reasons for joining and 
they have many different priorities for the various institutions which make up the 
EU. With a Presidency that rotates among Member States every six months 
consistent leadership and direction is left to the commission.
The commission is led by a president and 20 commissioners. They start most 
legislation within the EU and provide leadership in the international arena. Climate 
change being an area of mixed competence within the EU means that both the 
commission and the Member States have authority over issues related to climate 
change. Thus at international negotiations representatives of the Member States and 
the commission are in attendance. It also means that it is very difficult for the EU to 
change its negotiating position, as it would have been agreed between all 16 (and 
soon to be 26) participants in advance of the negotiations.
The individuals who work for the commission are an informed elite in their subject 
areas. Like the US civil service they can stay in the same subject area for their entire 
career; but unlike the US the European bureaucracy can initiate legislation and take 
the lead in policy formation. This has been extremely helpful to the development of 
the EU’s climate change policy.
At the Kyoto negotiations the European Union got an agreement that allowed the 
EU to take on reductions and then spread those reductions across the Community. 
This way some Member States took on large reductions while other less developed 
Member States were allowed to increase emissions.
The EU’s Burden Sharing Agreement is authorised under Article 4 of the Kyoto 
Protocol. This article allows parties included in Annex I to reach an agreement to 
fulfil their commitments jointly (Kyoto Protocol 1998:Art 4 Para 1). If the EU as a 
whole fails to meet its target, then each member state is responsible for meeting its 
own individual target as agreed within the Burden Sharing Agreement (Kyoto 
Protocol 1998: Art 4 Para 5).
The EU agreed that the contributions of each member state would amount to the 
overall 8% reduction commitment at the meeting of Environment Ministers of 15-16 
June 1998. The Council Conclusions of 16 June 1998 set out each country’s 
commitment and is referred to as the “Burden Sharing Agreement”.
H istory of E U  Emissions and Trends fo r  the Future
In December 2002 the European Environment Agency (EEA) issued a report on 
greenhouse gas emissions trends and projections on Europe (European Environment 
Agency 2002). This report was prepared for the commission as required under the 
Monitoring Mechanism Directive and provides an[d] annual evaluation of progress 
towards meeting the Communities Kyoto commitments (European Environment 
Agency 2002:5). As is required by the Monitoring Mechanism the report is based on 
Member State submissions.
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The EEA’s findings were mixed. Emissions between 1990 and 2000 were down by 
3.5% (European Environment Agency 2002:7). In 2000 six Member States were on 
track to meet their burden sharing targets: Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom (European Environment Agency 2002:8).
Unfortunately, Member State projections for emissions in 2010 with existing policies 
and measures are not expected to deliver sufficient emissions reductions to meet the 
Kyoto commitments. If planned additional policies and measures are implemented 
the Kyoto targets would be reached with over delivery by several Member States 
(European Environment Agency 2002:9-10). The EEA has recognised that this 
cannot be counted on. Several people I interviewed noted the potential legal dispute 
over ownership of any over delivery between the EU, the Member States, and the 
companies that have cut their emissions (Cameron 2001 Ini; Carrington 2001 Ini; 
Edwards 2001 Ini).
Existing policies and measures show projected reductions of 4.7% by 2010 on 1990 
levels. Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom projected that existing policies 
and measures will be sufficient to meet their targets. Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain are all expected to exceed their 
targets with existing policies and measures (European Environment Agency 2002:11).
If there is no over delivery109 the EU will only achieve “a 0.6% greenhouse gas 
emission reduction with existing policies and measures and a 6.2% reduction with 
additional policies and measures projections. This leads to a shortfall of 7.4% and
109 This is certainly a possibility and will be dependent on solving the ownership issues related to over 
delivery.
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1.8%, respectively, in 2010, taking into account domestic policies and measures only” 
(European Environm ent Agency 2002:33).
The following graphics demonstrates the potential problems the EU faces in meeting 
its Kyoto commitments. Only three countries are at or below their Kyoto target 
leaving the EU short o f its overall target.
Relative gap (over-delivery or shortfall) betw een 'with m easures' projections and targets
for 2010 for EU-15 and Member S tates
I El -15  (no  o v e r-d e lr  ery)
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(European Environm ent Agency 2002:33)
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The Structure of Policy Making in the United Kingdom
Government structures always seem so simple on first inspection. The government 
of the United Kingdom is no different. On the surface the United Kingdom’s 
governmental structure is pretty straightforward. The government is the party or 
parties asked by the Sovereign to form a government, and this is usually the party 
with the largest number of Members of Parliament (MPs). It sets the legislative 
programme for the term of up to five years. Parliament is there to scrutinise the work 
of the government and to vote on the government’s legislative proposals. The civil 
service is loyal to the Crown and works for the government of the day providing 
impartial advice and implementing the policies of the government. But a closer
inspection, of course, reveals a more complicated picture.
The government has extraordinary powers under Britain’s unwritten constitution, 
which can be exploited. MPs of the largest party rarely vote against the government, 
and if they do criticise government policy the government often doesn’t take any 
action as a result.
The government is a very powerful group of about 100 parliamentarians who have 
become ministers, junior ministers, under secretaries, whips etc who decide the 
direction of policy. Their selection is not based on qualification, but because they 
worked hard for the party, are owed a favour, have power within the party, or will 
follow the party line. The government is primarily responsible for arranging the 
business of both the House of Commons and the House of Lords. As the initiator of 
policy, it indicates which action it wishes Parliament to take, and explains and
defends its position in public debate.
The House of Commons is traditionally regarded as the lower house, but it is the 
main parliamentary arena for the political battle. As with the House of Lords, the 
House of Commons debates new primary legislation as part of the process of making 
an Act of Parliament. The House also scrutinises the work of the government - it 
does that by various means, including questioning ministers in the Chamber and 
through the select committee system. (UK Parliament 2002)
The elected parliamentarians are increasingly marginalised. Will Hutton described 
Parliament as a place “where politicians score meaningless points off each other in 
the style of Oxford or Cambridge Union debates while the business of government is 
conducted by a flawed bureaucracy” (Hutton 1996:5). This may not be an entirely fair 
description of Parliament today, but there are no written rules on how the 
government relates to Parliament and vice-versa. When a prime minister has a large 
majority he can assume that he has a virtual mandate to carry his policies through 
irrespective of any parliamentary objections.
Meanwhile the civil service can be explained by a reference to the 1980s British 
sitcom Yes, Minister110 that focuses on the political games and clashes between 
politicians and the civil service. In one episode Jim Hacker the Minister is talking to 
his wife:
Jim Hacker: "The opposition aren’t the opposition."
Annie Hacker: "No of course not, silly of me. They are just called the 
opposition."
Jim Hacker: "They are only the opposition in exile. The Civil Service is the 
opposition in residence." (Jay and Lynn 1980).
110 Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was very impressed with the series and once 
stated: "Its closely observed portrayal o f what goes on in the corridors o f power has given me hours 
o f  pure joy".
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The civil service is very important in the United Kingdom. It dominates the 
information flow to ministers111. Ministers are not specialists in the areas they are 
responsible for; instead they are (often) MPs who have curried favour with the Prime 
Minister. The civil servants are not specialists either. They stay two to three years in 
each post before moving on. When they move they may or may not stay within the 
same policy areas. Its origins are central to the character of bureaucracies, and to 
contemporary British education and society. The “Victorian idea was that 
administrators should be chosen, not with special experience of government, but as 
intelligent, well-educated amateurs — a crystallisation of the amateur ideal which runs 
through English life” (Sampson 1962:221).
Some people believe this is the strength of the civil service because it brings a wide 
background to the table with varied experiences. It can however be a disadvantage in 
the international arena because it is often dealing with seasoned international 
negotiators who have spent many years negotiating international treaties or working 
on the specific issues related to the negotiations (Lowen 2001 Inf), while the UK 
representative may never have been involved in an international negotiation.
Despite the fact that the civil servants change jobs so frequently “ [m]ost of the time 
British government departments do not have much to do with one another. Why 
should they? The Home Office imprisons prisoners. The Department of Transport 
builds roads. The Department of Social Security pays pensions. The Department of 
Health runs the National Health Service. The Ministry of Agriculture subsidises
111 The civil service is slowly losing this domination to N G O s and “independent advisers”.
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farmers. And so on. Most departments’ business requires little contact with other 
departments” (King 1993:54). This however is not true of climate change. The 
impact of this issue reaches across government departments, so unlike California, 
where there has been cross-departmental communication and cooperation since the 
early days of climate change policy development, the UK governments have often 
worked in isolation or even in competition with each other. This may be changing 
with the move of many top climate change policy civil servants to the cabinet office 
and the increased importance of the policy innovation unit.
Increasingly the function of the United Kingdom’s government is also influenced by 
the goings-on in Brussels. EU institutions are an increasingly complex labyrinth of 
power, which the British government often criticises or blames for unpopular 
policies. Anthony Sampson argues that this suits the government because it gives it 
“a scapegoat for their own secret agreements: and in controversial areas of 
regulation, including the environment and monopolies, they can shift the burden to 
Brussels” (Sampson 1992:45).
The European Union and the United Kingdom have had a love-hate relationship 
since the formation of the EU. Winston Churchill was one of the leaders to call for 
the formation of a United States of Europe, with some reservations, following World 
War II (Monnet 1978:283; Jenkins 2001:813). But the UK did not join the European 
Union until 1973 and this is after DeGaulle blocked its entrance twice (Coxall and 
Robins 1994:109).
“The founders of Europe, including Jean Monnet, had hoped that the British would 
bring some robust democratic questioning and argument into the fray. But the British
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robustness was directed more at confronting other nations and scoring party-political 
points rather than questioning the secret agreements between ministers at the top” 
(Sampson 1992:17). This is not surprising when you consider that most other 
members of the EU are used to “written constitutions, multi-party politics, coalition 
governments and a consensual style of political decision making” (Kavanagh 
2000:81). This is completely different from the British structure, which is a single 
party government and adversarial party system (Kavanagh 2000:81). Hearl described 
the difference as the “British adversarialism versus continental consensualism” 
(Kavanagh 2000:81).
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The Structure of Policy Making in the United States of  
America
The US is the world’s largest economy, the largest emitter of greenhouse gases per 
capita, the largest emitter of greenhouse gases overall, has withdrawn from the Kyoto 
Protocol, and the federal government has no coherent long-term strategy for significant 
reduction in its greenhouse gas emissions. On the basis of these facts it might be 
reasonable to believe that there is litde hope for improvement of the climate change 
problem the world faces. Fortunately, all hope is not lost. The US federal government is 
a government of limited power. The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution provides 
that:
The Powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the 
people” (US Const.)
So to the outsider, while the federal government may appear to have a lot of 
authority it should not be regarded as the sole hope for US climate change policy. 
The various levels of government in the United States are all working on climate 
change policies, including the federal government. The federal government is one of 
the largest funders of climate-change-related research in the world. It runs a number 
of voluntary programmes with participation from a wide variety of organisations and 
energy efficiency programs for both residential and commercial markets.
The US federal government is composed of a bicameral legislative branch, an 
executive branch and a judicial branch. It was created in this manner so that each 
branch would provide a check and balance with the other two. In theory no one 
branch is more powerful than the others.
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To date the judicial branch has issued several rulings in which climate change has 
formed at least a part of the basis of the ruling {City of Los Angeles v. 'National Highway 
Traffic Safety Admin. 1990; Foundation on Economic Trends v. Watkins 1990; Foundation on 
Economic Trends v. Watkins 1992; Center For Biological Diversity v. Abraham 2002; Border 
Power Plant Working Group v. Department of Energy 2003). Most recently, California and 
twelve other states have filed suits against the EPA over the EPA’s refusal to regulate 
C 0 2 as a pollutant.
The legislative branch on the other hand has been increasing its activities over the 
past four years. In the last complete legislative session, 2000-2001, 50 climate-change- 
related bills were introduced. Included in this was the McCain/Lieberman bill, the 
Climate Stewardship Act (S 139, The Climate Stewardship Act of 2003 2003). This 
bill was the first climate change bill to reach the floor of either house of Congress 
and while it did not pass112 it did force individual Senators to take a position on the 
issue (Lee 2003). Senator McCain promised that like the issue of campaign reform he 
would be back again and again on climate change (Baltimore 2003).
Additionally, the Senate has to ratify any international treaty by a two-thirds majority 
vote (US Const.). Every bill has to be passed by both houses of Congress and the 
President has to sign it before it can become law. If any money is required under the 
bill a separate appropriations bill must go through the same process after the initial 
bill has been passed and signed into law by the president.
112 The vote was 43 to 55 against. Senator Edwards (D-NC) who did not vote, later indicated he would 
have voted in favour o f the bill (US Congressional Record (2003c). Washington DC, US Senate. 149: 
SI3651-05.) Senator Nelsom (D-NE) who did not vote would have voted nay (US Congressional 
Record (2003b). 149: S13572-01.)
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The Executive branch in the US has large scope to effect climate change policy 
without the necessity of legislative action. George W Bush’s withdrawal from the 
Kyoto Protocol demonstrates what can be accomplished without legislative 
involvement. That being said, should any policies require additional funding 
Congressional approval must be obtained. This can be difficult as no single 
committee is responsible for climate change policy.
On the executive side of the federal government there are ten departments113 and 
numerous committees, boards, and commissions that develop, comment on or 
implement climate-change-related policies. An inter-agency committee chaired by the 
Office of the President attempts to ensure it is all coordinated.
At international negotiations the US delegation is headed by the State Department 
with the Environmental Protection Agency playing only a limited role alongside the 
other departments that send representatives to the negotiations.114 The environment 
departments often head European delegations. This difference is important to 
recognise as it may go some way towards explaining the different approaches taken at 
international negotiations.
Continuing down the pile of government levels in the United States there are states, 
Native American tribal organisations, local government and regional associations that
113 Departments o f  Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Justice, State, Transportation, and 
Treasury, the Environmental Protection Agency and the US Agency for International Development.
114 Other departments that send representatives are Commerce, Transportation, Treasury, Energy, 
Interior and the Agency for International Development. The make-up o f the negotiating team is at the 
discretion o f the President and therefore this list may not be accurate for all international climate 
change negotiations.
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have responsibility for areas affected by climate change policy. So while the federal 
government is important at the international level and may some day take action that 
is binding on the states, at the moment it is essential to understand the relationship 
between the federal government and the states and to be aware of what the individual 
states are doing.
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The Structure of Policy Making in California
California was an independent republic when it was admitted to the Union. It is still 
legally a state just like any other state, but this does describe the mindset of many 
Californians. They’ll do what they want and what they think is best irrespective of 
what Washington DC wants. Washington DC is almost as far from San Francisco as 
it is from London, approximately 3000 miles. When trying to understand the 
selection of policy instruments in California these two factors are important to 
remember. California likes to see itself as a leader among states (Lipper 2002 Int). 
And people expect California to take the lead among states. Any group which 
disagrees with the policy choices California makes fights hard to stop them because 
they realise that what California does will affect national policy (Stevens 2002).
California’s legislature is bicameral, an assembly and a senate, with a governor who 
heads the executive branch and a large court system.115 This is the same as the federal 
government, but there are a couple of important differences. Preparing legislation is 
not the sole prerogative of elected representatives; individuals can get initiatives on to 
a statewide ballot (CA Const) without the support of the legislature. All it takes is the 
signatures of their fellow citizens.116 The auto manufactures considered this option
115 In October 2000 to celebrate the 150th anniversary o f California’s admission to the Union o f the 
United States o f  America the California Legislature had published a 300 page overview o f California’s 
government. This document covered everything from California’s history, constitution, form o f  
government, elections, symbols, seals and just about anything else you would want to know about how 
Californian government works. (Wilson, E D  and B S Ebbert. (2000). "Overview o f  California 
Government." Retrieved 10 October 2002, 2002, from http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/califleg.html.)
116 There are two different signature requirements for initiatives, depending on what a citizen is trying 
to do. They are: “Initiative Statute: Petitions proposing initiative statutes must be signed by registered 
voters. The number o f  signatures must be equal to at least 5% o f the total votes cast for Governor at 
the last gubernatorial election (Cal. Const., art. II, § 8(b); § 9035). The total number o f  signatures 
required for initiative statutes, which qualify for circulation before the November 2002 gubernatorial 
election, is 419,260. Initiative Constitutional Amendment: Petitions proposing initiative constitutional 
amendments must be signed by registered voters. The number o f signatures must be equal to at least
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when trying to decide how to challenge AB 1493(Pavley), but it was rejected because 
of the fear of losing in the court of public opinion (Stevens 2002). Secondly anyone 
can draft a bill, and if they can find a member of the legislature to sponsor it have it 
go through the same process as any other bill. While this may happen at the federal 
level as well, in California the draftee’s name is clearly identified on all of the material 
associated with the bill and in all of the discussions. For instance, AB 1493 (Pavley) 
was drafted and shepherded through the legislature by a small relatively unknown 
NGO called the Bluewater Network.
This does not mean that the legislature is unimportant or that the executive branch is 
uninterested in climate change. While the governor only recently jumped on the 
climate change bandwagon - and this was probably the result of trying to shore up 
core constituencies during an election year (Lipper 2002 Int; Stevens 2002) - agencies 
within the executive branch have been working on climate change issues since 1988. 
There are now sixteen agencies117 in California that are looking at how climate change 
will affect their areas of competence. For example, the Department of Water 
Resources is worried because the decrease in snow pack in the Sierras has led to a 
decrease in the amount of water available for use throughout the rest of the year. The 
Department of Forestry and Fire Protection is looking at how California forests can
8% o f  the total votes cast for Governor at the last gubernatorial election. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 8(b); § 
9035) The total number o f  signatures required for such petitions, which qualify for circulation before 
the November 2002 gubernatorial election, is 670,816” • (Jones, B. (2002). "Initiative Guide." 
Retrieved 10 October 2002, 2002, from http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/init_guide.htm.)
117 These agencies are California Energy Commission, California Department o f Food and 
Agriculture, California Department o f Forestry and Fire Protection, California Environmental 
Protection, California Integrated Waste Management Board, California Department o f Transportation, 
California Technology, Trade and Commerce Agency, Department o f Fish and Game, Department o f  
General Services, Department o f Toxic Substances Control, Department o f  Water Resources, 
Governor’s Office o f  Planning and Research, State and Consumer Services Agency, State Water 
Resources Control Board, and the University o f  California.
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be used for sequestration activities and how to prevent an increase in the number of 
large forest fires caused by increasing summer temperatures.118
There is a Joint Agency Climate Team, headed by a representative of the Secretary of 
State for Resources, which works to co-ordinate the efforts of all of these 
government departments. And while there are occasional turf battles the people I 
spoke with felt that the agencies worked well together and there was little duplication 
of effort (Greenwood 2002 Int; Lipper 2002 Int; Lynch 2002 Int; Stevens 2002). 
These agencies can also propose legislation (California Legislature 2002), so if they 
feel they need for extra authority or a clarification of their authority they can 
propose legislation. Greg Greenwood, science advisor to the Secretary of State for 
Resources and chair of the Joint Agency Task Force, believes that the most 
important thing is to get the statutes on the books because the agencies are so good 
that they will sort out a solution (Greenwood 2002 Int).
The California court system to date has not been active in the area of climate change 
policy but it has issued numerous decisions on air pollution issues. The California 
court system is large, comprising trial courts divided by county, appellate courts 
divided by region, and the Supreme Court. All judges are elected by the voters in the 
county or region in which they sit. The Supreme Court judges are elected in a 
statewide ballot. The political reality is that once a judge is in office he or she is rarely 
unseated in an election.
118 For a discussion o f  how California agencies are addressing the climate change issue see California 
Energy Commission. (2002a). "California State Climate Change Activities." Retrieved 14 October 
2002, 2002, from http://www.energy.ca.gov/global_climate_change/state_roles.html.
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California Greenhouse Gas Emissions
California’s emissions breakdown is not significantly different from the rest of the 
US between gases. The big difference comes in the sources of the emissions. For 
example, in California 59% of C 0 2 emissions come from transportation while 
nationally only 32% of C 0 2 emissions are from transportation. Electricity generation 
accounts for 39% of carbon-related emissions nationally, but only 16% of emissions 
in California. These differences are one reason California’s policy choices may be 
different from those made at the national level.
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Change Capital
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119 Only jobs that are relevant to this research are listed in this table.
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